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The judiciary frequently mandates costly institutional reforms to correct state
and local governmental constitutional violations. This Article examines the
unprecedented equitable power exercised by afederal district court in its oversight of
a school desegregation remedial plan in Kansas City, Missouri at a cost exceeding
$1.8 billion. The district court ordered taxation to ensure funding for the remedial
plan and directed local authorities to disregard state law limitations that barred such
taxation.
Dean Griffith criticizes the judiciary's disregard of remedial plan costs in
devising institutional reforms. She proposes that courts apply a balancing test in the
remedial process-weighing both governmental interests, including fiscal
constraints, and the need to remedy constitutional violations. The judiciary should
evaluate the effectiveness of a proposed remedy as well The mandated expenditures
in the Jenkins litigation failed to improve test scores appreciably or to improve the
district's racial balance by attracting a significant number of white students.
Challenging the assumption that federalism restraints do not apply to the
judiciary's remedial powers, Dean Griffith argues that the Constitution's federal
structure, separation of powers principles, comity precepts, and the Guarantee
Clause limit judicial power to some extent. She points out that the Supreme Court's
1990 Missouri v. Jenkins decision upholding the district court's taxation orders lacks
consistency with the Court's recent federalism rdings that have invalidated
congressional acts viewed as excessively interfering with the operation of state
governmental functions. Viewing judicial taxation orders as deeply intrusive upon
state government and administration, Dean Griffith argues that such taxation should
be foreclosed except when tax structure deficiencies cause constitutional violations to
be plainly remediless. She rejects court-ordered taxation that is not authorized by
state law as involving the judiciary in law making, a legislative function.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article examines the implications of the United States Supreme Court's
1990 decision in Missouri v. Jenkins,I in which the Court sanctioned the federal
judiciary's exercise of new and unprecedented equitable powers to provide
fiding for court-mandated public school desegregation plans in the Kansas City,
Missouri School District (KCMSD). The Court affirmed that a district court may
order a school district to levy taxes to increase school desegregation funding;
further, a district court may enjoin the enforcement of state law limitations that
prevent such taxation. 2
The Jenkins litigation presents three important legal issues. First, Jenkins
raises questions as to the extent of the federal judiciary's remedial powers that
reallocate fiscal resources and the purposes that may be served by court-instituted
remedial processes. In Jenkins, the district court ordered quality-improvement
educational programs-the scope of which exceeded national norms. These
programs were initiated to improve the educational opportunities of children
adversely affected by past racial segregation and to increase the number of white
students attending the KCMSD schools. The district court sought to achieve a
better racial balance in the KCMSD schools by encouraging the voluntary
enrollment of white students living in surrounding suburban areas through the
provision of court-ordered distinctive, quality educational programs and enhanced
capital improvements. Although the Court did not review the cost and scope of
the district court's remedial program in its 1990 Jenkins decision, it upheld the
district court's taxation orders to ensure funding for these court-ordered
1 495 U.S. 33 (1990). Numerous articles in law reviews and journals have explored the
issues raised by Missouri v. Jenkins. See, eg., Barry Friedman, ien Rights Encounter Reality:
Enforcing Federal Remedies, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 735, 758-64 (1992). See generally D. Bruce
La Pierre, Enforcement ofJudgrnents Against States and Local Governments: Judicial Control
Over the Power to Tax, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 299 (1993); John Clayton Thomas & Dan H.
Hoxworth, The Limits of Judicial Desegregation Remedies After Missouri v. Jenkins, 21
PUBLIUS: THE JOURNAL OF FEDERALISM, Summer 1991, at 93; Stanley J. Andersen, Note,
Judicially Imposed Taxation and Desegregation: Missouri v. Jenkins, 24 CREIGHTON L. REV.
289 (1990); Douglas J. Brocker, Note, Taxation Without Representation: The Judicial
Usurpation of the Power to Tax in Missouri v. Jenkins, 69 N.C. L. REV. 741 (1991); JoAnn
Grozuczak Goedert, Comment, Jenkins v. Missouri: The Future of Interdistrict School
Desegregation, 76 GEO. L.J. 1867 (1988); Christopher W. Nelson, Comment, Missouri v.
Jenkins: Judicial Taxation and the Funding of School Desegregation, 26 NEw ENG. L. REv.
529 (1991); Karl Tage Olson, Note, 41 DRAKE L. REv. 223 (1992); Thomas J. Walsh, Note,
"No Taxation Without Representation... Unless Desegregation:" The Power of Federal
Courts to Order Tax Increases to Desegregate Schools: Missouri v. Jenkins, 12 HAMLINE J.
PUB. L. & POL'Y 191 (1991); Randall H. Warner, Note, Taxation and Desegregation: Pushing
the Limits of Federal Courts' Remedial Powers, 33 ARIZ. L. REV. 1007 (1991); G.R.
Wolohojian, Note, Judicial Taxation in Desegregation Cases, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 332 (1989).
2 See Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. at 51.
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remedies.3
The federal judiciary's purse string control of state and local governments'
expenditures raises separation of power and federalism issues irrespective of the
worthy causes served by such funding. District courts' orders frequently intrude
into state and local policy-decision making by specifying the types of educational
remedial programs that must be undertaken and the amount of funding required.4
The district court's aggressive remedial plan in Jenkins, at a cost of over one
billion dollars, for example, attracted widespread media attention and created
controversy.5
Second, Jenkins sanctioned the power of taxation as a remedial tool.
Although the Court has affirmed extensive fiscal remedies in many areas of
institutional reform litigation, Jenkins is the first United States Supreme Court
decision upholding a district court's authority to order additional taxation to fund
remedial educational programs at the level deemed necessary by the district court
to correct past racial segregation. The district court's order in Jenkins deeply
intruded upon state autonomy and engulfed the court in a legislative role.
Third, Jenkins approved the power of a district court to overturn state law that
3 Five years later the Court granted certiorari to consider the district court's exercise of
equitable power to order salary increases for both instructional and noninstructional staff. In the
course of the opinion, the majority held that the district court's pursuit of a metropolitan,
interdistrict remedy, designed to improve the desegregative attractiveness of the KCMSD,
exceeded the court's equitable powers because only intradistrict constitutional violations
occurred. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70,94 (1995).
4 Litigation to reform state and local governmental institutions is not limited to school
desegregation, but extends to other types of broad class actions against governmental entities.
The purpose of this litigation is to effectuate social, economic, and political reform. See John
Choon Yoo, Who Measures the Chancellor's Foot? The Inherent Remedial Authority of the
Federal Courts, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1121, 1122 n.6 (1996). For a discussion of public structural
reform litigation, see generally Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation,
89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976); Colin S. Diver, The Judge as Political Powerbroker:
Superintending Structural Change in Public Institutions, 65 VA. L. REV. 43 (1979); William A.
Fletcher, The Discretionary Constitution: Institutional Remedies and Judicial Legitimacy, 91
YALE L.J. 635 (1982); Paul J. Mishkin, Federal Courts as State Reformers, 35 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 949 (1978).
5 See, e.g., Charles-Edward Anderson, Curing Segregation: Parents Suefor Kid's Private
Education at Public Expense, 75 A.B.A. J., Nov. 1989, at 22; Opinion Editorial, Can Courts
Order Tax Increases?, WASH. POST, Oct. 31, 1989, at A22; William Celis, I, Kansas City's
Widely Debated Desegregation Experiment Reaches the Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11,
1995, at B7; William H. Freivogel, Jewels Shine Amid Failures in Kansas City, ST. Louis
POST-DISPATCH, May 16, 1994, at B5; Lynn Horsley, Energy and Enthusiasm Turned to
Detachment and Displeasure, KAN. CITY STAR, Feb. 4, 1995, at A13; Blake Hurst, Supreme
Court Looks Again at Missouri's Runaway Judge, WALL ST. J., Apr. 26, 1995, at A15; William
Robbins, Judge Is Calm in Eye of Storm He Helped Create, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 1989, at B24;
William Robbins, Kansas City Tries to Revive School, But the Cost Is Criticized, N.Y. TiMES,
Oct. 10, 1989, at A25; The MacNeil/Lehrer NewsHour, Taxing Lesson, Capitol Games (EBC &
GWETA television broadcast, transcript #3591, Oct. 30, 1989).
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would have barred the court-ordered taxation. The district court specifically
enjoined a tax levy rollback required by Missouri law. By this action, the district
court displaced a valid state law limitation to facilitate the funding of its remedial
desegregation plan. Jenkins thus upheld a district court's power to order taxation
for which no state legislative authority existed. This ruling sanctions the power of
a district court to authorize taxation, a power that historically has been the
province of the legislature.
Following the introduction of this Article, Part I begins by examining
significant United States Supreme Court decisions that expanded the scope of the
federal judiciary's equitable powers to desegregate public schools. The Missouri
v. Jenkins litigation commenced in the 1980s-at a time when district courts were
instituting quality-educational improvement programs in lieu of relying
exclusively upon mandatory pupil assignments to remedy unconstitutional school
segregation. Such mandated improvements greatly enlarged the district courts'
fiscal remedial power because these improvements were more expensive than
busing. Part I presents the background of the Jenkins litigation and explores the
far reaching remedial programs ordered by the District Court Judge Russell G.
Clark. Part II then examines the historical precedent leading to the federal
judiciary's willingness to order taxation to further expand its array of fiscal
remedial tools. The Jenkins opinions upholding judicial taxation in both the lower
courts and in the United States Supreme Court are examined and critiqued.
Part III analyzes the existing legal framework of the federal judiciary's fiscal
remedial powers once it has determined that public expenditures are necessary to
correct a constitutional violation. To guide the exercise of its fiscal remedial
powers, the Court has emphasized that (1) the cost of a remedy does not impede
its use, (2) state law limitations do not preclude the imposition of remedial
measures, and (3) remedial oversight should not be overly intrusive. The Court's
application of these principles in both school desegregation and Eighth
Amendment prison litigation are compared and contrasted. Acknowledging
respect for comity and federalism concerns, federal courts frequently caution
against the implementation of overly intrusive remedies in institutional litigation
involving unconstitutional prison conditions. In devising school desegregation
remedies, however, federal courts show less concern for federalism restraints. In
contrast to the federal judiciary's remedial principles, Part IV presents the
approaches taken by state court judges when fiscal remedial measures are deemed
necessary to correct constitutional violations.
This Article argues that Jenkins is inconsistent with the United States
Supreme Court's recent federalism rulings, the Constitution's structural
framework of separated powers, comity principles, and the Constitution's
Guarantee Clause. Recent Supreme Court decisions6 stress the constitutional
6 See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York v. United States, 505
U.S. 144 (1992); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
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limitations the federal structure imposes upon Congress's delegated power to
direct the states to carry out its policy choices. Part V specifically explores
whether structural limitations inherent in the Constitution's framework restrain
the Supreme Court and the federal judiciary from imposing judicial remedies that
severely strain a state or local government's financial resources. This Part also
examines whether separation of powers limitations emanating from the
Constitution's structure as well as comity principles restrict the federal judiciary's
expansive use of equitable powers. The Constitution's Guarantee Clause arguably
also limits the power of the judiciary to order remedial measures that abrogate
valid state and local laws found nonetheless to affect the remedial process. When
district courts order local authorities to tax without state authorization and in
violation of constitutionally valid state expenditure and taxation limitations, they
abridge the exercise of the guaranteed republican form of government at the state
and local level.7
Part VI presents different methodologies to guide the exercise of the federal
judiciary's equitable power. Prior to the imposition of remedial measures that
make resource allocation decisions for state and local governments, the federal
judiciary should engage in interest balancing, giving consideration to the interests
of state and local governments, as well as to the rights of the victims of the
constitutional violations. This Article advocates that a balancing test, weighing
both the need to protect civil rights and to free governments from overly intrusive
remedial actions, should guide the imposition of remedial measures in
institutional reform litigation. The federal judiciary's present reliance upon
categorical remedial principles, which often conflict with each other, is criticized.
The Court's decision in Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken 11)8 supports this
Article's recommended balancing approach to remedial measures. Milliken iTs
three-part test considered (1) the nature and extent of the constitutional violation,
(2) the need to restore the victims of discriminatory conduct to the position they
would have occupied absent such discrimination, and (3) the interests of state and
local authorities in managing their own affairs. This Article proposes a test that
expands Milliken I's rule number three to include consideration of the extent to
which the proposed remedial actions intrude upon state and local administration
of governmental affairs. The proposed test provides for consideration of the
following factors: (1) the cost of the proposed remedial actions, (2) the ability of
state and local resources to fund the proposed remedial actions, (3) the extent to
which the remedial actions will violate valid state and local laws, and (4) the
7 The inherent conflict between individual liberty and republicanism, while recognized at
the founding of the American republic in 1776, was viewed as reconcilable due to the emphasis
upon the collective well being of the people rather than upon a minority of individuals. See
GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPuBLIC 1776-1787, at 61-65 (1969).
Most Americans in 1776 recognized that virtue-viewed as the willingness to sacrifice private
desires for the good of the state-constituted the lifeblood of the republic. See id at 68-69.
8 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
[Vol 61:483
JUDICIAL FUNDING AND TAXMANDATES
extent to which the remedial actions will require the judiciary to displace state and
local managerial prerogatives and decision-making processes, including
representative rule. These considerations should be balanced against the rights
maximizing approach taken in Milliken 17s first two rules. The accommodation
of the rules with each other will facilitate a more balanced remedial approach in
which all rules receive consideration.
Part VII critiques the various principles relied upon by different federal courts
for determining the conditions upon which judicial taxation may be ordered to
correct constitutional violations. It examines whether the principles established in
Jenkins to guide the federal judiciary in the imposition of state and local taxes to
correct constitutional violations adequately serve as federalism postulates. The
Jenkins Court ruled that district courts possess remedial power to order taxation
upon making a finding that no other alternatives are available to fund a school
desegregation remedial plan. Since the amount of funding necessary to fund a
school desegregation plan, or another institutional remedy, cannot be determined
with precision, this Article suggests that other alternatives, involving a less costly
remedial plan, can be devised to defeat the application of the test. This Article
concludes that the no alternative test is unworkable because it permits the
judiciary to make subjective decisions as to when court-ordered taxation is
appropriate.
Unless overruled, Jenkins may be relied upon in the future to support
judicially created and authorized taxation that overrides state law limitations. Part
VIII proposes guidelines to ensure that district courts do not use their equitable
powers to order taxation without careful consideration of alternative remedial
choices. After examining the loss of legitimacy that the judiciary will suffer by
performing state and local legislative functions, this Article asserts that court-
ordered taxation for which no authority exists under state law intrudes so deeply
upon the operations of state and local government as to violate comity and
federalism principles designed to prevent the judiciary from usurping legislative
functions. When state authority exists for the imposition of taxes, this Article
concludes that judicially ordered remedial taxation cannot be completely
foreclosed, but should be ordered only upon a judicial finding that (1) alternative
sources of funding have been sought and repeatedly denied and (2) deficiencies of
the existing tax rate and method of taxation cause the constitutional violations to
be plainly remediless. The district court remedial process should analyze at the
outset the existing tax structure and scope of fiscal remedies needed to correct the
constitutional violation. Once the court understands the existing resources
available to correct the constitutional violation, it can more readily determine the
amount of additional revenue required as well as possible alternative funding
resources.
The State of Missouri continued to challenge the district court's remedial
orders following the United States Supreme Court's 1990 Jenkins decision. In a
subsequent 1995 ruling, the Supreme Court held that the district court's goal of
2000]
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inducing the enrollment of white students in KCMSD schools through expansive
programmatic and facilities improvements exceeded its remedial authority.9 This
ruling, while limiting the purposes for which remedial educational programs can
be imposed, does not change the Court's earlier approval of court-ordered
taxation. The Court's failure to articulate a coherent doctrine that recognizes the
existence of federalism restraints upon the federal judiciary, as well as upon the
Congress, continues into the new millennium.
Implementing court-ordered public school desegregation plans proved more
difficult than originally foreseen at the time of the 1954 Brown v. Board of
Education (Brown 1)1° decision. Given the importance of ending racial
discrimination in the provision of public education, the federal judiciary greatly
expanded the scope of its equitable powers, hoping that far reaching, mandated
institutional reforms would end segregation. At the millennium, greater
realization exists that the patterns of racial discrimination, which affect the quality
of education provided in our public schools, cannot be solved by the judiciary
alone. During the time of the Jenkins litigation in the late 1970s and 1980s, people
believed that the implementation of expansive quality improvement programs
would produce equal education for inner-city minority children in a short period
of time.11 Although children in the KCMSD received the benefits of increased
educational funding as a result of this litigation, the expensive remedial program
failed to produce greater racial balance in the school district.12
The federal judiciary's enlargement of its equitable powers must be examined
in the context of the Constitution's structure of separated powers as well as from a
school desegregation perspective. The judicially authorized taxation and disregard
of valid state law limitations endorsed by Jenkins to fulfill Brown rs promise
created precedent that the federal judiciary stands ready to use in areas other than
school desegregation. 13 Whereas some limitations exist upon Congress's fiscal
powers to mandate local institutional changes, the federal courts often consider
themselves removed from the Constitution's federalism restraints. Therein lies the
significance of Jenkins and its progeny.
9 The Court held that the district court's remedial order of salary increases for both
teachers and noninstructional staff to fulfill its "desegregative attractiveness" goal was too far
removed from remedying the vestiges of Missouri's previously mandated racial segregation.
See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 100 (1995).
10 347 US. 483 (1954).
11 See Gary Orfield, Forward to JOSEPH FELDMAN Er AL., THE HARVARD PROJECr ON
SCHooL DESEGREGATION, STILL SEPARATF, STILL UNEQUAL: THE LIMrrs OF MILUKEW ITS
EDUCATIONAL COMPENSATION REMEDIES 3 (1994).
12 See infra notes 201-05 and accompanying text.
13 See infra note 223 and accompanying text.
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I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO COURT MANDATED FUNDING
TO IMPLEMENT SCHOOL DESEGREGATION
A. Early Significant Supreme Court Decisions That Implemented School
Desegregation
1. Brown v. Board of Education
In Brown v. Board of Education (Brown 1), the United States Supreme Court
held that segregation of public school children on the basis of race violated the
Fourteenth Amendment14 of the United States Constitution because it deprived
minority children of equal educational opportunities.15 Studies confirmed that
expenditures for the education of white children greatly exceeded those for
Aflican-American pupils.16 Overturning Plessy v. Ferguson's17 "separate but
equal" doctrine, in the context of educational facilities, the Court opined that
separating African-American children from white children on the basis of race
generated feelings of inferiority in the former.18 Brown I did not specify how
segregation would be remedied, but in Brown v. Board of Education (Brown /),19
the Supreme Court stated that courts would be guided by equitable principles in
fashioning desegregation decrees.2 Further, the primary responsibility for
effectuating desegregation was placed upon local school boards.21 A finite time
14 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; see also JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTMUSr:
A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 82 (1980) (stating that the Fourteenth Amendment embodies
the ideal that minority interests must be represented in our republican government).
15 See Brown 1, 347 U.S. at 493. For a discussion of how the ground work was laid for this
lawsuit, see JIM HASKINS, SEPARATE BUT NOT EQUAL: THE DREAM AND THE STRUGGLE 82-93
(1998). Five key cases were initiated originally in Washington, D.C. and in localities in the
States of South Carolina (Clarendon County), Kansas (Topeka), Delaware (Claymont), and
Virginia (Prince Edward County). See id. at 94-127. Subsequently, the United States Supreme
Court consolidated the four state cases and separated out the Washington, D.C. case as
involving a federal district. See id. at 127.
16 In the 1920s, the NAACP conducted studies of school expenditures for white and black
students in several southern states. See HASKINS, supra note 15, at 82. The ratio in Georgia was
eight to one; in Mississippi, five to one; in North Carolina, two to one. See id. at 82-83.
17 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
18 See Brown I, 347 U.S. at 494. Dr. Kenneth B. Clark, a black psychologist, testified in
the Delaware and South Carolina cases, consolidated in Brown I, that school segregation
impaired black children's self-esteem by producing feelings of inferiority. See HASKINS, supra
note 15, at 115. To measure self-esteem, Dr. Clark conducted doll tests that evidenced African-
American children's preference for white dolls over brown dolls. See id. at 101.
19 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
20 See id at 300.
21 See id. at 299.
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period to implement desegregation was not set; instead, district courts were
directed to oversee the desegregation process "with all deliberate speed."22
2. The Supreme Court's Response to Public Resistance to School
Desegregation
Brown I ushered in an era of widespread resistance to immediate
desegregation in the South.23 For example, the Governor of Arkansas, Orville
Faubus, ordered the state National Guard to block the entry of African-American
students to Central High School in Little Rock. In response, President Eisenhower
ordered federal troops to ensure their admittance.2 4
Some southern school districts completely closed their schools to avoid
compliance with Brown L25 In Giffin v. County School Board,26 the Court ruled
22 Idi at 301.
23 See L HARVIE WILKINSON, III, FROM BRowN TO BAKKE: THE SuPREME COURT AND
SCHOOL INTEGRATION: 1954-1978, at 43, 51-52, 65, 71-74, 82 (1979). Southern school
desegregation after Brown Ihas been characterized as moving through four stages: (1) absolute
defiance from 1955 to 1959, (2) token compliance from 1959 until passage of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act, (3) modest integration from 1964 to 1968 to avoid the cutoff of federal funding, and
(4) massive integration beginning with the Court's decision in Green v. County School Board,
391 U.S. 430 (1968). See id. at 78.
New York Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan noted that the Court's order in Brown I was
not obeyed for the next 16 years, but by the fall of 1970, the dual school system in the southern
states had disappeared as a result of the appropriation of federal funds to aid desegregation. See
To Authorize Special Assistance for Desegregation Activities: Hearings on S. 1256 Before the
Subcomm. on Educ., Arts & Humanities of the Senate Comm. on Labor & Human Resources,
98th Congress 7-9 (1983) (statement of Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-NY) on S. 1256, The
Emergency School Aid Act). See generally Robert B. McKay, "With All Deliberate Speed: "A
Study of School Desegregation, 31 N.Y.U. L. REV. 991 (1956); L.A. Powe, Jr., The Road to
Swann: Mobile County Crawls to the Bus, 51 TEX. L. REv. 505 (1973).
24 For a description of the terror and harassment experienced by the black students who
attended the formerly white Central High School in Little Rock, Arkansas in 1957, see
HASKINS, supra note 15, at 148-50. For a short description of the life experiences of the nine
black students who first integrated Central High School, see id. at 166-67.
Opposition to integration was not confined to the South. On the first day of school in New
York City in September, 1965, black students bused from Brownsville to Bay Ridge were met
by an egg throwing mob who called them "niggers." See CLARENCE TAYLOR, KNOCKING AT
OUR OWN DOOR: MILTON A. GALAMISON AND THE STRUGGLE TO INTEGRATE NEW YORK CrTY
SCHooLS 181 (1997).
25 Many southern states resisted compliance with Brown I by school closing and fund-
cutoff laws. See WILKINSON, supra note 23, at 82-83. Virginia adopted the most extreme
measures, requiring its Governor to close any school where school desegregation was
contemplated. See id. at 82. For a study of the 1958 closing of the public schools in Norfolk,
Virginia in response to Brown I and the role journalism played in facilitating subsequent
desegregation, see generally ALEXANDER LEIDHOLDT, STANDING BEFORE THE SHOUTING MOB:
LENOIR CHAMBERS AND VIRGINIA'S MASSIvE RESiSTANE TO PUBLIC-SCHOOL INTEGRATION
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that the closing of the county's schools while other public schools in the state
remained open violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.27 A decade after the Brown I decision, the Court in Griffin
decisively rejected extreme tactics to impede the implementation of Brown I and
indicated that the pace of school desegregation could no longer be stymied.28 The
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 further spurred the dismantling of the last
barriers to desegregation. 29
3. Green's Mandate ofAffirmative Action to Remedy School Segregation
Brown IT specified remedial steps that considered "problems related to
administration, arising from the physical condition of the school plant; the school
transportation system, personnel, revision of school districts and attendance areas
into compact units to achieve a system of determining admission to the public
schools on a nonracial basis .... -30 Due to residential racial segregation in many
localities, attendance zones could be drawn to maintain a dual school structure.31
Where little residential segregation existed, enabling the provision of integrated
education through the utilization of geographical districts, some school districts in
the South adopted "freedom of choice" plans permitting students to choose from
among at least two public schools for their education.32 Few African-Americans
chose, however, to attend previously segregated white schools due to
misinformation, intimidation, or lack of free transportation. 33 In Green v. County
School Board,34 the Supreme Court invalidated a Virginia county school board's
"freedom of choice" plan as inadequate to convert the school district from a dual
system to a unitary system.35
(1997). Norfolk's schools were closed for 141 days, from September 27, 1958 to January 26,
1959. See id. at 92, 118.
26 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
2 7 See id. at 232. Prince Edward County's School Board refused to levy taxes to operate
the county's schools, using school closure as a technique to avoid the requirements of Brown L
See id at 222-23. For a discussion of the Giffln litigation, see WILKINSON, supra note 23, at
97-101.
2 8 See Griffin, 377 U.S. at 233-34. Prince Edward County's obstruction of school
desegregation has been credited with causing the Supreme Court to vest the district courts with
sweeping equitable powers. See WILKINSON, supra note 23, at 100-01.
2 9 See GEoFFREYR. STONEE TAL., CONSTrTTONALLAW 511 (2d ed. 1991).
30 Brown v. Board of Educ. (Brown I), 349 U.S. 294,300-01 (1955).
31 See STONE, supranote 29, at 511.
32 For a description of "freedom of choice" desegregation plans, see JEFFREY A. RAFFmL
HisroRICAL DICIONARY OF SCHooL SEGREGATION AND DESEGREGATION: THE AmERICAN
EXPERIENCE 108-09 (1998).
3 3 See id at 109.
34 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
35 See id. at 441-42. Unitary status under Green meant the dismantling of segregation
2000]
OHIO STA TE LA WJOURAL[6
Green has been described as "[t]he most significant post-Brown decision by
the U.S. Supreme Court that helped to define the standards by which the Court
judged whether a violation of the U.S. Constitution had been remedied in school
segregation cases.'" 36 Prior to Green, the remedial objective in school
desegregation cases was to eliminate race-based pupil assignments. After the
Green decision, school districts were required to take affirmative actions to
convert their schools into a racially balanced, integrated school system. 7 A
racially neutral school assignment policy did not suffice to eliminate a
constitutional violation stemming from a segregated school system? 8
4. Swann's Sanction ofBusing and Shift in the Burden ofProof to School
Districts
In Swann v. Charlotte-Mecldenburg Board of Education,3 9 the Court
extended Green's affirmative remedial obligations in rural dual systems to urban
school districts.4 ° The school district, encompassing the city of Charlotte, North
Carolina and the surrounding Mecklenburg County, had instituted a desegregation
plan based on geographical zoning and free transfer provisions that proved
ineffective 4 1 The Court established the remedial principle that the scope of the
remedy is to be determined by the nature and extent of the constitutional
violation. 42 It further ruled that a remedial decree is to be judged by its
under the dual system and the effectuation of racially integrated education, free of
discrimination. See RAFFEL, supra note 32, at 257.
36 R , supra note 32, at 113.
37 The Green Court ruled that an affirmative duty rests upon school board officials to take
whatever steps are necessary to convert the school system to a unitary one in which racial
discrimination is eliminated root and branch. See Green, 391 U.S. at 437-38; RAFFEL, supra
note 32, at 114. After Green, it became the school district's responsibility to create a system
without identifiable white and black schools. See AMY STUART WELLS & ROBERT L. CRAIN,
STEPPING OVER THE COLOR LINE: AFRICAN-AMmiCAN STUDENTS IN WHITE SUBURBAN
SCHOOLS 92-93 (1997). The purpose of a desegregation program was to convert a dual system
into a nonracial system. See Green, 391 U.S. at 437-38.
38 See WELS & CRAIN, supra note 37, at 92-93. The Green decision is attributed with
ending the use of freedom of choice plans to meet Brow Fs requirements. See BRIAN L. FIFE,
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION IN THE TwENTY-FIRsT CENTURY: THE Focus MUST CHANGE 9
(1997).
39 402 U.S. 1 (1971). For a discussion of Swann, see DAVID J. ARMOR, FORCED JUSTICE:
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION AND THE LAW 29-34 (1995); FIFE, supra note 38, at 10-12;
GREGORY S. JACOBS, GETTING AROUND BROWN DESEGREGATION, DEVELOPMENT, AND THE
COLUMBUS PUBLIC SCHOOLS 31-34 (1998).
40 See PAUL R. DIMOND, BEYOND BUSING: INSIDE THE CHALLENGE TO URBAN
SEGREGATION 56 (1985). The Charlotte-Mecklenburg school system was the nation's 43rd
largest school district, encompassing 550 square miles. See RAFFEL, supra note 32, at 247.
41 See Swann, 402 U.S. at 6-7.
42 See id at 16. The Court in Swann stated: "IThe nature of the violation determines the
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effectiveness4 3 Thus, the Court, by ruling that a school district should take
whatever steps are necessary to achieve integration, moved further towards a
results oriented approach. 4 Three other significant legal advances have been
attributed to Swann. First, the assignment of students to schools closest to their
homes did not meet the Court's remedial standards where past discrimination had
been practiced 45 In Swann, the Court sanctioned remedying segregation through
pupil reassignment commonly known as "busing," and the alteration of
attendance zones.46 Second, the Court placed the burden of proof on the school
district to show that the schools' racial composition did not result from past or
present discriminatory conduct 47 Third, the Court validated pupil assignments on
the basis of race, recognizing that the achievement of integration depended upon
the use of race for such decisions 48
Swann's approval of busing to remedy unconstitutional school segregation
stemmed from the Court's new belief that only mandatory pupil reassignments
could dismantle the persistence of dual schooling in the South. 9 Transporting
students to public schools distant from their residences to achieve greater
integration proved unpopular, however 50 White parents resisted busing their
scope of the remedy." M.; see also Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken I), 418 U.S. 717, 744 (1974)
(citing this remedial principle from Swann as the controlling principle). The Milliken I Court
held that judicial remedies could not be imposed upon governmental units not involved in or
affected by a constitutional violation. See id. at 752. In Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken 11), 433
U.S. 267, 282 (1977), the Court stated that this equitable principle "means simply that federal-
court decrees must directly address and relate to the constitutional violation itself."
43 See Swam, 402 U.S. at 25 (stating that a remedial decree "is to be judged by its
effectiveness').
44 See id. at 26; see also HASKINS, supra note 15, at 155; Owen M. Fiss, The Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Case-Its Significance for Northern School Desegregation, 38 U. Ci. L. REV.
697, 701 (1971). The Court upheld the following desegregation remedies: "reasonable bus
transportation, reasonable grouping of noncontiguous zones, the reasonable movement toward
the elimination of one-race schools, and the use of mathematical ratios of blacks and whites in
the schools as a starting point toward racial desegregation." FIFE, supra note 38, at 12. The
grouping of noncontiguous zones could include reassigning white and black students,
previously attending a predominantly white or a predominantly black school, so as to achieve
racial balance within both schools. See id. at 11-12.
45 See Swam, 402 U.S. at 27-29 (approving the pairing, clustering or grouping of
noncontiguous schools); see also Fiss, supra note 44, at 699-700. These remedial measures
involve the reassignment of students to attend different grades at different schools to
desegregate two or more schools; RAFFE, supra note 32, at 56 (explaining that if a K-5 black
school and a K-5 white school be paired-for example, all students could be reassigned to one
school for K-2 and the other for grades 3-5).
4 6 See Swann, 402 U.S. at 27,30.
47 See id at 26; see also Fiss, supra note 44, at 700-01.
4 8 See Fiss, supra note 44, at 702-03.
4 9 See DIMOND, supra note 40, at 58.5 0 See JACOBS, supra note 39, at 26-34 (describing busing's origin as a remedy and the
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children into areas with predominantly minority populations, making it politically
difficult to achieve integration.51 When massive busing plans were put into effect
African-American students more often than white students were assigned to
schools some distance from their residences.52 In 1983, a Senate bill proposed
denying the federal judiciary the jurisdiction to order the assignment or
transportation of public school students.53 Although Congress did not enact the
legislation, its introduction and consideration illustrates how politicized the
busing issue had become.
5. The Extension ofLiability in States Without a Record ofMandated
School Segregation
Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver, Colorado,54 decided in 1973, was the
first nonsouthem school desegregation lawsuit before the Supreme Court after
Brown /55 For the first time, the Court upheld remedial busing to achieve racial
backlash that developed during the 1970s to busing); see also STEVEN J. L. TAYLOR,
DESEGREGATION IN BOSTON AND BUFFALO: THE INFLUENCE OF LOCAL LEADERS 2 (1998) ("Of
those political issues with a strong racial content, very few have inflamed the public more than
school desegregation, particularly when it is attempted in the form of busing"). Many parents,
both black and white, preferred schooling for their children close to home. See HASKINS, supra
note 15, at 154. Black parents feared sending their children into a hostile school environment.
See JACOBS, supra note 39, at 31; TAYLOR, supra at 208. A comparison of the effects of busing
in Buffalo and Boston showed that antibusing leaders did not hold the African-American
community responsible for remedial busing, but the masses in Boston made the black children
bused into their neighborhood the focus of their anger. See id. at 208-09. In Buffalo, antibusing
leaders viewed busing as the result of a misguided district court judge. See id. at 206.
51 See JACOBS, supra note 39, at 28. For a discussion of opposition to busing, which was
advocated to further integration in New York City schools, see TAYLOR, supra note 24, at 157.
White parents opposed to busing launched a demonstration of 15,000 people at the Board of
Education's headquarters in 1964. See id.
52 See Alison Morantz, Desegregation at Risk- Threat and Reaffinnation in Charlotte, in
DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION: THE QUIT REVERsAL OF BROWN V. BOARD OFEDUCATION 181,
186-87, 199-200 (Gary Orfield et al. eds., 1996); TAYLOR, supra note 24, at 147.
53 See STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 98TH CONG., IST SESS.,
NEIGHBORHOOD SCHOOL TRANSPORTATION RELIEF ACT: S. 1647 (Comm. Print 1983).
President Johnson's administration supported busing or other remedial measures to achieve
integration, but President Nixon viewed busing as "forced integration." See HASKINS, supra
note 15, at 154-55. Despite political opposition, the Supreme Court continued to support busing
as seen in its 1971 decision in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board ofEducation, 402 U.S. I
(1971). See HASKINS, supra note 15, at 155.
54 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
55 For a discussion of Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver, Colorado, see FIFE, supra
note 38, at 12-14; James J. Fishman & Lawrence Strauss, Endless Journey: Integration and the
Provision of Equal Educational Opportunity in Denver's Public Schools: A Study of Keyes v.
School District No. 1, in JUSTICE AND SCHOOL SYSTEMS: THE ROLE OF THE COURTS IN
EDUCATION LITIGATION 185-224 (Barbara Flicker ed., 1990).
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balance in states without a history of mandated school segregation.56 After Keyes,
the liability requirements of Brown I were modified to encompass segregated
schooling arising from de facto housing segregation unless a school district could
prove that it did not cause the segregation.57 The Court ruled that de jure
segregation in one geographical area of a school district in a state that had never
mandated segregated education by statute could require a desegregation remedy
for the entire school district.58 The Court thus expanded the scope of
implementation remedies by ordering system wide remedies in school districts
where actions such as the placement of schools or the assignment of students may
have caused the segregation of students by race without statutes or constitutions
mandating a dual system 5 9
Following Keyes, litigation was instituted against many nonsouthem school
districts for intentionally segregating students on the basis of race, and district
court judges employed mandatory busing as a remedial measure once liability
was found.60 Localities with very segregated housing patterns,61 but without a
history of racial separation by law, suddenly faced racial issues previously absent
from their political discourse.62 Boston, for example, encountered many
difficulties in the implementation of a school desegregation plan, and violence
erupted necessitating the presence of state law enforcement agents.63 Buffalo, a
56 Racism and discriminatory treatment existed in Colorado without the presence of state-
mandated segregated education. See generally Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Home-
Grown Racism: Colorado's Historic Embrace-and Denial-of Equal Opportunity in Higher
Education, 70 U. COLO. L. REv. 703 (1999) (finding that Colorado's history is marked by a
wide range of discriminatory conditions and focusing on the effect of discriminatory treatment
upon higher education opportunities).
57 See ARMOR, supra note 39, at 34.
59 See Keyes, 413 U.S. at 200,203-04,213-14.
59 See RAFFEL, supra note 32, at 139-40. The complexity of racism makes it difficult to
isolate its causes. Racially discriminatory behavior has been attributed to unconscious racial
motivation. See Charles R. Lawrence 1I, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning
with Unconscious Racism, 30 STAN. L. REV. 317, 327 (1987) ("[O]bserv[ing] that Americans
share a historical experience that has resulted in individuals within the culture ubiquitously
attaching a significance to race that is irrational and often outside their awareness.").
60 See TAYLOR, supra note 50, at 1. Even states reputed as open to civil rights issues, such
as New York and Massachusetts, failed to address issues raised by the advocates of school
desegregation in the late 1960s and early 1970s. See id. at 5.
61 A comparison of the implementation of school desegregation in Buffalo and Boston
found that expanding black populations after World War II in both cities were rigidly
segregated. See id. at 4. Segregated housing patterns resulted in segregated schools. See id at 5.
62 See id at 2.
63 See id at 3. A race riot broke out in the cafeteria of Boston's Hyde Park High School on
September 19, 1974; stabbing incidents and other violence continued throughout the school
year. See id. at 136-37. The greatest level of violence occurred at South Boston High School
where buses transporting black students on the first day of the 1974-1975 school year were
stoned by residents standing on the streets. See id. at 137-38.
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city reflecting demographic similarities to Boston, on the other hand,
implemented school desegregation without violence two years later in 1976.64 A
study attributes the different result to the type of leadership provided by elected
officials in these communities. 65 In Boston, elected officials opposed Judge W.
Arthur Garrity, Jr.'s desegregation orders whereas Buffalo's leaders sought to
cooperate with the court by participating in the development of a plan they hoped
would minimize any disruptions caused by the desegregation process.66
B. Milliken I's Limit on Interdistrict Remedies
In 1974, the Court in Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken 1)67 limited the federal
judiciary's powers to remedy school segregation in urban school districts through
the imposition of metropolitan-wide remedies that included suburban areas.68
This decision ended an era of significant strides in the desegregation of public
schools that began in 1964.69 In Milliken I, the Court ruled that an interdistrict
remedy could not be imposed without an interdistrict constitutional violation or
interdistrict effects.70 Thereafter, district courts could address unlawful
segregation only within the boundaries of an incorporated geographically defined
area empowered to provide public education. In a number of cities, such
incorporated municipal areas could not provide integrated education because
residential segregation and the steady migration of whites to suburbia since World
64 See id at 3. One year after Buffalo's desegregation program began, specialized magnet
schools were created that resulted in the voluntary enrollment of white students in inner city
schools which previously provided education predominantly to minority students. See id. The
involuntary busing of white students was not implemented until later in the desegregation
process after many parents already had experienced their children voluntarily boarding buses to
attend a magnet school. See id. at 126. Many parents saw the mandated busing as an extension
ofpopular magnet school programs. See id.
65 Although Buffalo Mayor James D. Griffin had assumed a leadership role opposing
busing before he became mayor, he did not make desegregation an issue and maintained that
District Court Judge John T. Curtin's decision had to be obeyed. See id at 117. Horrified by
television coverage of the antibusing violence in Boston, Buffalo's elected Board of Education,
comprised of three black and six white members, sought to avoid violence in Buffalo and
cooperated with the district court. See id. at 98-99.
6 6 See id at 130. Realizing that desegregation was inevitable, the Buffalo Board of
Education voted 9-0 to develop a desegregation plan. See id. at 131. Conversely, those
protesting in Boston's antibusing movement did not seem to realize that protest would not
change Judge W. Arthur Garity, Jr.'s decision. See id at 130. Boston's antibusing leaders did
not perceive the need to urge nonviolence. See id.
67 418 U.S. 717 (1974). For a discussion of Milliken I, see ARMOR, supra note 39, at 38-
41; FIFE, supra note 38, at 14-16.
6 8 Milliken Iwas the first major United States Supreme Court decision that limited rather
than expanded the scope of desegregation remedies. See ARMOR, supra note 39, at 41.
6 9 See Orfield, supra note 11, at 1.
70 See Milliken 1, 418 U.S. at 752-53.
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War II caused predominantly nonwhite populations to reside within them.71 The
population of some school districts contained so few white students that
integration proved impossible without crossing city-suburban boundary lines. 72
C. Miliken H's Funding Requirements and the Shift in Focus from Pupil
Reassignment to the Achievement of Educational Quality
In 1977, in Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken R),73 the Court established that
desegregation plans could include ancillary remedial or compensatory funded
educational programs such as in-service training for teachers and administrators,
guidance and counseling programs, remedial reading programs, and revised
testing procedures.74 The Court rejected the State's argument that the
unconstitutional segregation of students on the basis of race must be remedied
solely by addressing unlawful pupil assignments.7 5 Ruling that a desegregation
remedial decree must restore the victims of discriminatory conduct to the position
they would have occupied in the absence of the conduct, the Court held that those
children who had been segregated were more likely to need an educational
remedy.7 6
In view of Milliken !s limitation upon metropolitan-wide desegregation
remedies and Milliken !/'s remedial expansion to cover a school district's
educational components, district court judges shifted their focus to the
implementation of educational improvementsY7 Increasingly, they ordered the
funding of programs and facilities to improve the quality of education in minority
71 Because of residential segregation patterns and the exodus of large white populations to
the suburbs, school desegregation has remained largely an urban phenomenon. See Jenkins v.
Missouri, 639 F. Supp. 19, 38 (W.D. Mo. 1985); FIFE, supra note 38, at 15. Judge Russell G.
Clark stated that clear evidence indicated that further student reassignments in Kansas City
would "reduce the potential for desegregation." d He thereby sought other means, such as
volunteer interdistrict transfers and capital improvements, to accomplish desegregation within a
school district whose enrollment was 68.3% black. See id. at 38-39, 53-54.
72 See Orfield, supra note 11, at 1.
73 433 U.S. 267 (1977). For a discussion of Milliken II, see DIMOND, supra note 40, at
174-76; F supra note 38, at 16-20; RAFFEL, supra note 32, at 166.
74 See Milliken 1, 433 U.S. at 272, 275-77, 281-88; RAFFEL, supra note 32, at 166.
75 See Milliken 1, 433 U.S. at 281. The district court ordered that the cost of the remedial
educational programs be equally shared by the Detroit School Board and the State. See id. at
277. The State defendants challenged the state's obligation to fund the costs of the remedial
programs. See id. at 279.
76 See id at 281-82, 287-88; RAFFEL, supra note 32, at 166.
77 For example, the district court in Milliken II ordered the Detroit School Board and the
State defendants to institute comprehensive programs to address the four educational
components of (1) reading, (2) in-service training, (3) testing, and (4) counseling and career
guidance. See Milliken 11, 433 U.S. at 275-77.
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populated school districts. 78 School districts turned to the federal judiciary for
additional dollars and special programs7 9 During the 1980s, district courts moved
away from the pursuit of greater racial diversity, remedied by busing, toward
greater reliance upon voluntary or choice techniques.80 Remedial desegregation
measures began to include voluntary transfer plans to attract minority students to
schools with predominantly white populations and the creation of specialized
magnet schools designed to pursue excellence in a particular programmatic
area.8 1 The federal judiciary expected that magnet schools would induce white
students seeking higher quality facilities and programs to enroll in schools
attended by many minority students. 82
7 8 See, e.g., id. at 279-88 (upholding the use of remedial educational programs as part of a
school desegregation decree); United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 380 F.2d 385,
394 (5th Cir. 1967) (ordering a remedial educational program to enable students previously
attending segregated schools to overcome past inadequacies in their education); Berry v. School
Dist. of Benton Harbor, 515 F. Supp. 344, 369-73 (W.D. Mich. 1981) (finding a social skills
and achievement component to the court-ordered desegregation plan necessary to effectively
remedy effects of past unconstitutional segregation); Kelley v. Metropolitan County Bd. of
Educ., 492 F. Supp. 167, 191 (M.D. Tenn. 1980) (rejecting pupil assignments as the sole
desegregation remedial tool and finding the necessity for educational components in a
desegregation remedial plan); Liddell v. Board of Educ., 491 F. Supp. 351, 357 (E.D. Mo.
1980) (upholding magnet schools, a variety of specialty programs, and enrichment programs
that included remedial features as components of a desegregation plan).
The new focus on quality education led the courts to devise remedies that lacked the
definiteness of pupil reassignment remedies. The court in Coalition to Save Our Children v.
State Board of Education of Delaware, 757 F. Supp. 328, 359-60 (D. Del. 1991), authorized
the implementation of magnet school programs and student reassignments through choice as
permissible remedial measures in addition to pupil reassignment feeder patterns. The court
noted that the latter plans alone were unlikely to remedy the effects of racial imbalance. See id.
at 351-54. According to the court in Coalition to Save Our Children, the actual validity of
magnet schools as a remedial measure remains unknown until educational outcomes are
assessed. See id. at 336. The degree to which the goal of integration can be fostered by setting
higher than average teacher salaries, by introducing supplemental programs, such as after
school tutoring and early development programs, and by improving school physical facilities,
cannot be answered with certainty. See id. at 352. Thus a clear measurement of whether these
remedies removed constitutional violations remained lacking. See id. at 352-53.
A study conducted by the Harvard Project on School Desegregation concluded that the
reliance upon additional funding and specialized educational programs to remedy the harms
created by segregated education proved ineffective. See FELDMAN ETAL., supra note 11, at 5.
79 See RAFF supra note 32, at 166. ("Critics have viewed Milliken H as a re-institution
of the separate but equal doctrine as school districts trade off school desegregation for extra
money and special programming").
80 See ARMOR, supra note 39, at 48.
81 See id. at 47-48. For a definition of a magnet school, see RAFFEI, supra note 32, at 149.
82 For example, in Jenkins, District Court Judge Russell G. Clark stated: "The long term
goal of this Court's remedial order is to make available to all KCMSD students educational
opportunities equal to or greater than those presently available in the average Kansas City,
Missouri metropolitan suburban school district." Jenkins v. Missouri, 639 F. Supp. 19, 54
[Vol. 61A483
JUDICIAL FUNDING AND TAXMANDATES
Quality educational remedies required a massive infusion of capital into the
school systems subject to desegregation orders.83 Urban school districts,
geographically confined, frequently lacked the financial resources to implement
the remedies imposed by the courts.84 They seized upon desegregation orders as
leverage to obtain more state money to fund their operations.85 District courts
soon became decision makers as to the share of the education costs that should be
born by the state and thus by all the taxpayers in the state.
D. Milliken H's Three Part Test
In Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken 1l), the Court consolidated remedial rules it
had earlier forged in Green and Swann into the following three equitable rules to
guide the crafting of future remedial desegregation decrees:
(1) The nature of the remedy is to be determined by the nature and scope of
the constitutional violation.86
(W.D. Mo. 1985); see also Lynn Byczynski, Judge Raises Taxes to Pay for School Bias
Remedy, NAT'L LAW J., Oct. 5, 1987, at 25 (stating that the KCMSD remedial program was
"designed to attract white students from the suburbs and private schools to help balance the 74
percent minority district").
83 See Howard I. Kalodner, Overview of Judicial Activism in Education Litigation, in
JUSTICE AND SCHOOL SYSTEMS: THE ROLE OF THE COURTS IN EDUCATION LrrIGATION 3, 6
(Barbara Flicker ed., 1990) (transporting children to magnet schools, providing special or
remedial education to assist in the educational process, and paying the costs of lawyers and
other litigation expenses all increase the costs of the public educational system).
84 See id. at 6 (finding limited financial resources in many cities due to population
movements that have depleted the tax base at the same time that the costs of municipal
government have risen dramatically).
85 See Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 59-60 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting
the KCMSD's friendly relationship with the plaintiffs and its lack of concern for the costs
associated with the expensive magnet school remedies); Kelley v. Metropolitan County Bd. of
Educ. of Nashville, 836 F.2d 986, 987-88 (6th Cir. 1987) (reversing the district court's order to
the state to assume 60% of the costs attributable to the board of education's desegregation plan
in response to the board's request for state assumption of these costs); see also CARL
MCGOWAN, THE ORGANIZATION OF JUDICIAL POWER IN THE UNITED STATES 79 (1969)
(expanding constitutional concepts like equal protection cause people to turn more to the courts
for relief against alleged oppressions); Lynn Horsley, School Accord Reached; Tentative
Settlement on Magnet Funding Reduces State's Share by $22 Million, KAN. CrTY STAR, Feb.
17, 1995, at Al (reporting on marathon negotiations to reach a settlement on magnet school
funding that involved the school district, the plaintiffs, the state governor, and the Missouri
education commissioner).
86 See Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken RI), 433 U.S. 267, 280 (1977). This rule is derived
from Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971). See supra
note 42 and accompanying text. This rule directs the court to examine the nature and extent of
the constitutional violation that has been committed by the local governmental unit in operating
a school system to determine the scope of the remedy. See Swann, 402 U.S. at 16. This rule
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(2) The decree must be remedial in nature. It must be designed to the extent
possible "to restore the victims of discriminatory conduct to the position they
would have occupied in the absence of such conduct."87
implies that the greater the constitutional violation, the greater the need for an extensive
remedial process. The rule is viewed as one that maximizes rights. See infra notes 87-93 and
accompanying text.
The rule has been criticized as too open ended to be applied in a consistent mariner. See
Friedman, supra note 1, at 743-45; Yoo, supra note 4, at 1132. Later Supreme Court decisions
tightened this rule to emphasize a closer nexus between the remedy and the constitutional
violation it is designed to correct See Hills v. Gautreau, 425 U.S. 284 (1976) (citing Swann,
402 U.S. 1) ("Once a constitutional violation is found, a federal court is required to tailor 'the
scope of the remedy' to fit 'the nature and extent of the constitutional violation."); see also
Gautreau, 425 U.S. at 293-94.
In Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406 (1977), the Court found the
system wide remedy imposed by the district court to be out of proportion to the constitutional
violations in the absence of findings that such a remedy was necessary to eliminate all vestiges
of school segregation. Brinknan, 433 U.S. at 418. The Court laid down more specific
guidelines upon the finding of a constitutional violation with the ruling that the district court:
(1) must determine how much incremental segregative effect these violations had on
the racial distribution of the... school population as presently constituted, when that
distribution is compared to what it would have been in the absence of such constitutional
violations. The remedy must be designed to redress that difference, and
(2) [O]nly ifthere has been a systemwide impact may there be a systemwide remedy.
Id. at 420 (Powell, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
By limiting the judiciary's remedial processes to correct only those constitutional
violations found, the Court seeks to limit the extent to which judicially imposed remedies
become a tool to address broad social, political, and economic problems outside of the context
of the litigation. For example, in Evans v. Buchanan, 555 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1977), the court
stated:
A court is not at liberty to issue orders merely because it believes they will produce a result
which the court finds desirable. The existence of a constitutional violation does not
authorize a court to seek to bring about conditions that never would have existed even if
there had been no constitutional violation. The remedy for a constitutional violation may
not be designed to eliminate arguably undesirable states of affairs caused by purely private
conduct (de facto segregation) or by state conduct which has in it no element of racial
discrimination. This much is settled by Milliken v. Bradley...
Id at 379.
87 Milliken II, 433 U.S. at 280. The Court added a rights maximizing rule, earlier stated in
Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken1), 418 U.S. 717, 746 (1974), that relates to the effectiveness of the
remedy. This rule is derived from Swanm and echoes the goal set forth in Green's emphasis
upon affirmative action to convert a segregated school system "to a unitary system in which
racial discrimination would be eliminated root and branch." Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S.
430, 437-48 (1968). This rule measures judicial decrees by their effectiveness and stops at
nothing short of complete equalization for those who have suffered discriminatory conduct. See
id. It calls for the complete elimination of the effects of constitutional violations. See Morgan v.
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(3) The "interests of state and local authorities in managing their own affairs,
consistent with the Constitution" must be taken into account in devising the
remedy.88
Rules number one and two focus exclusively on the remedial efforts
necessary to restore the victims of discriminatory conduct to the position they
would have achieved in the absence of the constitutional violations. This
approach has been termed "rights maximizing."89 School desegregation opinions
following Milliken IT placed more emphasis upon rights maximizing rules,
number one and two, than upon the third rule's "interest balancing!' 0 inquiry 1
Kerrigan, 530 F2d 401,415-16 (1976).
Professor Barry Friedman has criticized rule number two as "redundant and
uninformative." Friedman, supra note 1, at 745. He has pointed out that the rule supports
compensation for the victims of discriminatory conduct, a goal at odds with the Court's
Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence that focuses on prospective relief. See id. at 745-46.
Professor Richard A. Epstein has criticized this rights maximizing rule as ignoring remedial
limitations applicable in the private law of remedies and the reality that not all innocent
plaintiffs can be restored to the positions they would have enjoyed in the absence of the
constitutional violation. See Richard A. Epstein, The Remote Causes of Affirmative Action, or
School Desegregation in Kansas City, Missouri, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1101, 1111 (1996).
88 Milliken 11, 433 U.S. at 280-81. Rule number three stems from a statement in Swann.
See Swann, 402 U.S. at 16. According to Swann, the "task [in framing equitable remedies] is to
correct, by a balancing of the individual and collective interests, the condition that offends the
Constitution." Id.
Rule number three suggests awareness that rights cannot be restored in a vacuum, but must
be remedied in an ongoing political process that should result in greater awareness and
sensitivity to the rights and needs of the plaintiffs. The inclusion of rule number three clearly
calls upon the court to weigh the collective interests, including the ability of the locality and
state to fund the remedial decrees, when devising a remedy to restore the victims to the position
they would have occupied in the absence of discrimination. Rule number three has been
criticized as contrary to the principle articulated in Marbuy v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137,
163 (1803), that a remedy should be provided for every right violated. See Friedman, supra note
1, at 747.
89 Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585, 588-89 (1983). Many lower
federal court decisions have cited Swann for authority to redress constitutional violations
without examining the public burden such remedies impose. See, ag., Evans v. Buchanan, 416
F. Supp. 328, 345 (D. Del. 1976); Hart v. Community Sch. Bd. of Brooklyn, N.Y. Sch. Dist.
No. 21,383 F. Supp. 699, 752, 766 (E.D.N.Y. 1974); Dandridge v. Jefferson Parish Sch. Bd.,
332 F. Supp. 590, 594 (E.D. La. 1971). This view is understandable given the absence of any
reference to the principles of comity and federalism in the Swann opinion. See ELY, supra note
14, at 80-81 (arguing that the Constitution's checks and balances between the federal
government and the states and among the three federal branches do not adequately protect
minorities); Fiss, supra note 44, at 705-06 (arguing that segregated patterns of student
attendance constitute the predominant concern in the Swann case rather than the past
discriminatory acts causing segregation and that this concern triggers remedial plans that
require school boards to take every possible step to eliminate segregation).
90 Gewirtz, supra note 89, at 589. The interest balancing test stems from the statement in
2000]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNrAL
Even the Milliken I Court ignored the thrust of the third rule, which
acknowledges the worth of devising remedies that give local governments and
school districts power to continue to manage their own affairs while remedying a
constitutional violation.92 It devoted numerous pages to a discussion of the use of
remedial programs in court-ordered desegregation remedies, but failed to discuss
the local concerns entailed in the operation of a public school system.93 One
explanation for this discrepancy may lie in the difficulty encountered in
identifying the essential core elements of a successfully operating federalist
Swann that individual and collective interests should be balanced in the process of remedying
the constitutional violation. See Swann, 402 U.S. at 15-16. The Swann Court's admission that
limitations exist as to the scope of remedies that the federal judiciary may impose has received
even less recognition than the balancing test articulated in Swann. See id. at 28. After opining
that remedies for school segregation may be "administratively awkward, inconvenient, and
even bizarre in some situations," the Court stated: "No fixed or even substantially fixed
guidelines can be established as to how far a court can go, but it must be recognized that there
are limits." Ia
91 In San Francisco NAACP v. San Francisco Unified School District, 695 F. Supp. 1033
(N.D. Cal. 1988), the court stated, for example, that federal courts are obligated to protect
constitutional rights of school children, a mission that cannot be thwarted by lack of funding or
other political conditions. See id. at 1041-42. Relying upon rights maximizing principles, the
district court in Little Rock School District v. Pulaski County Special School District No. 1, 597
F. Supp. 1220 (E.D. Ark. 1984), remanded, 778 F.2d 404, 408, 433-34 (8th Cir. 1985)
(ordering less intrusive remedial measures than the district court's consolidation plan),
emphasized that school desegregation remedies must be fashioned with a scope and nature to
correct the constitutional violations found. See Pulaski, 597 F. Supp. at 1228. Victims of the
discrimination must be restored as nearly as possible to the position they would have occupied
in the absence of discrimination. See id. The court made no reference to state and local interests
in its summary of the reasons given for its remedial desegregation orders. See id A critique of
Milliken 1/'s rights maximizing rules notes that "[t]he Court does not appear to have ever
invalidated a structural remedy on the ground that it improperly intruded upon the proper
authority of state and local institutions." Yoo, supra note 4, at 1133 (footnote omitted).
In Evans v. Buchanan, 455 F. Supp. 715, 723 (D. Del. 1978), the district court noted the
tension between the principles of federalism and the court's judicial duty to enforce equitable
decrees to vindicate constitutional rights. The court stated its preference to enforce remedial
decrees "however unpopular or economically unattractive." Id
92 Given the extent of the past and present racial discrimination that exists in American
society, the Court's rights maximizing approach is not surprising. The Supreme Court, in fact,
in Milliken 1, for the first time, addressed the issue of whether remedial and quality education
programs could be mandated as part of a remedy for unconstitutional segregation. See Milliken
II, 433 U.S. at 279. The answer was yes. See id. at 279,287-88.
93 It is also noteworthy, as Justice Powell pointed out in his concuring opinion in Milliken
II, that the local school board enthusiastically endorsed the Milliken II remedies even though
they intruded upon its decision-making processes. See Milliken II, 433 U.S. at 292-93. The
board stood to receive $5,800,000 from the state to fund the educational components. See id
The Court summarily dismissed the claim that the relief ordered violated the Tenth Amendment
and general principles of federalism in one paragraph. See id. at 291.
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system.94
While many courts ignore Milliken ITs third rule,95 some opinions do express
a need for greater sensitivity to local and state concerns in crafting remedies. In
Diaz v. San Jose Unified School District,96 one of the few reported school
desegregation decisions that have elaborated upon Milliken l's three-part test, the
district court stated that the court's remedy should be responsive not only to the
abridgment of the plaintiffs' constitutional rights, but also to the collective
interests affected by the remedial plan.97 The court noted that the burden of
devising an effective remedial plan fell upon the defendant school district and
emphasized a balancing of both individual and collective interests.98 It declined to
impose student reassignment mandates, a remedial plan proposed by the
plaintiffs, until the school district had the opportunity to maximize voluntary
choices to achieve desegregation through the use of magnet schools. 99 The court
concluded that the district's operation of magnet schools would be more effective
than the plaintiffs' proposed remedy, which could cause community bitterness
and a decline in the number of majority students according to expert testimony. 00
94 The Tenth Amendment states that "[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to
the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X. Contemporary definitions of federalism focus on the
division of power between the states and the federal government. See Martin Diamond, The
Federalist on Federalism: "Neither a National Nor a Federal Constitution, But a Composition
ofBoth," 86 YALE LJ. 1273, 1277 (1977). The retention of power at the state level is viewed as
making the United States government a federal one. See id at 1279. Professor Diamond argues,
however, that The Federalist shows that the Framers viewed the central government as
comprised of both national and federal elements. See id. at 1277-79. The central government is
national as to the extent of the powers granted to it, but it contains federal elements such as the
Electoral College and the Senate. See id at 1278-79.
Historically, the values of federalism have been difficult to articulate and define. See Vicki
C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and Principle, 111 HARV. L.
REV. 2180, 2243 (1998) (pointing out that the core values of individual rights and liberties
appear in many jurisprudential systems, but that identifying core federalism values is harder);
Yoo, supra note 4, at 1134 (noting the difficulty courts experience in identifying the elements of
local authority that deserve federalism protections). In a 1997 article, Professor Barry Friedman
asserted that federalism is undervalued because not enough effort has been made to measure the
worth of the values it serves. See Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REv. 317,
317 (1997).
95 See, e.g., San Francisco NAACP, 695 F. Supp. at 1042 (referring to Milliken 11 as
precedent to support the district court's order to the state to pay desegregation costs without
mentioning the three-part test).
96 633 F. Supp. 808 (N.D. Cal. 1986), aff'd, 861 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1988).
97 Seeid at811.
98 Seeid. at 811-12.
9 9 See id. at 810, 827.
10 0 See i. at 812-14.
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E. Unitary Status
In Green, the Court held that a school system achieves unitary status only
when racial discrimination has been eliminated completely.10' The Swann Court
believed that at some point full compliance with Brown I would be achieved
making further intervention by a district court unnecessary.10 2 However, these
opinions did not address the issue of whether a district can abandon a
desegregation plan after achieving unitary status or whether it remains subject to a
duty to attain racial balance indefinitely.103
In Board of Education of Oklahoma City Public Schools v. Dowell,1°4 the
Court held that once a school district eliminates the vestiges of past discrimination
to the extent possible and exhibits good faith compliance with a desegregation
order, judicial supervision can terminate. 105 In considering whether the vestiges
of de jure segregation had been eliminated, the district court was instructed to
examine every facet of school operations, including student assignments.10 6 The
question remained after Dowell whether a district court could relinquish its
control over a school district in incremental stages as compliance with Brown I
101 See Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430,437-38 (1968). A unitary system has
been defined as follows:
A school system judged by the federal courts to no longer be a dual system,* that is,
operating one system for majority and one for minority children; thus the school district
has corrected the problem of segregation* and is released from direct monitoring by the
federal District Court* of the implementation of the school desegregation plan.* When
districts lack unitary status and are under a court order, they must receive approval for all
changes to the desegregation plan from the plaintiffs and the court.
RAFFEL, supra note 32, at 256.
102 See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 31-32 (1971).
103 See ARMOR, supra note 39, at 49.
104 498 U.S. 237 (1991).
105 See id at 248-50. The Court stated that residential segregation in Oklahoma City,
resulting from private decision making and economics, was too attenuated to constitute a
vestige of past school segregation. See id. at 250 n.2; see also ARMOR, supra note 39, at 118.
10 6 SeeDowell, 498 U.S. at 250. The Court stated:
The District Court should address itself to whether the Board had complied in good faith
with the desegregation decree since it was entered, and whether the vestiges of past
discrimination had been eliminated to the extent practicable. In considering whether the
vestiges of de jure segregation had been eliminated as far as practicable, the District Court
should look not only at student assignments, but "to every facet of school operations-
faculty, staff, transportation, extra-curricular activities and facilities."
Id. at 249-50 (citations omitted).
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was achieved. In Freeman v. Pits,107 the Court held that district courts have such
authority.' 08 Factors to be considered in incremental withdrawal included
compliance with the desegregation decree in the areas to be removed from
control, the impact of withdrawing supervision upon the other areas for which
compliance had not been achieved, and good faith commitment to comply with
the court's decree. 109
F. Jenkins v. Missouri: The Cost and Scope of lli"en H-Type Remedies
Expand
1. The Complaint
In 1977, the Kansas City Missouri School District (KCMSD) and a group of
school students sued the States of Kansas and Missouri, suburban school districts
in the Kansas City metropolitan area, and federal agencies for the implementation
of a metropolitan-wide school desegregation plan." 0 The complaint alleged that
the defendants' actions caused racially isolated and identifiable school districts to
be maintained in the Kansas City metropolitan area.111  The plaintiffs
claimed that the defendants' discriminatory practices resulted in "white flight,"
the exodus of middle class families away from the KCMSD, causing a reduction
in the KCMSD's tax base and increasing its operating expenses for the education
107 503 U.S. 467 (1992).
108 See id. at 490 ("We hold that, in the course of supervising desegregation plans,
federal courts have the authority to relinquish supervision and control of school districts in
incremental states, before full compliance has been achieved in every area of school
operations.").
109 See id at 491.
110 The plaintiffs sued the State of Kansas, its State Board of Education, certain Kansas
school districts within the metropolitan area, the State of Missouri, the Missouri State Board of
Education, certain Missouri school districts within the metropolitan area, the United States
Departments of Housing and Urban Development; of Health, Education, and Welfare; and of
Transportation. See School Dist. of Kansas City v. Missouri, 460 F. Supp. 421, 427 (W.D. Mo.
1978).
111 See id at 428. The complaint alleged that the States of Missouri and Kansas had
caused increased racial segregation through piecemeal actions and the creation of arbitrary
boundary lines. See id. at 427. The complaint also alleged that the States of Kansas and
Missouri had failed to remedy the effects of previously state-imposed racial segregation. See id
at428.
By 1976, African-Americans comprised 65% of the children enrolled in the KCMSD, up
from less than 50% in 1960. See Alison Morantz, Money and Choice in Kansas City: Major
Investments with Modest Returns, in DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION: THE QUET REvERSAL OF
BROwm V. BOARD OF EDUCA77ON 244-45 (Gary Orfield et al. eds., 1996). The percentage of
African-Americans in the KCMSD in 1994 reached 75%. See id. at 244.
2000]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURAL
of disadvantaged children.1 2 Claiming that only a metropolitan solution could
alleviate the area's segregated conditions, the plaintiffs sought a court-ordered
reassignment of students in the KCMSD and in the suburban school districts to
achieve a greater racial balance among students.' 13
As the litigation progressed, the district court dismissed many of the party
defendants. In 1978, the State of Kansas and the Kansas suburban school districts
were dismissed from the case for lack of personal jurisdiction.114 At that time the
district court also dismissed the KCMSD as a party plaintiff for lack of standing
and rejoined it as a party defendant to the action.115 In May 1979, after the
KCMSD was realigned as a party defendant the plaintiffs filed an amended
complaint against the KCMSD and the original Missouri and federal
defendants.116
In their amended complaint, the plaintiffs again claimed that their rights could
be protected only by the reassignment of students among all the school districts in
the metropolitan area.1 17 The district court noted, however, that pursuant to the
Milliken I standards it could not mandate an interdistrict remedy unless the
defendants had acted unconstitutionally in a discriminatory way that caused
interdistrict segregation."18 Finding no interdistrict violation and no interdistrict
effect the district court in 1984 dismissed the suburban school districts.1 19
Further, the court dismissed the federal defendants for lack of racial animus and
1 1 2 Disadvantaged children need greater individual attention, compensatory education,
and counseling. See School Dist. ofKansas City, 460 F. Supp. at 428.
1 13 See id The plaintiffs alleged that the Kansas City, Missouri metropolitan area,
covering over 50 local governments and school districts, constituted a single urban community
that was integral from the perspectives of commerce, employment, recreation, cultural
activities, utilities, and transportation issues. See id. at 427.
114 Seeid at445.
115 See id at 444-45.
1 16 See Jenkins v. Missouri (Jenkins I), 807 F.2d 657, 661 (8th Cir. 1986); Jenkins v.
Missouri, 593 F. Supp. 1485, 1488 (W.D. Mo. 1984). The plaintiffs claimed that the KCMSD
bad ineffectively dealt with segregative patterns that had developed due to "impaction of
minorities, white flight, housing policies of other agencies and 'other factors beyond the
capacity of that district to manage."' See Jen/ans, 593 F. Supp. at 1488.
1 17 See Jenkins, 593 F. Supp. at 1489. The plaintiffs alleged that Missouri, the suburban
school districts, and the Department of Housing and Urban Development had committed
interdistrict constitutional violations and that the State defendants and the KCMSD had
committed intradistrict violations. SeeJenkins 1, 807 F.2d at 661.
1 18 SeeJenkin, 593 F. Supp. at 1488; see also Jenkins 1, 807 F.2d at 672.
119 See Jenkins, 593 F. Supp. at 1488-90. The district court found that the constitutional
violations in the KCMSD had no effects in the suburban school districts and that no acts or
omissions of the suburban school districts (SSDs) caused segregative effects in other school
districts. See Jenkins I, 807 F.2d at 672, 674. The SSDs were found to have eliminated any
vestiges of the former state-mandated dual system of education within at most four years after
Brown Iwas decided. SeeJenkins 1, 807 F.2d at 669.
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discriminatory actions, 120 leaving only the KCMSD and the State of Missouri as
defendants.121
2. The Imposition of Costly Milliken 11-Type Remedies
Dismissing the suburban school districts made desegregation efforts far more
difficult and costly than would have been the case otherwise. 122 The imposition
of an interdistrict remedy could have reassigned students living in the KCMSD to
suburban schools and vice versa, resulting in greater integration. Given the high
percentage of minority children in the KCMSD, racial balance within its schools
was unobtainable by the pursuit of only intradistrict remedies. 123 The KCMSD
and the plaintiffs opposed further mandatory student reassignment from that
undertaken in earlier remedial attempts within the KCMSD, fearing additional
white withdrawal from the school district.124 Thus, the only remedial alternative
left was the imposition of the more costly Milliken H-type remedies.
District Court Judge Russell G. Clark expressed fiustration with the inability
to implement an interdistrict desegregation plan that promised greater
opportunities for pupil integration and quality education initiatives. Viewing the
court's long-term remedial goal as one that would secure educational
opportunities for Kansas City school children that equaled or surpassed those
available to white suburban children, Judge Clark set out to achieve the benefits
of an interdistrict plan in an inner-city school district. 125 He sought to attract
120 The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) was dismissed "for
plaintiffs' failure to prove the agency acted with racial animus or abused its discretion in the
enforcement of Title VI." See Jenkins, 593 F. Supp. at 1488. The Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD) was dismissed because plaintiffs failed to show that HUD had
acted in a discriminatory fashion. See id at 1498-1501.
121 Seeid at 1506.
122 See Morantz, supra note 111, at 247 (discussing Judge Clark's reasons for dismissing
the suburban school districts and his thoughts on the difficulty of integrating the KCMSD
schools once the suburban districts were dismissed).
123 In 1977, the enrollment in the KCMSD schools was comprised of 65.6% minority
students. See Jenins v. Missouri, 639 F. Supp. 19, 35 (W.D. Mo. 1985). In 1985, 19 of the 50
elementary schools had enrollments of 90% or more black students. See id. at 36.
124 See id. White enrollment had decreased by more than 44% since a 1977 desegregation
plan implemented by the KCMSD went into effect. See id The district court refused to accept
white flight as an excuse for the failure to desegregate public schools. See id. at 37.
Nonetheless, the district court concluded that 'Turther mandatory student reassignment at this
time will only serve to increase the instability of the KCMSD and reduce the potential for
desegregation." lt at 38.
12 5 See id at 54. Judge Clark stated: "The long term goal of this Court's remedial order is
to make available to all KCMSD students educational opportunities equal to or greater than
those presently available in the average Kansas City, Missouri metropolitan suburban school
district." Id (emphasis in the original).
In Jeldhns II, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals characterized the district court's goals as
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white students to voluntarily enroll in the KCMSD's schools primarily through
the creation of many magnet programs and a massive capital improvement
program.1 26
The remedial plan's design to increase educational achievement in the
KCMSD was ambitious. The district court ordered the hiring of additional
librarians, the recruitment of well-trained and qualified teachers, a reduction in
class sizes, the implementation of a summer school program, the expansion of an
all-day kindergarten program to include all students, early childhood development
programs, and school tutoring.1 27 Judge Clark also ordered the KCMSD to
establish a staff development program in conjunction with public relations
programs to inform and solicit the support of the communtity for the remedial
plans.128
The court believed that the improvements in the quality of education offered
by the KCMSD would maintain nonminority student enrollments. 129 It hoped that
these improvements would increase the number of desegregative educational
experiences available in the KCMSD by attracting a greater nonminority
enrollment.130 To further enhance racial diversity in the KCMSD, the court
ordered the State to seek participation from the suburban school districts in a
voluntary interdistrict transfer program.13' Magnet schools and capital
improvements to the KCMSD's facilities constituted the primary tools, however,
to attract more white students to join minority students in Kansas City
classrooms.132
The plaintiffs and the KCMSD proposed a comprehensive magnet program
to make every senior high school, every middle school, and about half of the
elementary schools in the KCMSD a magnet school. The plaintiffs thought that
world-class facilities and the magnet schools' unique curricula would augment
follows: "[F]irst, to improve the educational lot of the victims of unconstitutional segregation;
second, to regain some portion of the white students who fled the district and retain those who
are still there; and third, to redistribute the students within the KCMSD to achieve the
maximum desegregation possible." Id. at 1302.126 See Jenkins, 639 F. Supp. at 39-41, 53-55.
127 See id at 26-33. The reduction in class size was believed to attract nonminority as
well as minority students. See id. at 29. The all-day kindergarten program entailed the hiring of
additional kindergarten teachers. See id. at 29,31-32.
128 See id at 35. The court viewed staff development as an essential means to improve
student achievement. See id.
129 See id at 38.
1 3 0 See id
131 See iad at 38-39. The court ordered the State to pay the costs associated with the
transfer of African-American students from the KCMSD schools to another school district in
which their race was in the minority. See id at 39.
132 See idr at 34-35,41; see also Morantz, supra note 111, at 248 (stating that the magnet
plan was chosen because it was viewed as the only viable way to attract white students back
into Kansas City).
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the KCMSD's marketability to white parents.133 Because the State assumed a
litigation posture of opposing the plaintiffs' remedial approach without
compromise, it alienated Judge Clark, who was committed to a comprehensive
plan, and, as a result, made him more receptive to the plaintiffs' proposed
remedies. 134 When the State failed to offer a scaled-down version of the
comprehensive magnet plan, viewed as a tactical error on its part, Judge Clark
lacked a credible alternative to the plaintiffs' sweeping magnet school
proposal.135
The State and the KCMSD also sharply disagreed over capital improvement
expenditures. The KCMSD estimated building rehabilitation costs to be between
fifty-five million and seventy million dollars, whereas the State proposed that a
twenty million dollars facilities program be undertaken with the State's
contribution no greater than ten million dollars.136 The district court rejected the
State's arguments noting that more than health and safety improvements would
be necessary to attract nonminority students into the KCMSD.137
Once the court ordered an initial capital improvement program at a cost of
thirty-seven million dollars138 and approved the plaintiffs' full-scale magnet
plan,139 the focus of the litigation turned to the financing of the mandated
remedial measures. The cost to implement the remedial plan, exceeding well over
a billion dollars, far outstripped the school district's resources. 140 Failing to
examine its course of action from a long-term perspective, the district court
embarked on a remedial plan, unprecedented in scope, that the KCMSD was
133 See Morantz, supra note I11, at 248. The plaintiffs also hoped that by magnetizing all
schools, the elimination of a two-tiered system, in which nonmagnet schools received fewer
resources and provided inferior education, could be avoided. See id
13 4 See id at 249. Judge Clark characterized the State's policy of "total opposition" as
counter-productive. See id.
135 See Morantz, Supra note 111, at 249.
136 See Jenkins v. Missouri, 639 F. Supp. 19, 40 (W.D. Mo. 1985). The State's four
reasons for its proposed $10,000,000 contribution were as follows: (1) the condition of the
facilities was not traceable to the existence of any unlawful segregation found by the court; (2)
the facilities had deteriorated because the KCMSD had failed to properly maintain them; (3) the
proposed outlays were not necessary to effectuate the quality education components of the
desegregation plan; and (4) the KCMSD's $55,000,000 to $70,000,000 estimates were
excessive making a budget of $20,000,000 sufficient to address poor health and safety
conditions in the KCMSD schools. See a
137 See id at41.
138 See id at53.
139 See id at 54. In 1995, the Court stated that the magnet school program had operated at
a cost of $448,000, 000. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70,77 (1995).
140 Judge Russell G. Clark, who retained jurisdiction of the case for 19 /2 years until
jurisdiction was turned over to Judge Dean Whipple in 1997, ordered expenditures in the range
of $1,800,000,000. See Stephen Winn, Clark's Final Assessment Is Portent Worth Heeding,
KAN. Crry STAR, March 29,1997.
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unable to finance, or even maintain for that matter, with its own resources. 141
Holding the KCMSD and the State jointly liable, the district court allocated many
remedial costs to the State.142 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled,
however, that the State should not be required to bear more than one-half of the
total cost.143
In addition to challenging the district court's allocation of costs, the State also
contested the scope of the district court's remedial measures144 and challenged
the court's power to raise local property taxes to fund them.145 The Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's scope of remedies with slight
modifications. 146 In Part II of this Article, the Eighth Circuit's treatment of the
judicial taxation issues is discussed. The United States Supreme Court declined to
review the district court's authority to order the expansive remedial program,147
but granted certiorari with respect to the power of the district court to raise local
property taxes.148 Thus, the Court's 1990 Jenkins decision addresses the propriety
of the district court's authorization of taxation and its removal of state law
limitations to facilitate such taxation. In 1994, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari, however, on the propriety of mandated salary increases as part of the
141 See Morantz, supra note 1 11, at 262. (In Jenkins, the district court ordered new
facilities on a scale so immense that the district would never be able to maintain them on its
own.'). Jenkins is viewed as "[representing] an extreme case of one popular type of
desegregation remedy." Id at 241.
In Jenkins II, on the rehearing en banc, Circuit Judge Bowman, dissenting from the denial
of the rehearing en banc, stated:
The remedies ordered go far beyond anything previously seen in a school desegregation
case. The sheer immensity of the programs encompassed by the district court's order-the
large number of magnet schools and the quantity of capital renovation and new
construction-are concededly without parallel in any other school district in the country.
Similarly, in no other case has federal judicial power been used to impose a tax increase in
order to provide funding for a desegregation remedy.
855 F.2d 1295, 1318-19 (8th Cir. 1988).
142 See Jenkins v. Missouri, 639 F. Supp. 19, 43-44, 55-56 (W.D. Mo. 1985). Finding
lingering vestiges of the prior state-mandated, dual school system, the district court held that the
obligations of the State to both the plaintiffs and the KCMSD had not been met. See Jenkins v.
Missouri, 593 F. Supp. 1485, 1504-05 (W.D. Mo. 1984). The imposition of joint liability
makes it possible for one of the liable parties to make up any shortfalls that occur by reason of
the other party's inability to pay its share of the costs.
14 3 See Jenkins v. Missouri (Jenkins I), 807 F.2d 657,686 (8th Cir. 1986).
144 See Jenkins 1, 855 F.2d at 1302-09.
145 See id. at 1309.
146 See id at 1299.
147 See Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 45 (1990) (citing Missouri v. Jenkins, 490
U.S. 1034, 1034 (1989)).
148 See Missouri v. Jenkins, 490 U.S. at 1034.
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ordered quality improvements and the district court's reliance upon the use of test
scores to determine whether the state had achieved partial unitary status.149 The
Court resolved these issues in its 1995 Jenkins decision.
G. The Supreme Court's Retreat in Its 1995 Jenkins Decision
The genesis of the Court's 1995 decision can be traced to 1987 when the
district court first provided for teacher salary increases as part of its remedial
desegregation plan for the KCMSD.150 At that time, the State of Missouri did not
contest this order.151 When the KCMSD filed a motion in 1992-93 for approval
of its desegregation plan that included salary increases for instructional and
noninstructional staff, the State objected. It challenged the district court's salary
funding for both instructional and noninstructional staff as exceeding the scope of
the district court's remedial powers. 152 The State firther contested the district
court's order to continue funding remedial quality education programs,
suggesting that the district court should enter a finding of partial unitary status for
the State's quality improvement funding.153 The court of appeals, upholding the
district court orders, found that the State should not be relieved of its duty to fund
the quality improvement programs because the vestiges of past discrimination-
the system-wide reduction in student achievement and the white flight-had not
been eliminated to the greatest extent possible.154 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari to consider the following: (1) the district court's authority to impose the
salary increases and (2) the propriety of the district court's reliance upon student
achievement test scores to determine whether partial unitary status had been
reached for the quality improvement programs? 55
The Court chose to review the scope of the district court's remedial power in
determining the constitutionality of the salary increase orders. The Court affirmed
its earlier standard set forth in Milliken H that a district court in addressing
unconstitutional school segregation should restore the victims of discriminatory
conduct to the position they would have occupied in the absence of that
conduct.156 The Court ruled, however, that the district court's pursuit of a remedy
14 9 See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 83 (1995) (citing Missouri v. Jenkins, 512 U.S.
1287, 1287 (1994)).
150 See Jenkins v. Missouri, 672 F. Supp. 400,410 (W.D. Mo. 1987). The court provided
for additional revenue to be applied toward salary increases it believed necessary to implement
the educational improvement programs and to ensure no diminution in their quality. See id
151 See Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 143 (Souter, J., dissenting).
152 See id at 80.
153 See id.
154 See Jenkins v. Missouri (Jenkins Il), 11 F.3d 755,764-66 (8th Cir. 1993).
155 See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 83.
156 See id at 89. Milliken I's broad governing legal principles guiding the school-
desegregation remedial process remained substantially unchanged in the 1990s. See HASKINS,
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with an interdistrict purpose, "desegregative attractiveness," 157 exceeded its
authority to remedy an intradistrict violation.158 Viewing the salary increases as
an integral part of the district court's remedial goal of "desegregative
attractiveness," the Court ruled that these increases lacked a sufficient remedial
nexus to the previously mandated segregation.159
As to the second issue, the State's continued funding of quality improvement
programs, the Court ruled that the district court's role was to assess whether the
reduction of student achievement attributable to the prior de jure segregation had
been remedied to the extent practicable.160 The Court found that improved
achievement on test scores did not constitute a requirement to satisfy Freeman's
three-part test for partial unitary status. 161 The Court supported this conclusion
with statements to the effect that the State had helped finance rather than
implement the quality improvement programs, noting that demographic changes
and other external factors independent of de jure segregation could affect the
racial composition of the KCMSD's schools. 162
I Assessment of School Desegregation Remedies at the Millennium
The immediate goal of Brown I was to eliminate the state sanctioned
separation of public school children on the basis of race. 163 The Court justified its
decision, however, not only on equal protection grounds, but also on the premise
that racial segregation damaged the self-confidence of African-American
students.164 Brown's call for an integrated education-a goal surpassing the
immediate objective of removing state imposed barriers-has been less far
reaching than originally hoped due to the inherent nature of race relations in the
supra note 15, at 159.
157 Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 91.
158 See id. at 89-90.
159 See id at 100.
160 See id. at 101-02.
161 See id. For a discussion of Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 487 (1992), see supra notes
107-09 and accompanying text.
1 6 2 See Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 102.
1 6 3 See 14 FORTY YEARS AFrER THE BROwN DECISION: SocIAL AND CULTURAL EFFECTs
OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 425-27 (Charles Teddlie & Kofi Lomotey eds., 1997) [hereinafter
FORTYYEARS].
164 This assumption has come under attack. See WOLTERS, THE BURDEN OF BROY,7.
THRTY YEARS OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 283 (1984) ("[B]y the early 1960s the social
science research the Supreme Court had cited in Brown had been widely discredited."); see also
Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 114 (Thomas, ., concurring) ("[T]he theory that black students suffer an
unspecified psychological harm from segregation that retards their mental and educational
development... relies upon questionable social science research ... [and] also rests on an
assumption of black inferiority").
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United States.165
The benefits stemming from a racially integrated education cannot be
achieved solely on the basis of neutral pupil assignments due to residential
segregation. 166 The housing market, with its set of discriminatory attitudes and
practices, continues to cause residential segregation by race. 167 The proportion of
African-American students enrolled in large urban cities increased dramatically
over the last two years.168 Declining white enrollments are attributed to
demographic changes and the movement of whites to the suburbs, trends that
cannot be reversed by school desegregation plans.169 The migration, since the
1 6 5 See FELDMAN Er AL., supra note 11, at 14; FORTY YEARS, supra note 163, at 426-28;
JACOBS, supra note 39, at 196-99. For statistics substantiating rising poverty among children
attending Columbus, Ohio public schools between 1968 and 1986, see JACOBS, supra note 39,
at 155.
166 While courts could dictate pupil assignments to alter the relationship between housing
and school attendance, they could not control the local residential market, which continued to
make race-conscious decisions resulting in the redlining of areas subject to desegregation
remedies. See JACOBS, supra note 39, at 197. The failure of desegregation efforts in Columbus,
Ohio to achieve equal educational opportunities, for example, has been attributed to the
market's unwillingness to make capital investments in areas served by an inner-city school
system undergoing desegregation. See Id at 121, 130. The filing in 1973 of the desegregation
lawsuit, Columbus Board of Education v. Penick, chilled investment in the central city home-
building market due to market uncertainty. See id. Fearing that the elimination of a predictable
neighborhood school assignment would deter prospective home buyers, bankers, developers,
and builders chose not to risk their resources on new construction within the boundaries of the
Columbus school system. See id.
167 See Gary Orfield, Segregated Housing and School Resegregation, in DISMANTLING
DESEGREGATION: THE QuIEr REVERSAL OFBROWN V. BOARD OFED uCA77ON 308 (Gary Orfield
et al. eds., 1996).
168 See FORTY YEARS, supra note 163, at 428-29. In the Indianapolis public schools, for
example, white students comprised a majority in 1978-79, but by 1995-96 they constituted just
40% of the school population. See FIFE, supra note 38, at 71. In 1954 blacks accounted for
18.9% of the KCMSD's enrollment, but by 1983-84 they comprised 67.7% of the student
population. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 116 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring). The
large nonwhite underclass trapped in the inner cities in the 1990s includes a large Latino
population as well as African-Americans. See HASKINS, supra note 15, at 163. In 1994, a
number of years after the implementation of the Milliken I remedies in Detroit, 92% of Detroit
students were members of racial or ethnic minority groups. See FELDMAN ETAL., supra note 11,
at 19. While Columbus, Ohio's black population increased by 112% between 1950 and 1970,
only 15% of the city's African-Americans lived outside of the city's 1950 boundaries. See
JACOBS, supra note 39, at 11.
1 6 9 See Gary Orfield, The Growth of Segregation: African Americans, Latinos, and
Unequal Education, in DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION: THE QUIET REVERSAL OF BROW V.
BOARD OF EDUCATION 53, 61-63 (Gary Orfield et al. eds., 1996). Among the demographic
reasons for declining white enrollments in city public schools is a decrease in the birth rate of
white persons since the 1950s and an increasing in-migration of minorities. See TAYLOR, supra
note 50, at 154. The decline in white school enrollment in the central cities has occurred even in
cities that retained neighborhood schools and did not implement busing plans. See Orfield,
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Brown I decision, of many African-Americans from rural areas in the South to the
central cities of the nation's largest metropolitan areas also accounts for
demographic changes in urban school districts.170
By the 1970s, the Court stressed active measures on the part of school
districts to achieve integration through balanced racial enrollments. 171 The
Court's Milliken I decision to disallow the desegregation of the Detroit schools
with the surrounding suburban areas, however, was a turning point that limited
the scope of school desegregation and busing.172 In response, district courts in the
1980s employed voluntary methods to attract white students to attend schools in
areas with predominantly minority populations. District court judges expanded
their remedial tools to include the creation of magnet schools, providing a
particular curricular theme or method of instruction, and other quality
improvement programs.173 These remedies greatly expanded educational costs,
supra, at 63.
The root cause of resegregation in Kansas City, Missouri since the 1950s cannot be
identified precisely. See RAYMOND WOLTERS, RIGHT TURN: WILLIAM BRADFORD REYNOLDS,
THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION, AND BLACK CIVIL RIGHTS 415 (1996). Affluence, the lure of
the suburbs, fear of crime, the desire to live among whites, and apprehension about the quality
of inner-city education have been cited as an explanation for white flight See id. The federal
govemment furthered the movement to the suburbs by siting a disproportionate amount of
public housing in the city, underwriting home mortgages in the suburbs, and funding roads and
other infrastructure improvements outside the city. See id. Boston began losing population after
World War I and experienced a white flight acceleration in the mid-1970s when school
desegregation remedies commenced, but during the 1980s the decline in white residents was
lower than it had been in the 1960s. See TAYLOR, supra note 50, at 152-53. In Columbus, Ohio,
federal lending practices and the creation of the interstate highway system accelerated the white
exodus from the inner city, pulling jobs and services toward the city's periphery. See JACOBS,
supra note 39, at 10.
170 See FORTY YEARS, supra note 163, at 428-29. By the 1970s, African-Americans had
become the most urban of the nation's groups. See id. at 428. In 1954, blacks lived
predominantly in rural areas, but by the 1970s more than 50% of African-Americans resided in
urban areas, 37% of them living in the central cities of the nation's largest metropolitan areas.
See id. at 428-29.
171 See WOLTERS, supra note 164, at 3-5. The Green decision changed the Court's stance
from antidiscrimination, making student assignments without regard to their race, to a policy of
required integration, using race as a factor in the assignment of students to schools. See RAFFEL
supra note 32, at xiv-xv; WOLTERS, supra note 164, at 7. The Court's frustration with the
implementation of racially neutral school assignments is attributed with causing it to require
racial balancing. See RAFFEL, supra note 32, at xv.
172 See RAFFEL, supra note 32, at xv. Busing was resisted throughout the country. See
WOLTERS, supra note 164, at 6-7. It is virtually impossible to achieve integrated education
without massive busing that would include the metropolitan area as well as inner city areas. See
FELDMAN ET AL., supra note 11, at 7.
173 The imposition of the ancillary, quality improvement programs approved by the Court
in its Milliken II decision cause greater judicial intrusion into the provision of public education
than remedies designed to cause desegregation such as busing. See Orfield, supra note 11, at 3.
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leading the federal judiciary to impose fiscal educational mandates upon states
and local school districts.
This Article argues that the remedial measures employed by the Jenkins
district court eroded representative democracy and violated the federal
Constitution's separation of powers framework. Jenkins presents, nonetheless, the
issue of whether the district court's deeply intrusive measures may be justified
because the goal of school desegregation warrants judicial action when political
will is lacking.174 In a technological era in which the ability to obtain a quality
education holds the key to success, it has been argued that the improvement of
schools indeed constitutes a civil rights issue.175 Although an evaluation of the
effectiveness of school desegregation is beyond the scope of this Article, a
sufficient amount of time has elapsed from the Court's affirmative action
approaches, beginning in the 1970s, to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of
the desegregation remedies.1 76
At the millennium evidence has been gathered proving the value of an
integrated education for all children. 177 The influx of African-American students
into suburban schools as a result of St. Louis's desegregation plan, for example,
caused some educators to change practices that not only alienated black students,
but failed to meet the needs of hundreds of white students as well.178 Discourse in
a racially mixed classroom broadens all students' understanding of different
cultures, racial issues, and inequality.179 White students benefit from exposure to
multicultural "ways of knowing" and greater opportunities to critique existing
societal conditions that build awareness of racial polarization and inner city
174 See Kalodner, supra note 83, at 4 ("[L]itigation is the last and the least but all too
frequently the only recourse of those who suffer discrimination at the bands of those who
administer our educational systems.").
175 See Orfield, supra note 169, at 53-57,65-71; Ira J. Hadnot, B. Keith Fulton, DALLAS
MORNING NEWs, June 27, J999, (Sun. Reader), at 1J (providing an interview with B. Keith
Fulton, Director of Technology, National Urban League).
176 District court judges overseeing the implementation of school desegregation express
satisfaction with the results achieved and attribute the lack of complete success to white flight,
segregated housing patterns, and insufficient finding. See Kalodner, supra note 83, at 4-5.
177 Surveys found the Columbus, Ohio school district, for example, to be healthier in 1985
than it was at the commencement of the Columbus Board ofEducation v. Penick desegregation
lawsuit in 1973. See JACOBS, supra note 39, at 158. Teacher and student attitudes toward
desegregation had grown more positive. See id. A smaller percentage of people viewed
desegregation and busing as the biggest problem facing the Columbus schools. See id. Black
student performance had continued to increase at all levels and test scores for elementary and
middle schools were on the rise. See id.
178 See WELLS & CRAN, supra note 37, at 287-88. Implementation of the desegregation
plan resulted in enhanced awareness of students' individual needs and served as a catalyst to
improve teaching techniques. See id. at 288.
179 See id. at 293.
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poverty.' 80 African-American students who have positive contacts with white
students expand their social and work network, making them more successful in
earning a livelihood.181 A recent study found that students who attend racially
diverse schools become thoughtful learners and leave better prepared to
participate in a heterogeneous society than those attending less diverse
institutions.182 The Court's decision in Milliken Ito confine all remedial action to
the geographical area in which the constitutional violations occurred, however,
makes Brown Ts goal elusive. Studies show that the greatest amount of
integration has occurred in school districts organized on a metropolitan wide
basis.183 The .federal judiciary's lack of power to reorganize school districts
covering a large area encompassing both predominantly white and minority
populations makes racial diversity in the public schools impossible without the
cooperation of the affected political subdivisions.
At the time of Brown I, many African-Americans believed that integration
would improve education for all children by providing the resources to African-
American children that previously white children had enjoyed.1 84 By eliminating
decision making on the basis of race, they hoped that all children would be treated
alike in the same environment. 185 But Brown Ps nondiscrimination policy did not
erase the country's social and economic disparities. 186 When the struggle for
180 See id. at 289.
181 Studies have showed that African-American male graduates of integrated high schools
are more likely to obtain higher-status jobs and earn higher incomes than Afiican-American
graduates who attend segregated schools. See HASKINS, supra note 15, at 161-62. When black
children have positive experiences with white mentors, they are more likely to achieve
educational success and befriend whites later in life. See SANK POWE, GRIT, GUTS, AND
BASEBALL: THE STORIES OF COACH SANK PowE 229 (Beth Boswell Jacks ed., 1996). Interracial
mentoring and tutoring programs and integrated education can help forge positive relationships
between black and white children and adults. See id.
182 See Notebook CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Mar. 26, 1999, at A51; see also Sheff v.
O'Neill, 678 A.2d 1267, 1273 (1995) (stating that an integrated public school system benefits
all children by eliminating racial and ethnic isolation).
183 The most integrated metropolitan areas had mandatory city-suburban busing plans. See
HASKINS, supra note 15, at 161. These areas included Louisville, Kentucky; Tampa, Florida;
Wilmington, Delaware; Nashville, Tennessee; Greenville, South Carolina; and Greensboro,
North Carolina. See id.
184 See JACOBS, supra note 39, at 18.
185 See id. at 18. It is believed that "most African Americans maintain[ ] a lingering faith
in integration, buttressed by the reality of segregation's inevitable economic limitations" See id.
at 176.
186 See TAYLOR, supra note 24, at 177. In the 1990s, a growing number of black mayors
in the nation's large cities supported ending busing because racial balance was unachievable in
these cities. See JACOBS, supra note 39, at 188--89. The mayors also believed that busing
harmed their cities' economic base. See id. In Columbus, Ohio, the district court found that
racial problems continued to exist even at the time it terminated its supervision of court-ordered
desegregation. See id. at 157-58. For example, the discipline rate for black students was far
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integrated education failed to meet the expectations engendered by Brown I,
many African-Americans focused their attention on community control of the
public schools.187 Some African-Americans disagree with the pursuit of racial
balance strategies believing that segregated schools do not harm blacks' self-
images.188 In the KCMSD, for example, African-Americans challenged the
district court's pursuit of suburban white students to diversify the student body;
instead, they believed that integration was far less important than providing
quality education for black children.189
The quality improvement programs have achieved only limited success. 190
The Harvard Project on School Desegregation studied the effects of Milliken I-
type programs in Detroit Michigan; Little Rock Arkansas; Prince George's
County, Maryland, and Austin, Texas. The report concluded that the Milliken IT
remedies were used to supplant rather than supplement Brown !'s goal of
higher than the rate for white students at this time. See id
187 The civil rights movement failed to rid the nation of urban slums, inadequate health
care, segregated schools, and black unemployment. See TAYLOR, supra note 24, at 177. Black
power activists criticized attempts to forge an integrated society and advocated community
empowerment and control over institutions in the black community to improve the lives of
Aflican-Americans. See id In New York City, for example, when the school integration
movement ended in 1966 due to inaction on the part of the New York City Board of Education
and white resistance to busing, community activists and concerned parents organized to gain the
right to hire teachers, shape the curriculum, exercise budgetary control, and negotiate with the
unions. See id. at 120-23, 157, 180-81. They fought for school decentralization that transferred
power from the city's Board of Education to local governing school boards. See id. at 180-207
(describing the drive for decentralization, the Ocean Hill-Brownsville crisis stemming from
teacher opposition to decentralization, and the 1969 state legislative action relating to
decentralization).
188 See HASKINS, supra note 15, at 165; WOLTERS, supra note 164, at 283.
189 See Anderson, supra note 5, at 22. Justice Thomas in his concurring opinion in
Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995), criticized the district court's pursuit of racial balance in
the KCMSD as resting on the assumption "that blacks cannot succeed without the benefit of the
company of whites." Id. at 119. He cited several studies criticizing the studies cited in Brown I
that segregation causes feelings of inferiority. See id. at 119-20. In Columbus, Ohio, African-
Americans criticized school superintendent Ron Etheridge who resigned in 1990 "for being
more concerned with attracting suburban whites than educating urban blacks.' See JACOBS,
supra note 39, at 187-88.
190 In the four districts surveyed, the Harvard Project found no evidence that expensive
programming had redressed harms caused by segregation or improved educational
opportunities. See FELDMN ET AL., supra note 11, at 5. The Milliken I ancillary educational
programs employed in Detroit, for example, did not come close to eradicating students'
educational deficits. See id. at 8. Detroit's school enrollment is virtually all African-American in
the 1990s despite the extra money spent for the educational programs. See Orfield, supra note
167, at 315. In Austin, Texas, the school district allocated additional funding and special
programs into the most segregated schools and designated these schools as "Priority Schools."
See FELDMAN ET AL, supra note 11, at 10. These "Priority Schools" improved slightly over a
six-year period, but remain unequal to other school districts by many measurements. See id.
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integrated education.' 9 ' The programs served as a tool to extract more financial
resources from the state, providing temporary relief, but failing to reverse the
effects of past segregation.' 92 The educational remedies were viewed as
compensation for past discrimination rather than as a means to correct the
minority students' educational deficiencies.' 9 3 The study concluded that the array
of expensive programs did not fulfill Milliken ifs charge to restore the victims of
discrimination to the positions they would have achieved in its absence.194 The
study's authors found that no program could make "segregated minority schools
fundamentally equal to schools that enroll a racial and economic mix."195
The Harvard Project report noted a number of deficiencies in the
implementation of the ancillary educational programs. The school districts
surveyed failed to incorporate any evaluative tools to measure the success of the
remedial programs. 196 The programs were generally ill conceived and
191 See FaDMAN ETAL., supra note 11, at 7,14.
192 See id. at 19. In Detroit, the city school superintendent, at the time a settlement
agreement was reached with the state, characterized the settlement as a way to retain funding
for the educational programs as long as possible. See id. at 22. Many people viewed the
settlement plan in Little Rock, Arkansas as a deal for more money in lieu of mandatory busing.
See id. at 31.
193 See id at 8, 14. In Detroit, the inattention given to student performance likely resulted
from the view that the compensatory programs served to provide temporary relief rather than to
achieve educational equality. See id. at 19.
194 See id at 8, 14. The Little Rock, Arkansas case study, which examined the eight
"Incentive Schools" created to provide Milliken II relief, found that the programs made scant
progress toward restoring the victims of discriminatory conduct to the position they would have
occupied in its absence. See id. at 8. Little Rock's "Incentive Schools" remain highly
segregated. See id. Likewise, no evidence shows that the Milliken if remedies employed in
Prince George's County, Maryland, restored the victims to the positions they would have
obtained in its absence. See id. at 9.
195 Id. at 10-11.
196 Six years after the educational components of the Detroit desegregation plan were
ordered, the defendants and plaintiffs negotiated a settlement ending the remedies in 1989
without any evidence that the remedies had corrected the plaintiffs' educational deficiencies.
See id at 19. The authors of the Harvard Project on School Desegregation were unable to obtain
any documentation of evaluations made by the Detroit school district, or by the state, of the
effect of the educational improvements made as a result of the Milliken Il litigation. See id. at
25-26.
The case study of the remedial educational programs in Little Rock, Arkansas concluded
that no systematic evaluation of the programs had been conducted. See id. at 8. A 1985
Memorandum of Understanding reached by the defendant school board in Prince George's
County, Maryland and the plaintiff NAACP required the existence of Milliken I programs, but
made no reference to standards or measurement of success. See id. at 41. Some evaluations
were made, but the measurements upon which they were based are questionable. See id. at 40.
Standardized test scores, the principal data used by school authorities to measure the
effectiveness of the ancillary programs surveyed in the Harvard Project, cannot measure the
effectiveness of a given program or curriculum See id. at 58-59.
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unaffordable, with little thought given to future funding for them or achievable
outcomes.1 97 These programs had the further disadvantage of creating a
perception of inequality at the schools that did not receive Milliken IT-type
funding, but faced declining white student enrollments.1 98 The Harvard Project
argued in favor of greater emphasis upon the achievement of Brown !'s goal of
integration. 199 It supported further funding for properly designed educational
programs, but only if measured outcomes showed that their implementation helps
to remedy the effects of past racial discrimination. 00
The Milliken if-type remedies imposed in the KCMSD schools, at a cost of
$1.5 billion over an eight year period,201 achieved only modest success.2 02 The
KCMSD experienced the same problems reported in the Harvard Project. Clearly,
greater educational expenditures in the KCMSD did not translate automatically
into improved educational performances.203 The massive infusion of money into
the KCMSD failed, for example, to cause much improvement in student test
scores, which continued to remain low after the quality improvement programs
were instituted.2 04 The plan also failed to attract a significant number of white
197 See id at 32. In Little Rock, Arkansas, school officials did not develop a coherent
strategy for addressing the educational deficits of minority children by setting achievable
outcomes. See id. Instead, an assumption was made that expensive techniques and programs
would produce results without the need for further thinking. See id. at 32-33. Further, the
funding and educational elements of the Little Rock desegregation plan were developed
separately by two different committees, resulting in an unaffordable program. See id. at 33-34.
In Prince George's County, additional funds provided to magnet and Milliken 1I schools drew
better teachers and more active parents away from the remaining schools, leaving these schools
with inadequate leadership and funding. See id. at 44.
198 As non-Milliken H schools become more segregated, their representatives seek
entitlement to Milliken II-type funding. See id. at 44. A new kind of inequity is created if
funding cannot be provided to schools experiencing a decline in white student enrollments. See
id. at 45.
199 See id at 57. The Harvard Project argues that Milliken I remedies should not be
viewed as a substitute for racial integration. See id.
200 See id at 6.
201 See Morantz, supra note 111, at 242. In 1985, prior to the implementation of the
desegregation remedies, the KCMSD expenditures per pupil exceeded the statewide average by
10% to 21%. See id. at 252. From 1988 to 1993, the KCMSD's per pupil costs were
comparable to those in St. Louis and two of St. Louis's wealthy white suburbs. See id.
202 See id at 243, 256-61; William H. Freivogel, Jewels Shine Amid Failures in Kansas
City, KAN. CrrY STAR, May 16, 1994, atB5.
203 See Lynn Horsley, The Plan: Ambitiously Unrealistic Barriers Overcome, But Others
Remain, KAN. CITY STAR, May 9, 1994, at Al; Barbara Shelly, Clark Held onto Goals Some
Forgot, KAN. CrrY STAR, Jan. 29, 1997, at Cl; Stephen W. Winn, Local Test Scores Prompt
Divergent Views on Progress Hard to Believe Everyone Is Talking About the Same District and
the Same Test Scores, KAN. CrIY STAR, Mar. 20,1994, at LI.
204 Although students at magnet schools performed better on standardized tests than their
nonmagnet counterparts, the KCMSD test scores from 1990 to 1993 showed no improvement
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students to attend the KCMSD schools.2°5 Perhaps a longer time period is needed
to measure the effects of the federal judiciary's school desegregation intervention.
Even District Court Judge Russell G. Clark expressed great disappointment with
the pace and quality of the improvements he ordered in the KCMSD during his
oversight in the Jenkins lawsuit.20 6 The district court's experiment with
mandating financial support for the KCMSD that far outstripped the resources of
nearby school districts undoubtedly inured to the school district's benefit 207
However, in 1997, the State was released of its funding obligations leaving the
KCMSD with a less secure financial base.2 08 Three years later, the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals reinstated the twenty-three year old lawsuit following a 1999
in closing the gap between district and Missouri state averages. See Morantz, supra note 111, at
256-59. The KCMSD scores remained from 10% to 20% below Missouri state averages. See
id. at 259. Students enrolled in eight magnet schools providing foreign language immersion did
score above district averages and national norns. See id. at 257; see also Mark Bredemeier,
Equal Educational Opportunity and Race: School Desegregation in the '90s, Remarks at the
Panel I Discussion of the Drake University Law School Fourth Annual Constitutional Law
Symposium (Feb. 12-13, 1993) in, DRAKE UNVERSrrY LAW SCHOOL FouRTH ANNUAL
CONSTrUTIONAL LAW SYMPOsIUM: QUALiTY EDUCATION FOR ALL IN THE 21sT CENTURY:
CAN WE GET THERE FROM HERE? 1994, at 69-70 (reporting only minimal improvement in
student performance); Stephen Chapman, Sobering Lessons in KC Desegregation Case, KAN.
CITY STAR, June 22, 1995, at C7 (stating that no measurable improvement has been found in
student performance on standardized tests in the KCMSD).
In Missouri v. Jenkins, the Court rejected strong reliance upon student achievement, as
measured by test scores, to assess the success of a desegregation plan. See 515 U.S. 70, 101-02
(1995). The Court held that a finding of unitary status or the return of a school district to local
control can be found without such student improvement See id.
20 5 See Deborah E. Beck, Note, Jenkins v. Missouri: School Choice as a Method for
Desegregating an Inner-City School District, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1029, 1035-36 (1993) (stating
that the KCMSD's desegregation remedy attracted less than 750 new white students); see also
Morantz, supra note 111, at 259-60 (noting a slight increase in minority enrollment from the
1986-87 to the 1992-93 school year and no sizable increase in white transfer students after
initial implementation stages of the magnet programs, with 66% of entrants staying at least one
year after their transfer); Shelly, supra note 203, at Cl (stating that a smaller percentage of
white students are enrolled in the KCMSD than when the desegregation effort began).
20 6 See Winn, supra note 140, at C7. Judge Russell G. Clark was reported to express
disappointment with the district's low test scores and its lack of progress in implementing
instructional plans, a security plan, and sound budgeting principles. See id. Judge Clark was
reported also to have lost confidence in the KCMSD officials. See id.; see also Stephen W.
Winn, Judge Clark's Despair, KAN. CITY STAR, Mar. 27,1997, at C6.
207 Other jurisdictions resented the state mandated financing of the KCMSD because the
district with 4.3% of the state's public school students received twice as high a proportion of the
state's funding. See RAFFEL, supra note 32, at 169.
208 See id at 169. The release was contingent upon payment of $320 million in
desegregation funding over a three year period. See Jenkins v. Missouri, 959 F. Supp. 1151,
1169 (W.D. Mo. 1997).
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district court order dismissing it.209
When the federal judiciary undertakes complex, wholesale institutional
reforms, it runs the risk of failing to accomplish its objectives single handedly,
thereby impairing the public's expectations and good will.21 Nonetheless, the
judiciary must continue to protect the constitutional rights of minority groups, and
it should be mindful that many voters harbor racist sentiments.21' Every attempt
should be made to eradicate discriminatory practices and to clarify the law so that
the goal of racial equality can be understood better. 2 12 In school desegregation
lawsuits, the judiciary should engage in a dialogue with the parties to gain support
for the remedial reallocation of resources.2 13 When elected officials oppose the
federal judiciary's remedial measures, judicial reform may not succeed.2 14 By
undertaking intrusive remedies without sufficient political support or cooperation,
209 See Jenkins v. Missouri, 73 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1080-81 (W.D. Mo. 1999) (finding
that the vestiges of prior discrimination had been eliminated and relieving the KCMSD of
further liability), rev'd, Jenkins v. Missouri, Nos. 00-1048, 00-1288, 2000 WL 228296, at
*9 (8th Cir. Feb. 29, 2000). The Eighth Circuit ruled that the district court's "sua sponte
ruling declaring the district unitary" constituted error. See Jenkins, 2000 WL 228296, at
*6. The appellate court suggested a more gradual withdrawal of district court supervision
prior to a declaration of unitary status. See id. at * 8. It further recommended the
appointment of another district court judge to preside over the litigation. See id. at *9; see
also Phillip O'Connor, KC Desegregation Ruling Reversed Appeals Court Suggests New
Judge, Monitors, KAN. CITY STAR, Mar. 1, 2000, at Al (praising the state education
department for demanding higher standards from the KCMSD and expressing concern
about duplicative oversight upon the reinstatement of court-appointed monitoring).
2 10 See TAYLOR, supra note 50, at 204-05. Ordering controversial measures such as
busing can generate resistance among the voters. In Boston, Massachusetts, court mandated
busing in Morgan v. Hennigan, 379 F. Supp. 410 (D. Mass. 1974), not only sparked violence
and opposition, but caused the nation to focus attention on school desegregation and busing. See
RAFFEL, supra note 32, at 171. Unable to obtain the cooperation of the Boston School
Committee, Judge W. Arthur Garrity, Jr.'s increasing involvement in the day-to-day operations
of Boston's public schools led to widespread criticism of the judge and the federal courts. See
id. The white flight that accompanied the implementation of the desegregation plan raised
questions as to the effectiveness of the court's remedy. See id. When Judge Garrity excused
himself from the case, only 27% of the district's students were white whereas one year before
the desegregation plan was ordered the district had a 57% white enrollment. See id. at 170-71.
211 The federal courts may be "the only recourse available to the black community" due to
the insulation of federal judges from hostile white voters who are powerless to revoke their life
appointments. See TAYLOR, supra note 50, at 5.
212 See id at 6 (finding that working class ethnic communities in Boston and Buffalo were
indifferent to court mandated busing because the severity of racial discrimination against
African-Americans was not understood due to a lack of interaction with blacks).
2 13 See Diver, supra note 4, at 72 (explaining that judicially enforced reductions in
existing programs and tax increases marked for new programs can threaten the authority of
executive officials).
2 14 See TAYLOR, supra note 50, at 5--6.
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the federal judiciary may activate opposing political forces that eventually cause
the Court to retreat from its earlier well intentioned stances.2 15
This Article argues that political and community action is needed as well as
judicial will to effectuate the reforms needed to improve the educational
opportunities of minority school children.2 16 A comparison of the history of
desegregation in Buffalo and Boston shows that the factors leading to the more
successful school desegregation in Buffalo were related to the cooperation the
district court received from the Buffalo Board of Education.2 17 It should be
pointed out, however, that Buffalo officials learned from the failure of Boston's
antibusing movement to overturn Judge Ganity's desegregation orders. Realizing
that desegregation was inevitable, they cooperated with Judge Curtin and
provided input for the desegregation plan developed. 2 18
2 15 Judicial intervention to accomplish institutional reform continues to be a heated
political issue, and resistance to the judiciary's role in desegregation litigation has moved to
other venues as reflected in the intense inquiry made of court nominees to ascertain their
judicial philosophy. See Barbara Flicker, The View from the Bench: Judges in Desegregation
Cases, in JUSTICE AND SCHOOL SYSTEMS: THE ROLE OF THE COURTS IN EDUCATION LmGATION
365, 367 (Barbara Flicker ed., 1990). The most recent bitter controversy between a federal
judge and a community occurred in United States v. Yonkers Board of Education, 635 F. Supp.
1538 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). See Flicker, supra, at 367. There, housing segregation issues, rather than
the school desegregation orders, provoked political obstruction prompting Judge Leonard B.
Sand to impose heavy fines and contempt decrees. See id. The Court's most recent retreats from
the activist stance it took in Green, Swann, and Keyes are reflected in its 1990s decisions that
loosened the requirements for achieving unitary status, namely Dowell, Freeman, and its 1995
Jenkins decision.
The Court's role in legitimizing needed societal changes, however, can prod legislatures
and administrators to undertake comprehensive reforms that the judiciary single handedly
cannot effectuate. See John Denvir, Towards a Political Theory ofPublic Interest Litigation, 54
N.C. L. REV. 1133, 1140-41 (1976).
2 16 Motivated by concern about political reaction against judges who had implemented
school desegregation remedies, the Institute of Judicial Administration surveyed them. See
Flicker, supra note 215, at 366. Many of the judges surveyed, while acknowledging some initial
resistance to judicial intervention, found ways to secure cooperation from the officials and other
people needed to adopt a desegregation plan. See id. Thirty-three percent of the survey
respondents indicated open defiance or protest to the judicial process. See id.
217 See TAYLOR, supra note 50, at 8. This cooperation was related to Buffalo's history of
shared power among ethnic groups whereas in Boston the old interethnic tensions between
Protestant New Englanders and Irish-Americans caused a distrust of power exercised by any
outside elite group. See id at 6-7, 39-40. Other differences existed in Buffalo and Boston that
affected school desegregation. In Buffalo, unlike Boston, there were African-American elected
officials at the municipal level. See id Buffalo's phase-in of the desegregation remedies was
longer than that occurring in Boston, and voluntary remedial measures were first imposed
before phasing in mandatory pupil reassignments. See id. at 7-8. In Buffalo, the desegregation
efforts did not lead to increased white flight. See id. at 160. There, white flight was a product of
declining birth rates and increased suburbanization, as it was in Boston. See id.
2 18 Seeid. at l30-31.
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Faced with the occurrence of resegregation in some areas, the Court in the
1990s realized that federal judicial supervision would have to be prolonged
indefinitely to achieve the racial balances prescribed by some school
desegregation decrees. The Court curtailed the requirements for unitary status
achievement, thus pulling away from its long-term investment in the local school
districts under court order.219 The Court's 1995 ruling in Jenkins eliminated the
use of achievement test scores as a measurement for unitary status. This decision
also rejected Judge Clark's pursuit of metropolitan wide students from areas not
subject to the court's desegregation decrees with the hope of achieving better
racial balances in the KCMSD schools. Given this retreat, one may ask why
devote attention to the Court's 1990 Jenkins decision at all.
Jenkins continues to be a far reaching precedent in several respects. 220 First
the Court's endorsement of extensive remedial programs with unprecedented
monetary impacts, set in motion by Milliken H, remains in effect.2 21 The Court
indicated in its 1995 Jenkins decision only that more attention should be given to
returning schools to local control, thus affirming Miliken Ts three-part balancing
test.222 Second, the district court's empowerment to impose judicial taxation and
override state law limitations that hinder its desegregation remedial actions
remains unquestioned by the Court. Further, Jenkins's judicial taxation and
disregard of state law limitations are not confined to the area of school
desegregation. In 1999, District Court Judge John Feikens cited Jenkins as
supporting the power of a federal court to order local governmental taxation to
satisfy obligations mandated under a consent decree addressing Clean Water Act
violations even if the taxes imposed exceeded state law limitations.2 23 Thus, the
significance of the Court's 1990 Jenkins decision cannot be overlooked despite
the Court's willingness to admit some forty-six years after Brown I that it has
been unable to achieve the aspirations of the generation that fought for this
decision. The road to desegregation cannot be fully achieved until racism itself
and the conditions of poverty in urban areas are addressed. 24
219 See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995); Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467
(1992); Board of Educ. of Oklahoma City Pub. Schs. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991).220 Jenkins has been characterized as the "high-water mark for judicial intervention in
local affairs in the course of carrying out a remedial decree?' CHARLES F. ABERNATHY, CIVIL
RIGHTS AND CONSrTUnONALLIGATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 223 (2d ed. 1992).
221 In Liddell v. Special School District, 149 F.3d 862 (8th Cir. 1998), the court ordered,
for example, that after the 1998-99 school year, only one entity was authorized to provide
vocational education in the city of St. Louis and the county serving the metropolitan area. See
id. at 870.
2 22 See Epstein, supra note 87, at 1108 (finding that the 1995 Jenkins decision "deals with
midcourse corrections, not fundamental changes in direction").
22 3 See Bylinski v. City of Allen Park, 8 F. Supp. 2d 965 (E.D. Mich. 1998), afJ'd Bylinski
v. City of Allen Park, 169 F.3d 1001 (6th Cir. 1999) (upholding the consent decree as barred by
laches without reaching the power to tax issue).
224 Most commentators agree that solutions to racial segregation in the public schools can
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I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO JUDICIALLY MANDATED
TAXATION TO REMEDY CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS
In its 1990 Missouri v. Jenkins decision, the United States Supreme Court
extended the federal judiciary's equitable remedies to embrace a taxation order
when existing funding sources proved inadequate.2 25 The Court upheld the
district court's taxation orders to raise revenues deemed necessary to carry out a
remedial school desegregation plan irrespective of state law limitations that barred
the taxation.2 26 The Court endorsed the principle that taxation should be ordered
only after the exhaustion of all other permissible alternatives to remedy the
constitutional violations at issue.227 This Part explores the precedents that laid the
ground work for this ruling. It analyzes the remedial funding and taxation at issue
in Jenkins in both the lower federal courts and in the Supreme Court. The
majority opinion and Justice Kennedy's concurring in part opinion are reviewed.
Part VII further critiques the standards set forth in these precedents, including
Jenkins, for determining upon what conditions judicial taxation may be ordered to
correct constitutional violations.
A. Early Supreme Court Rulings on the Judicial Power to Order Taxation
An examination of the precedent that provided the foundation for Jenkins's
extraordinary taxation remedy may prove helpful. In an 1874 decision, the
Supreme Court emphatically declared that the judiciary does not possess the
power to impose taxation upon the citizenry.228 This principle has been
consistently upheld.229 In the latter half of the nineteenth century and the early
only be found by understanding the complex legal, social, political, and educational issues
involved in school desegregation. See RAFFEt, supra note 32, at xxii. District Court Judge
Robert M. Duncan, Ohio's first African-American federal district court judge, who oversaw
court-ordered remedial desegregation in Columbus, Ohio in the Penick lawsuit, expressed the
view that "courts were ill suited to deal effectively with the complexity of racial segregation in
America." See JACOBS, supra note 39, at 57. He criticized the failure of governmental bodies to
address pressing social and racial problems, thereby necessitating court intervention. See id
225 See Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33,55 (1990).
226 See id. at 56-57.
227 See id at 51.
2 28 See Heine v. Levee Comm'rs, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 655, 660-61 (1874) (reftising to use
the Court's equitable powers to order taxation to provide a remedy for holders of delinquent
bonds issued by local levee commissioners because taxation is a legislative power and judicial
taxation invades the state government's legislative functions); see also THE FEDERALST NO. 78,
at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (stating that the judiciary possesses
"neither FORCE nor WILL but merely judgment" and "has no influence over either the sword
or the purse").
2 29 In Davis v. Michigan Department of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 817 (1989), the Supreme
Court held that a Michigan law that exempted state retirement benefits from taxation, but taxed
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twentieth century, the Court upheld, however, judicial orders directed at local
governmental units to levy taxes for the purpose of raising revenue to retire
outstanding bonds issued or guaranteed by them. In these so-called "bond cases,"
local governments defaulted on bond principal and interest payments, and the
Court sought to enforce under the Contract Clause230 the pledge made by the
localities to make these payments.231 In each of these cases, the Court ordered a
local governmental unit to use its taxation powers to comply with the clear
Contract Clause command.
B. Evolution of Federal Court-Ordered Taxation to Fund School
Desegregation Remedies
1. Griffin v. County School Board
In Jenkins, the Court relied most heavily upon its earlier decision in Griffin v.
County School Board. The Giffin litigation originated from resistance by Prince
Edward County's Board of Supervisors to comply with the 1954 Brown v. Board
ofEducation decision. When confronted with a court decree to integrate its public
schools, the County Supervisors refused to levy any school taxes for the 1959-60
school year. This decision ultimately led to the closure of all of the county's
schools and the opening of private schools for white children.2 32 The plaintiffs
rejected an offer to fund private education for African-American children,
preferring to proceed with their public school desegregation efforts.2 33 As a result,
African-American school children did not receive any formal education in Prince
federal retirement benefits, violated the principles of intergovernmental tax immunity. The
Court refused, however, to order the elimination of the tax exemption for state employees. See
id. at 818. This proposed action was characterized as a "remedy beyond the power of a federal
court." Id; see also Moses Lake Homes, Inc. v. Grant County, 365 U.S. 744, 752 (1961)
(finding that federal courts lack power to assess or levy state taxes to replace state taxes
declared invalid); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism:
Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and "Dual Sovereignty" Doesn't, 96 MiCH. L. REV. 813,
932-33 (1998) (arguing for greater flexibility than that demonstrated by the Davis court in
defining what state practices discriminate against federal institutions).
230 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
231 In Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 55-56 (1990), the Supreme Court cited the
following bond cases: Louisiana ex rel. Hubert v. Mayor of New Orleans, 215 U.S. 170 (1909);
Graham v. Folsomn 200 U.S. 248 (1906); Wolff v. New Orleans, 103 U.S. 358 (1881); United
States v. New Orleans, 98 U.S. 381 (1879); Heine, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) at 657; City of Galena v.
Amy, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 705 (1867); Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 535
(1867); Board of Comm'rs of Knox County v. Aspinwall, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 376 (1861).
232 See Griffin v. County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218,222-23 (1964).
233 See id. at 223.
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Edward County from 1959 to 1963.234
In 1960, Virginia's General Assembly revised a tuition grant program to
provide funding for both white and African-American students to attend
nonsectarian private schools or public schools. The Prince Edward County
Supervisors enacted an ordinance authorizing tuition grants pursuant to this
program and further authorized property tax credits for contributions to private
schools. These actions helped to support private schools, and the County's public
schools continued to remain closed.2 35 The Supreme Court agreed with a district
court ruling that closing the public schools in Prince Edward County while public
schools were open in all other Virginia counties denied African-American
students the equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment.236
The Court believed that opposition to school desegregation fueled the closing of
the county's public schools. 237 The Court upheld the district court's remedial
decree that barred county tax credits or tuition grants so long as its public schools
remained closed.238 It further held that the district court could require the local
taxing authority to levy taxes to provide for the re-opening of public schools that
closed to avoid school desegregation. 239
2. United States v. Missouri
After Griffin, other courts, grappling with financing issues raised by school
desegregation implementation, began to express the view that the judiciary
possesses the power to order taxation to provide necessary remedial funding. In
United States v. Missouri,2 40 the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit first
stated, in dicta, that district courts "[have] the authority to
implement... desegregation order[s] by directing that provision[s] be made for
the levying of taxes essential to the operation of [a] school district."2 41 The court
ruled, however, that deference should be given to state and local estimates of the
anticipated amount of funds available to carry out the desegregation plan.242 It
upheld the rate of taxation recommended by the State to effectuate the
desegregation plan, an amount authorized by state law.243 The appeals court
234 See id.
235 See id. at 223-24.
236 See id. at 225.
237 See id. at 231.
238 See id at 232-33.
239 See id
240 515 F.2d 1365 (8th Cir. 1975).
241 See id at 1372-73.
242 See id. at 1373.
243 See id.; see also United States v. Missouri, 388 F. Supp. 1058, 1059 (E.D. Mo. 1975).
The district court, after ordering the consolidation of three school districts, ordered that the tax
rate, which was to be uniform throughout the new district, be set at $6.03 per hundred dollars of
[Vol. 61:483
JUDICIAL FUNDING AND TAX MANDATES
rejected the district court's order to set the tax levy at a rate higher than the level
authorized by the voters pursuant to state law.244
3. Evans v. Buchanan
Shortly after the Eighth Circuit's decision in United States v. Missouri, the
difficulty of setting a tax rate sufficient to fund a desegregation plan that did not
violate state law limits became apparent in Wilmington, Delaware in Evans v.
Buchanan.245 In Evans, the district court's desegregation plan encompassed the
reorganization of eleven school districts into one school distict.246 At first the
state legislature refused to enact a statutory governance framework to devise a tax
rate for the new single school district.247 The district court then proceeded to
transfer authority to a new five-member board, appointed by the State Board of
Education as ordered by the court, charged with the duty to develop a
desegregation plan and to govern the school system.248 The court ordered this
board, the New Castle County Planning Board of Education (NCCPBE), to
establish a tax rate for the single school district created.249 In devising the new
district, the court attempted to follow state law to the extent possible, but admitted
that the successful operation of the single district would not conform to existing
statutes, if literally applied.250
assessed valuation, a rate in excess of that permitted by the Missouri Constitution without a
two-thirds vote of the electorate. See id at 1060. The district court had received testimony that
such tax rate was deemed necessary to operate a desegregated system and "that there was no
reasonable possibility that such a tax levy would be approved by the required two-thirds vote in
the aftermath of a desegregation order." Id. at 1059. The district court's order stated that the
$6.03 tax rate "shall be deemed to have been approved by the voters for the purposes
of... [the] Missouri Constitution." Id at 1060.
The Eighth Circuit in United States v. Missouri, 515 F2d 1365, 1372-73 (8th Cir. 1975),
opined that the district court's remedial powers were not limited by state law. Nevertheless, this
court set the tax rate at $5.38 per hundred of assessed valuation, an amount authorized under
state law, because it thought deference should be given to the state officials' belief that the
$5.38 tax rate would be adequate with the receipt of anticipated funds from the state legislature.
See id. at 1373.
244 See Missouri, 515 F.2d at 1373.
245 447 F. Supp. 982 (D. Del. 1978).
246 Each of the 11 school districts before consolidation had disparate tax rates, and the
equalization of per pupil expenditures required a tax increase in 10 of the 1 districts. See id at
1025.
24 7 See Evans v. Buchanan, 455 F. Supp. 715, 717 (D. Del. 1978); Evans, 447 F. Supp. at
1035.
248 See Evans, 447 F. Supp. at 988.
249 See id. at 1035. "[The Board's] primary responsibilities were to develop a complete
desegregation scheme and to prepare and plan for the assumption of authority over the school
system."Id. at 988.
250 See id. No state legislation had been enacted to take cognizance of the operation of a
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The district court in Evans thus chose to order the implementation of the
remedial single-district desegregation plan without waiting for the state legislature
to pass enabling legislation. The State Board of Education advocated delaying the
remedial plan until the legislature provided a legal framework for the unitary
district, but the court considered this proposal impractical.2 51 Another option
existed: scale down the remedial plan to accomplish only those objectives
permitted by state law. Instead, the court empowered the NCCPBE to carry out
the remedial plan, following state law to the extent possible.2 52 The Court
authorized the NCCPBE to set a tax rate, but invited the legislature to raise or
lower this rate provided the rate enabled the desegregation process to proceed
without peril.253 This action prompted the legislature to pass legislation that
changed the court's remedial plan by replacing the court-ordered single district
with four districts and providing a mechanism for each of the four districts to
establish a tax rate.254 The State Board of Education immediately set a maximum
tax rate for each of the new school districts.2 55
The district court enjoined the creation of the four districts,256 and also
invalidated the tax rate set by the State Board of Education, a rate lower than that
large unitary district by the New Castle County Planning Board of Education. See id
251 See id. at 1035.
252 See id
2 53 See id. at 1026. The court recognized and sought justification for its legislative action,
stating:
[T]he goal of nondiscriminatory public education... has not reached fruition. All the
foregoing problems articulated by the Supreme Court and more, have been at issue in this
enduring litigation. The Court has looked for guidance to each of the equitable
considerations enumerated by the Supreme Court, devoting particular attention to local
needs and the importance of reconciling public and private interests. Now the promise of
Brown is in sight; implementation is near and the constitutional infirmity... will at least
receive treatment.
Id. at 1040 (citation omitted).
The Evans court cited Brown v. Board of Education (Brown 1), 349 U.S. 294 (1955), as
authority for the "foregoing problems." See Evans, 447 F. Supp. at 1040. Those problems
included those "related to administration, arising from the physical condition of the school
plant, the school transportation system, personnel, revision of school districts and attendance
areas into compact units to achieve a system of determining admission to the public schools on
a nonracial basis, and revision of local laws and regulations which may be necessary in solving
the foregoing problems." Brown HI, 349 U.S. at 300-01.
The Evans court stated that "political processes [were] preferred over even limited
intervention by a federal court." Evans, 447 F. Supp. at 1026.
2 54 See Evans v. Buchanan, 455 F. Supp. 692,695 (D. Del. 1978).
255 See id.
256 See id. The district court enjoined the implementation of the four-district plan as
conflicting with its January 9, 1978 order, and the injunction was not contested on appeal. See
Evans v. Buchanan, 582 F.2d 750,775 n.21 (3d Cir. 1978).
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established by the NCCPBE for the new school district.257 This tax rate,
according to the court, frustrated the remedial process designed to vindicate
constitutional rights.2 58 The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, however,
vacated the district court's order and ruled that the district court erred in refusing
to grant the usual presumption of legislative regularity to the legislature's taxation
frarnework.259 It directed the district court to conduct a new hearing at which the
usual deference to the legislature's tax policy was to be in place.260
By deferring to Delaware's taxation policy, the Third Circuit took a position
directly at odds with the 1990 Jenkins decision. The court did not believe that the
judiciary, in devising remedies to correct constitutional violations, possesses an
inherent power to disregard the usual deference accorded to legislatures in
taxation matters261 The court gave several reasons for granting presumptive
validity to the existing state taxation policy. First, it characterized judicial taxation
as violative of "two venerable maxims of the American tradition: '[tjaxation
without representation is tyranny' and 'the power to tax involves the power to
destroy.' 262 It also found that the district court had failed to accord sufficient
weight to the following: (1) the legislature's greater understanding of local
conditions, (2) the traditional respect for a separation of powers among the
branches of government and (3) the judiciary's longstanding adherence to
legislative presumptive validity as a guiding principle ofjudicial review needed to
preserve the legislative branch's independence and ability to finction. 63
25 7 See Evans, 455 F. Supp. at 703.
258 See id at 698-99. The court ruled that it had inherent power to "[assure] the collection
of adequate funds to effectively operate a racially nondiscriminatory unitary school system." Id
It also found that the usual presumption of deference to a legislature's tax policy did not
mandate acceptance of the state board of education's tax rate. See id
259 See Evans, 582 F2d at 778-79.
260 See id. at 779. The district court in a later opinion stated that the appellate court had
ordered it to do the following:
(1) vacate the May 5, 1978 order, (2) enter an order preliminarily enjoining a tax rate of
$1.68 [the rate adopted by the New Castle County Planning Board of Education] and
requiring the NCCBE [sic] to impose a tax rate of $1.585 [the level set by the state board
of education]; and (3) conduct a new hearing in accordance with the Court of Appeals'
opinion.
Evans v. Buchanan, 468 F. Supp. 944,947 (D. Del. 1979).
261 See Evans, 582 F.2d at 778.
262 Id at 777; see also McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 431 (1819)
(invalidating a state tax on banks not chartered by the state and stating "[t]hat the power to tax
involves the power to destroy"). But see ELY, supra note 14, at 85-86 (noting that the
burdensomeness of a tax is a critical factor in determining its destructive propensities and
arguing that the Court in McCulloch was ensuring protection of the banks that lacked
representation).
2 63 See Evans, 582 F.2d at 777-78.
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When the district court reheard the issue of the legality of the state established
tax rate, it characterized the issue as whether "the tax rate so strip[ped] the
[county school district] of financial support that the unconstitutional intent to
thwart desegregation decrees may be inferred as a matter of law.' 264 A second
issue was whether the state arrived at its tax rate in bad faith.265 The court
resolved both issues in the negative,266 and opined that the record did not present
an extreme case such as Griffin.267
4. Liddell v. Missouri
Following United States v. Missouri, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals,
first in Liddell v. Missouri268 and then in Jenkins v. Missouri, continued its
activist approach to judicial taxation. In Missouri, court-directed desegregation
plans in St. Louis (Liddell) and in Kansas City (Jenkins) faced state constitutional
funding limitations.269 The Missouri Constitution provided that bond issues to
finance capital improvements required a two-thirds voter approval.2 70 During a
twenty-four year period preceding the Liddell lawsuit, voters in St. Louis defeated
thirteen proposed bond issues and authorized only one.271
In Liddell, the district court ruled, in 1983, that it possessed the authority to
order the Board of Education of the City of St. Louis (City School Board) to
increase its tax rate by an amount necessary to fund the city's share of
implementing a settlement plan that imposed costs upon both the state and the
264Evans, 468 F. Supp. at 951.
265 See id. at 951-52.
266 The court characterized these inquiries as controlling legal principles. See id at 951-
52.
267 See id. at 952. The court stated, however, that the "[b]urden of proof should not be
confused with standard of review" and concluded that the standard of review could exceed the
rational basis test because the state legislation had been enacted in response to a Fourteenth
Amendment, remedial desegregation decree. See id, at 950.
268 For a discussion of the Liddell case, see D. Bruce La Pierre, Voluntary Interdistrict
School Desegregation in St. Louis: The Special Master's Tale, in JUSTCE AND SCHOOL
SYSTEMS: THE ROLE OF THE COURTs IN EDUCATION LmGATION 233 (Barbara Flicker ed,
1990).
269 See Mo. CONST. art. VI, § 26(a) (limiting indebtedness to the amount of annual
income and revenue); Mo. CoNsT. art. VI, § 26(b) (requiring a two-thirds majority vote to
authorize bond issues to finance capital improvements); Mo. CONST. art. X, § 1l(b)-(c)
(imposing limitations upon local tax rates). The tax limitation provisions of Mo. CONST. art. X,
§ I(c) at issue in United States v. Missouri involved a plan to desegregate the Kinloch School
District No. 18. See United States v. Missouri, 515 F.2d 1365, 1371-73 (8th Cir. 1975).
270 See Mo. CONST. art. VI, § 26(b); see also Liddell v. Missouri (Liddell VII), 731 F. 2d
1294, 1300 &n.5 (8th Cir. 1984).
271 See Liddell VII, 731 F.2d at 1318. Approval of the one bond issue occurred after
resubmission to the voters. See id.
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city.272 The court specifically authorized and ordered the City School Board not
to reduce its operating tax levy as otherwise required by Missouri law
(Proposition C) in order to finance the court-supervised settlement plan.273 The
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Liddell Vl 274 affirmed the district court order
and stated: "We hold that the district court's broad equitable powers to remedy
the evils of segregation include a narrowly defined power to order increases in
local tax levies on real estate. Limitations on this power require that it be
exercised only after exploration of every other fiscal alternative."'275 The Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals found the district court's order to be deficient, however,
because it failed to make findings that no other fiscal alternatives were
available.276 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals illustrated what it meant by
exhaustion of alternative sources of revenue to fund the desegregation order. It
listed the following three possible alternatives: (1) submission to the voters of a
referendum for an increased operating levy, (2) state legislature authorization for
the City School Board to impose nonreal estate taxes within the city, or (3)
272 See Liddell v. Board of Educ., 567 F. Supp. 1037, 1052 (E.D. Mo. 1983). The Court of
Appeals in Liddell v. Missouri (Liddell ), 717 F.2d 1180, 1182-84 (8th Cir. 1983) denied a
motion to stay implementation of the plan with a few exceptions. The settlement plan, which
had been approved by the Liddell plaintiffs, the Caidwell plaintiffs, the City of St. Louis Board
of Education, and by all 23 school districts in St Louis County, as well as the court, provided
for (1) voluntary interdistrict transfers of students between city and suburban schools, (2)
improvements to the quality of education in St. Louis schools, (3) the creation of magnet
schools, and (4) special educational improvements in all-black schools. To finance the plan, it
provided that the state would be responsible for the costs of voluntary interdistrict transfers,
magnet schools, and alternative integration programs. The state was to pay one-half the cost of
the programs to improve the quality of city education, and one-half of the cost of capitalimprovements. The City Board was required to pay for the remaining costs. See id. at 1181-82.
Estimates of the first year costs of the plan ranged from $37,000,000 to over $100,000,000. See
Liddell, 567 F. Supp. at 1051.
The plan specifically provided that the court would enter an order to increase the property
tax rate in the city of St. Louis by an amount necessary to fund the city board's share of the
plan. See Liddell V1, 717 F,2d at 1183. The court of appeals barred such an order until further
order from it, but approved the plan's provision that directed the city board not to undertake tax
rate reduction as required under Missouri law. See id. at 1183-84.273 See Liddell, 567 F. Supp. at 1056. In 1982, Missouri voters approved a referendum,
known as Proposition C, which "directed local school officials to reduce their operating levies
by an amount equal to fifty percent of the revenues local school districts would receive under a
one-cent increase in the state sales tax.' Liddell VM, 731 F.2d at 1319; see also Mo. REv. STAT.
§ 164.013 (Supp. 1994).
274 731 F.2d 1294 (8th Cir. 1984).
275 Liddell VM, 731 F.2d at 1320.
276 See id at 1323. The Eighth Circuit stressed the necessity for district court findings
prior to the issuance of any tax levy increase orders. First, the Eighth Circuit imposed a finding,
preceded by a determination of the amount necessary to fund the desegregation order, that the
school district lacks sufficient resources to finance the desegregation order, and, if so, a finding
that no other alternatives can provide the necessary funding. See id.
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agreement between the City School Board and the state on alternate methods to
raise the board's share of costs. 277 Thus, under the Liddell VII "no alternative?'
test, 278 the litigants work within the existing tax structure until the state
legislature demonstrates its refusal to authorize a requested alternative funding
plan found necessary to fund the decreed desegregation remedies.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals also made implementation of the no
alternative test a condition precedent to any orders that disregarded state law
limitations upon capital flnancing.279 It upheld, in Liddell VI, the district court's
refusal to order a tax increase to fund capital improvements until voters acted
upon the proposed bond issue, covering an amount determined suicient to meet
capital improvement needs by the City School Board. 80 The City School Board
held a bond issue election on November 8, 1983, in response to the district court's
order to finance the Board's share of capital improvements under the settlement
plan, but the $63.5 bond issue failed.281 The Eighth Circuit then ordered in
Liddell VII that a new bond issue be submitted to the voters after the City School
Board more carefully identified the projects covered, as well as their cost 2 82 The
court further instructed the district court to provide directions for capital
improvement funding should the next voter submission meet defeat. 83 This bond
issue also failed. 284
In Liddell VIII 85 the Eighth Circuit ordered that a smaller bond issue of
twenty million dollars be submitted to the voters. 86 The City School Board
rejected this directive and submitted a larger bond issue that also met voter
277 See ia
278 See id
279 After voter rejection of several bond issues to finance capital improvements, the
district court refused to authorize the city board to ignore the two-thirds vote requirement for
bond issues and directed the board to use other funds available to finance its share of the cost of
needed capital improvements. See Liddell v. Board of Educ., 674 F. Supp. 687, 722-26 (ElD.
Mo. 1987). The court stated that it "[was] convinced that the City Board [had] within its means
the funds necessary for its share of the capital improvements program." Id. at 726.
280 See Liddell VI1, 731 F.2d at 1322. In Liddell v. Missouri (Liddell VI), 717 F.2d 1180,
1183 (8th Cir. 1983), the court, in refusing to stay the implementation of the settlement plan,
indicated that if the bond issue proposal submitted to the voters should fail, the district court
should defer action or alternative measures until further order of the court of appeals.
281 See Liddell VII, 731 F2d at 1318-19. The bond issue received a 55% voter approval.
See id. at 1319.
2 8 2 See id.
283 See id.
284 See Liddell v. Missouri (Liddell VIII), 758 F.2d 290, 302 (8th Cir. 1985). The City
School Board rejected the Eighth Circuit's advice and issued another large bond issue. See id
285 758 F.2d 290 (8th Cir. 1985).
286 See id at 302. The state was to match the $20,000,000 bond issue by an equal amount.
See id
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rejection.2 87 When the City School Board asked to be exempted from the two-
thirds vote required for capital improvements financing, the district court refused
to override the Missouri Constitution. The court stated that "[t]his court is not
prepared to begin carving out judicially mandated exemptions to state statutes in
which constitutionality is not at issue. '288 The court indicated that the exorbitant
amount of the bond issues likely led to the failure to obtain the two-thirds voter
approval required.289
The lengthy Liddell litigation illustrates the Eighth Circuit's assertion of its
power to override state law limitations upon taxation and capital financing
deemed necessary to effectuate a desegregation plan. Realistically, it shows an
unwillingness to disregard these limitations until exhaustion of all other sources of
financial relief occurs. The court ordered the City School Board to undertake
numerous bond issue submissions. Yet, it chose not to disregard voter sentiment
and ordered the City School Board to find other ways to finance its capital
improvements when voters rejected the bond issue submissions. It ruled that
limitations upon taxation powers such as Proposition C could not be ignored until
the district court made a finding that alternative sources of funding did not
exist.290 Nonetheless, Liddell VII does support judicial taxation when state law
limitations block the funding deemed necessary to finance a school desegregation
plan.291
5. Jenkins v. Missouri
a. Jenkins in the Lower Federal Courts
In Part I of this Article, the initiation of the Jenkins case was presented as
well as the scope and cost of the remedies ordered by District Court Judge Clark.
This Part discusses the funding plan and the taxation ordered by the court to
finance the KCMSD's share of the school desegregation costs. With a budget
287 See Liddell v. Board of Educ. (Liddell D), 801 F.2d 278,284 (8th Cir. 1986).
288 Liddell v. Board of Educ., 674 F. Supp. 687,722 (E.D. Mo. 1987).
289 See id at 722-23.
290 See Liddell v. Missouri (Liddell VII), 731 F.2d 1294, 1322-23 (8th Cir. 1984).
29 1 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeal's tax authorization rationale relied upon the Tights
maximizing cases of Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1977),
North Carolina State Board of Education v. Swam, 402 U.S. 43 (1971), and Griffin v. County
School Board, 377 U.S. 218 (1964). See Liddell VII, 731 F.2d at 1320. The court opined that the
Griffin Court endorsed judicially ordered tax increases by its omission of an order to set the tax
rate at its previous level and its direction to find the school system at a level adequate to reopen
and maintain schools without racial discrimination. See id. The Eighth Circuit also cited cases
upholding taxation orders to enforce municipal bond commitments protected by the Contract
Clause and judicial orders to ensure payment for municipal torts even if the tort liability
exceeded constitutional or statutory debt limits. See id at 1322.
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inadequate to finance its share of the remedial plan, the KCMSD needed to
increase its revenues by additional property tax levies. In many states,
constitutional and statutory provisions restrict the amount of taxes that a state or
local entity may levy, and Missouri is among them.292
Several state law limitations impeded the KCMSD's ability to finance its
allocated portion of the desegregation costs. First, the Missouri Constitution
limited real property taxes that the KCMSD could levy to $1.25 per $100 of
assessed valuation unless the voters approved a higher percentage. 293 In 1969
voters had approved, however, a total levy of $3.75 per $100 of assessed
valuation for the KCMSD.2 94 Second, the 'Hancock Amendment" required
property tax rates to be rolled back upon the assessment of property at a higher
valuation to ensure that taxes would not be increased as a result of the
reassessment of the value of real estate.2 95 Third, "Proposition C," allocating one
cent of every dollar raised by the state sales tax to a schools trust fund, required
school districts to reduce property tax levies by an amount equal to 50 percent of
the previous year's sales tax receipts in the district 296 The adjustments required
under Proposition C reduced the KCMSD's operating levy from $3.75 to
$3.26.297
The district court, citing Liddell VI as authority, on June 14, 1985, enjoined
the tax levy rollback required by Proposition C to help finance the KCMSD's
portion of remedial costs for the ensuing fiscal year.298 The court stated that time
292 See M. David Gelfand, Seeking Local Government Financial Integrity Through Debt
Ceilings, Tax Limitations, and Expenditure Limits: The New York City Fiscal Cris, the
Taxpayers'Revolt, andBeyond, 63 MINN. L. REV. 545, 551-52 (1979) (explaining the origin of
taxation limits in the 1870s and 1880s as a check upon the growth of public expenditures and
resulting tax burdens).
293 A majority vote was needed to raise the levy to $3.25 and a two-thirds vote was
necessary to raise the levy above $3.25 per $100 of assessed valuation. See MO. CONST. art. X,
§§ 11(b)-(c). The district court noted that the likelihood of a two-thirds voter approval was
unlikely. See Jenkins v. Missouri, 639 F. Supp. 19,44 (W.D. Mo. 1985).
294 See Jenkins v. Missouri (Jenkins 11), 855 F.2d 1295, 1312 (8th Cir. 1988). The levy
was later reduced due to the operation of state law limitations. See id. In Jenkins v. Missouri,
672 F. Supp. 400,413 (W.D. Mo. 1987), the court stated that the KCMSD then had a tax levy
of $2.05 per $100.00 of assessed valuation.
295 See Mo. REV. STAT. § 137.073.2 (Supp. 1994). The provisions of the Missouri
Constitution, Article X, sections 16-24 are referred to as the Hancock Amendment. Not at issue
in Jenkins was the Hancock Amendment's restriction upon new or increased taxation. See Mo.
CONST. art. X, § 22 (prohibiting Missouri's political subdivisions from levying new taxes,
licenses, or fees or increasing the current levy of an existing tax, license, or fees without
approval of a majority of voters).
29 6 See Mo. REV. STAT. § 164.013.1 (Supp. 1994).
29 7 See Jenkins, 639 F. Supp. at 44. Proposition C diverted nearly one-half of the sales
taxes collected in the KCMSD to other parts of the state. See Jenkins 11, 855 F.2d at 1312.
2 98 See Jenkins, 639 F. Supp. at 45.
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constraints prevented it from presenting a proposal to the voters for additional tax
levies and noted the unlikelihood of voter approval for such a proposal.2 99 In
Jenkins I, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals did not specifically review the tax
rollback order, but appeared to affirm it by stating that the remedy ordered by the
district court should be fully funded while acknowledging its placement of greater
desegregation costs upon the KCMSD.300
On September 15, 1987, the district court rendered several taxation orders to
increase the funding available to the KCMSD. These orders became controversial
due to their scope and lack of authorization by the state legislature. The district
court ordered the levy of a 1.5% Missouri state income tax surcharge on income
earned in the KCMSD by both residents and nonresidents. Judge Clark
characterized the tax as equitable because evidence showed that the potential
taxpayers included a number of people who moved outside the district to avoid
desegregation costs, but continued to work in the district.30 ' The district court also
ordered a tax levy of $1.95 per $100 of assessed valuation, thereby raising the
KCMSD's existing levy of $2.05 per $100 assessed valuation to $4.00 per $100
assessed valuation.302 To complete the financing package, the district court
directed the KCMSD to issue capital improvement bonds in the amount of
$150,000,000.303
On appeal in Jenkins I, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the scope
of the district court's capital improvement programs30 4 and its property tax
299 See id. at 44-45.
300 See Jenkins v. Missouri (Jenkins I), 807 F.2d 657, 686 (1986). The Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals ordered an equal division of the remedial desegregation costs between the
state and the KCMSD. See ial In Jenkins 1, the court stated- "[s]hould the funds that KCMSD
can provide for desegregation expenses... fall short, the remainder must be paid by the State,
as the orders of the district court have imposed joint and several liability on the State and
KCMSD." 855 F.2d at 1316.
301 See Jenkins v. Missouri, 672 F. Supp. 400, 412 (W.D. Mo. 1987) (stating that
"[d]uring the hearing on the liability issue in this case there was an abundance of evidence that
many residents of the KCMSD left the district and moved to the suburbs because of the
district's efforts to integrate its schools"). The income tax surcharge raised the rate on
individuals from 6% to 7.5% and was to be imposed on "residents and nonresidents of the
KCMSD, including business associations, partnerships and corporations who earn salaries,
wages, commissions and all other compensation and income subject to the Missouri State
Income Tax for work done, services rendered and business or other activities conducted within
the KCMSD." Id. The proceeds of the surcharge were to be used to pay the principal of and
interest on the KCMSD capital improvement bonds. See id at 413.
3 02 See id. at 413. This tax increase was done without voter approval as required by the
Missouri Constitution. See Mo. CONST. art. X, § 1 l(c). The court estimated that this tax levy
increase would provide an additional $27,000,000 annually that could be used to fund the
desegregation costs. See id.
3 03 See id In Jenkins I, the court stated that the KCMSD's bond issue had been sold.
Jenkins II, 855 F.2d at 1306.
3 04 See Jenkins II, 855 F.2d at 1306. This approval did not extend to the second phase of
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increase,30 5 but directed that the school district, rather than the district court; make
future tax levy submissions to tax collection officials. 306 The new tax levy
procedure called for the district court (1) to establish the maximum tax levy
permitted, 30 7 (2) to authorize the school board to present a proposed tax levy to
the collection authorities, subject to the district court limit and (3) to enjoin the
application of Missouri constitutional and state law limits to the extent the district
court deemed these restrictions reduced or limited the tax below the amount
necessary to fund the desegregation remedies. 308 The Eighth Circuit opined that
this procedure allowed for more local input.309
The Eighth Circuit struck down the income tax surcharge because, unlike the
tax levy, it did not constitute "the established source of revenue for Missouri
school districts. . . ."310 The court stated that the income tax surcharge "invaded
the province of the legislature... and... [was] beyond the power of the district
court as outlined in Swann... ." 311 The court interpreted precedent to support the
removal of state law limitations that impeded the school desegregation remedial
process only when accompanied by adequate deference to local tax collection
procedures and the views of state and local officials.3 12 The ordered income tax
surcharge failed to do so because it restructured the state's methods of financing
schools by creating a new form of taxation.3 13
Although the Eighth Circuit upheld court-ordered property tax increases, it
noted the limitations on a district court's remedial powers.3 14 The court further
cautioned that the federal judiciary should use "minimally obtrusive methods to
remedy constitutional violations."315 It ordered the district court to defer to local
tax collection procedures and the views of state and local officials, to the extent
the capital improvement program, estimated to cost between $200 and $300 million. See id.
305 See id at 1311.
3 0 6 See id. at 1314.
307 See id The court of appeals cautioned that the district court should consider the tax
levy rates in neighboring areas before setting the maximum rate. See id.
308 See id.
309 See id The Eighth Circuit thought that the district court's role should be limited to
setting the maximum tax rate that could be imposed and enjoining the enforcement of state law
limitations upon tax levies. See id310 Id. at 1315.
311 Id. (citations omitted). For a discussion of Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of
Education, see supra notes 39-52 and accompanying text.
312 See Jenkins I, 855 F.2d at 1315.
313 See id
314 See id. at 1299-1300. The Eighth Circuit stated that a balancing process should guide
the choice of remedies to redress racial discrimination and referred to the three-part test in
Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken 11), 433 U.S. 267, 280-81 (1974), as the controlling guideline for
the district court's exercise of remedial power. See Jenkins 1I, 855 F.2d at 1299.
315 Jenkins1I, 855 F.2d at 1314.
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possible without compromising its remedial goals. 16 Nonetheless, greater school
district participation in the tax levying process realized as a result of this ruling
would hardly seem to ameliorate the district court's deeply intrusive tax order.3 17
The district court had purported to follow Liddell fTls no other alternative
test318 before resorting to tax levy orders, indicating that it "[had] explored all the
alternatives set forth by the Eighth Circuit and [was] left with no choice but to
exercise its broad equitable powers... :,319 It found the test satisfied by the
following events: the rejection by the voters of a 1987 bond issue and four tax
levy increases between 1986 and 1987; the failure of the state legislature to enact
legislation, supported by the court, to authorize more financing options to
effectuate school desegregation, and the inability of the state and the KCMSD to
agree on alternate funding methods for the KCMSD's share of the desegregation
costs.3 2 0 The Eighth Circuit agreed that Liddell VlTs no alternative test had been
met and declared that the Liddell VH requirement of an evidentiary hearing was
inapplicable because both the plaintiffs and the defendants consented to the entry
of a judgment without an evidentiary hearing? 21 Chief Judge Lay, however, in
his concurring and dissenting opinion, disagreed with respect to the availability of
other measures to satisfy the no alternative test He believed that other remedies
were available. The court could order the state, as a joint tort-feasor, to fund the
desegregation costs that existing state law restricted the school district from
fumding.3 22
316 See id
317 The district court ordered that the property tax increase to $4.00 per $100 of assessed
valuation stay in effect through the 1991-92 fiscal year. See Jenkins v. Missouri, 672 F. Supp.
400,413 (W.D. Mo. 1987); see also Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 63 (1990) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (discussing the district court's order).
318 See Liddell v. Missouri (Liddell VII), 731 F2d 1294, 1323 (8th Cir. 1984)
(articulating the no other alternative test).
319 Jen/ins, 672 F. Supp. at 411.
32 0 See id The court stated that no bond issues or tax levy increases had been approved by
the voters since 1969. See id
321 See Jenkins v. Missouri (Jenkins II), 855 F.2d 1295,1310 (8th Cir. 1988).
322 See id at 1318 (Lay, Ci., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Chief Judge Lay
saw state funding as an alternative way to avoid the district court's order of a tax increase
contrary to law. See Jenkins, 495 U.S. at 45.
On rehearing en banc, Circuit Judge Bowman, joined by Circuit Judge Wolman, dissented
from the denial of the rehearing en bane and stated that in no other case in the country had the
federal judiciary imposed a tax increase to fund a desegregation remedy. See Jenkins H, 855
F.2d at 1319. The dissenting opinion questioned the power of the court "to solve social
problems that have their origins in other causes" and expressed the view that the federal
judiciary had abrogated powers that were reserved to the states under the Tenth Amendment
Id
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b. Jenkins in the Supreme Court of the United States in 1990
The State of Missouri filed a petition for certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court, arguing that the district court's remedies were excessive in scope
and that the court-ordered property tax increase violated Article DI, the Tenth
Amendment and principles of federal-state comity.323 The Court granted the
petition, but limited its review to the question of the property tax increase3 24 In
Part III of Justice White's majority opinion, to which Justices Brennan, Marshall,
Blackmun, and Stevens joined, the Court applied the no alternative test and held
that the direct imposition of the tax increase by the district court violated comity
principles because a less intrusive remedial action was available.325
The Court opined that the district court, for example, could have ordered the
KCMSD to raise taxes in an amount sufficient to fund the desegregation orders,
and it could have enjoined the state law limitations that curtailed the amount of tax
revenue the KCMSD could raise.326 The Court characterized the difference
between a court's actual imposition of a tax and its direction to a governmental
unit to levy a judicially authorized tax as "far more than a matter of form."327
Because the district court alternatively could order the KCMSD to raise sufficient
taxes to fund its remedial decrees, rather than order the taxes itself, another
remedial alternative existed, leaving the no alternative test unsatisfied.
The Court dismissed the State's arguments that the Tenth Amendment and
Article III barred the court-ordered taxation.328 The exercise of judicial powers to
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment could not be restricted by the Tenth
Amendment because the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted specifically to
"disestablish local government institutions that interfere with its commands. '329
323 See Jenkins, 495 U.S. at 45.
324 See id. The Court stated that it would not review whether the scope and cost of the
funding orders violated principles of cornity and equity because the Court's grant of certiorari
was limited to the taxation issue. See id. at 53.
325 See id. at 50-51. The Court held that the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals should have
invalidated the tax. See id. at 52. The Court declined to address the constitutional issues raised
by Article I and the Tenth Amendment See id. at 50. Later in the opinion, Justice White,
writing for the majority, did address the issues raised by Article III and the Tenth Amendment
See id. at 55.
326 See id at 51.
327 Id. The Court's distinction between a direct order of the district court to tax and a
district court order directed at a local governmental entity to tax is meaningless. See La Pierre,
supra note 1, at 342-43; Brocker, supra note 1, at 759.328 See Jenkins, 495 U.S. at 55. Earlier in the opinion, Justice White, writing for the
majority, stated that the difficult constitutional issues posed by Article III and the Tenth
Amendment were unnecessary to reach because the district court's direct imposition of the tax
increase violated comity principles. See id. at 50.
329 Id. at 55. The Jenkins Court cited to New York City Board of Estimate v. Morris, 489
U.S. 688 (1989), and Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 585 (1964). SeeJenkins, 495 U.S. at 55.
These decisions required that the one-person one-vote principle be followed in the
establishment of districts from which state, see Sims, 377 U.S. at 566, and local governmental
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When the Court next addressed the issue of whether a judicial order to increase
taxes could be upheld under Article III's grant ofjudicial powers, it stated that "a
court order directing a local governmental body to levy its own taxes is plainly a
judicial act within the power of a federal court."330 Relying upon the Supremacy
Clause,3 31 the Court concluded that once a district court finds that a particular
remedy is required to fulfill a constitutional obligation, it may set aside state law
limitations that prevent or obstruct the remedial process.332
The significance of Jenkins lies in its substantial expansion of the federal
judiciary's equitable powers. The Court upheld judicially ordered property tax
increases to raise the level of funding available for the implementation of court-
ordered desegregation plans. It upheld the power of a district court to set aside
state laws that limited the ability of a local school district to levy and collect taxes
that the district court deemed necessary to meet its remedial objectives. By
enjoining the operation of Missouri laws that authorized, as well as limited, the
exercise of the KCMSD's taxation powers, the Court ordered school district
taxation unauthorized by state law.333 The Court thus expanded the KCMSD's
power to levy taxes beyond that permitted by state law. The state laws set aside
did not violate the Constitution and were not enacted to thwart a court-ordered
officials, see Morris, 489 U.S. at 692, were selected. Enforcement of the one-person one-vote
principle enhances representational democracy whereas the Court's displacement of tax and
expenditure limitations limits representational democracy.
330 Jenkins, 495 U.S. at 55. The Court cited Griffin v. County School Board, 377 U.S. 218,
233 (1964), as precedent as well as cases in which the Supreme Court had ordered local
governments to levy taxes to satisfy their contractual conmnitments. See Jenkins, 495 U.S. at
55-56. The Court failed to deal squarely with the State's argument that, unlike the cited cases,
Jenkins was unique in requiring local authorities to raise taxes not authorized under state law.
See id. at 56-57. The decision, Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, cited by the Court, was not
clearly applicable because the objectionable state law in Von Hoffman withdrew power from
the city to raise taxes to fund payment of its indebtedness a number of years after the city had
issued the outstanding bonds at issue pursuant to state authorization. See 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 535,
554-55 (1866). Such action was found to impair a contract in violation of the Constitution. See
Jenkins, 495 U.S. at 555.
331 The Supremacy Clause compels local and state governments to meet constitutional
obligations. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. In Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2255 (1999),
Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court in a 5-4 majority opinion, stated that the states'
obligation to abide by "the supreme Law of the Land" pursuant to the Supremacy Clause
applied only to those federal acts in "accord with the constitutional design." Based on this
statement, the Court appears receptive to the argument that the federal judiciary's institutional
reform decrees likewise must conform to the Constitution's federal design in order to be
obligatory upon the states.
332 See Jenkins, 495 U.S. at 57-58.
333 One commentator, finding the majority opinion's distinction between direct taxation
and an order to tax as a "distinction without a difference," stated that Jenkins presents this issue:
"judicial power to order local officials to levy and collect a tax in excess of their authority and
contrary to state law limits." La Pierre, supra note 1, at 343.
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remedial process. The Court, in effect, fashioned a federal common law rule that
the federal judiciary may command and authorize taxation without the consent of
the electorate to implement its remedial orders. 334
Chief Justice Retnquist and Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, and Scalia
concurred in the Court's judgment that the district court's direct imposition of the
tax at issue exceeded its judicial authority, but not in the view that a court may
order a school district to levy taxes that exceed state law limits. 35 Justice
Kennedy's concurring opinion rejected the majority's distinction between the
direct imposition of a tax by the federal judiciary and a judicial order directing
local entities to tax, characterizing the distinction as merely "convenient
formalism."336 Justice Kennedy pointed out that local governments must derive
their powers from a state government.337 Accordingly, a federal judicial order to
impose a tax not authorized by state law could be made only by virtue of a federal
decree, thereby raising the question of "whether a district court possesses a power
to tax under federal law, either directly or through delegation to the KCMSD. ''338
Justice Kennedy criticized the Court for failing to confront the issue of whether
the district court possessed such power.3 39
The concurring justices argued that the district court's taxation order
constituted an improper exercise of judicial power.340 Judicially imposed
taxation, in their view, lacked the adjudicative character needed for the exercise of
judicial powers. 41 It denied due process to taxpayers, who were not parties to the
litigation, because it gave them neither notice nor an opportunity to be heard
through elected representatives. 342
Justice Kennedy attacked the district court's judicially imposed taxation as an
invasion of the province of the legislative branch, finding that district court orders
intruded into a sphere protected by Milliken !'s admonition that district courts'
3 3 4 See id at 401.
335 See Jenkins, 495 U.S. at 58-59 (Kennedy, J., concurring). The concurring opinion
referred to National City Bank v. Battisti, 581 F.2d 565 (6th Cir. 1977), and Plaquemrines
Parish School Board v. United States, 415 F.2d 817 (5th Cir. 1969), as pertinent examples of
federal court decisions in which remedial decrees dictating school financing methods had been
found to be beyond federal judicial authority. See Jenkins, 495 U.S. at 61 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
3 36 See Jenkins, 495 U.S. at 63-64 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
3 3 7 See id. at 64.
3 38 Id. at 65.
339 See id.
340 Id. at 66. The concurring opinion stated that a federal court lacks the remedial power to
directly impose a state tax and cited The Federalist No. 78 as "[reflecting] the Framers'
understanding that taxation was not a proper area for judicial involvement" Jenkins, 495 U.S. at
65.
341 See Jenkins, 495 U.S. at 66 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
342 See id
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remedial powers do not extend to the restructuring of local government entities or
their financial systems. 43 His concurring opinion also raised the following policy
concerns: the lack of judicial accountability to the voters,344 voter frustration
stemming from a lack of representation, the difficulty of administering a system
of taxation without input from the electorate, and the need to get community
support for taxation.3 45
Justice Kennedy next rejected the majority's view that the failure to uphold
the district court's tax order would leave the federal judiciary powerless to redress
constitutional violations.3 46 Further, the concurring in part opinion denied the
necessity of judicial taxation in Jenkins because interdistrict comparability, the
district court's goal, lacked constitutional command.347 The Court had ruled
earlier, in a 1973 decision, that unequal school district expenditures did not
violate the Equal Protection Clause.3 48 Justice Kennedy's opinion gave credence
to the State's charge that the KCMSD used the litigation as a tool to obtain
expanded funding that otherwise would be unavailable to it349
Justice Kennedy contended that a demonstrated need for the judicial taxation
was missing because the district court did not try less costly remedies, obtainable
within the existing tax structure. He argued that a taxation order should not be
entertained until the district court made a specific finding that the constitutional
343 See id. at 68.
344 See id at 71 ("A legislative vote taken under judicial compulsion blurs lines of
accountability by making it appear that a decision was reached by elected representatives when
the reality is otherwise.:).
345 See id. at 69-70.
346 See idr at 75. Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion stated that both the scope of the
remedies and the taxation approved by the Eighth Circuit were "without parallel." See id. at 61.
347 See id. at 76. Justice Kennedy argued that the judiciary risks a loss of legitimacy when
it fails to exercise restraint and oversteps its authority by entering into the "volatile field of
taxation.' Id. at 75. The opinion cautioned that a remedial plan centered upon upgrading the
KCMSD schools to a quality that would attract white suburban students placed the district court
in a policy area best left to the local community. See id. at 76. The concurring opinion stated:
A remedy that uses quality of education as a lure to attract non-minority students will place
the District Court at the center of controversies over educational philosophy that by
tradition are left to this Nation's communities. Such a plan as a practical matter raises
many of the concerns involved in interdistrict desegregation remedies.
Id. (citation omitted).
34 8 See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 54-55 (1973). The
concurring opinion in Jenkins referred to the Rodriguez case. See Jenkins, 495 U.S. at 76
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
34 9 See Jenkins, 495 U.S. at 76 (Kennedy, J., concurring). The concurring opinion stated
that the initial finding of discrimination could not become the rallying ground for the provision
of quality education that enmeshed the court in a debate over spending priorities. See id. at 77.
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violation would remain unremedied without judicially mandated tax increases.350
He viewed specific components of the educational program approved by the
district court as well beyond the norm of expected educational expenditures and
criticized the district court for failing to consider the availability of other remedies
without causing a revenue shortfall.351 The concurring justices' viewpoints are
well reflected in the following closing remarks: "[R]ules of taxation that override
state political structures not themselves subject to any constitutional infirmity
raise serious questions of federal authority, questions compounded by the odd
posture of a case in which the Court assumes the validity of a novel conception of
desegregation remedies we never before have approved. '352
C. Court-Ordered Taxation in Bond Cases Distinguished from Taxation
Ordered in Jenkins
The Supreme Court's majority opinion in Jenkins relied heavily upon the
nineteenth century bond cases and Griffin v. County School Board as precedent
for upholding the district court's judicial taxation.3 53 These precedents, easily
distinguishable from Jenkins, do not provide the support necessary for Jenkins's
deep intrusion upon state and local taxing discretion. The bond cases may be
distinguished in several respects.
1. Violation ofExpress Text in the Bond Cases
First the nature of the constitutional violation in the bond cases differs from
that in Jenkins. In the former, the local governments violated the express text of
the Constitution, Article I, Section 10, Clause 1, known as the Contract Clause,
which prohibits the states from impairing contractual obligations. 3 54 In each bond
case cited by the Court in Jenkins, the local government had obligated itself by
contract to levy taxes to retire indebtedness evidenced by outstanding bonds. In
some instances, the state passed subsequent legislation that prevented the local
government from levying taxes in the amount originally committed at the time of
350 See id. at 79 ("[Als a prerequisite to considering a taxation order, I would require a
finding that that [sic] any remedy less costly than the one at issue would so plainly leave the
violation unremedied that its implementation would itself be an abuse of discretion.).
351 See id. at 77-79.
35 2 Id. at 80.
353 See id at 55-58.
354 Originally, the Contract Clause was viewed as prohibiting the states only from
interfering with private contracts; its applicability to contracts made by state and local
governments was first made by the Marshall Court in Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87,
139 (1810). See Janice C. Griffith, Local Government Contracts: Escaping from the
Governmental/Proprietary Maze, 75 IoWA L. REv. 277,288-89 (1990).
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the issuance of the bonds.3 55 The Court found that the local government impaired
its obligation of contract with bondholders when it failed to levy taxes, whether
attributable to deliberate neglect or the removal of taxation power after the
issuance of the bonds. In those instances, the local governments' clear violation of
the Constitution was indisputable.
The Court's interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, beginning in
Brown I, makes racially segregated public education unconstitutional. Unlike the
express constitutional language governing the bond cases, no specific
constitutional text mandates that a school district carry out certain remedial
measures to further integrated school education, nor is it textually clear, as to the
necessary parameters of the remedial process to arrive at a unitary system of
education. In fact, district courts approve a variety of educational plans and
administrative structures designed to reach unitary status.356
2. Removal of the Constitutional Violation in the Bond Cases
The effectiveness of a taxation remedial order is demonstrated easily in the
bond cases. In those cases, the Court's order to levy taxes clearly eliminated the
Contract Clause violation by providing the governmental funding necessary to
355 See, e.g., Louisiana ex rel. Hubert v. Mayor of New Orleans, 215 U.S. 170, 180-81
(1909); Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 535,548,554 (1866).356 In Coalition to Save Our Children v. State Board of Education of Delaware, 757 F.
Supp. 328, 359-64 (D. Del. 1991), for example, the district court ordered a desegregation plan
that included magnet school programs, student assignments, written curriculum guides,
community outreach, reporting to the state's board of education, and the creation of a parent
information center. In United States v. Yonkers Board of Education, 635 F. Supp. 1577, 1577-
79 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), the district court judge ordered the city to implement a fair housing
program to assist in school desegregation. The plan included the development of public housing
in predominantly white areas ofthe city. See id at 1582; see also Stell v. Board of Educ., 724 F.
Supp. 1384, 1386-87, 1399-1400 (S.D. Ga. 1988) (approving a magnet school program and
majority to minority transfers when court-directed 1971 plan providing for pairing and
clustering of all-black and all-white schools, mandatory student assignments, and extensive
busing failed to achieve unitary status due to white flight); Arthur v. Nyquist, 473 F. Supp. 830,
838-39 (W.D.N.Y. 1979) (describing a voluntary desegregation program in Buffalo, New York
that provided elementary education for minority inner-city students by transporting them to a
predominantly majority receiving school located on the periphery of the city); Reed v. Rhodes,
455 F. Supp. 569, 610-12 (N.D. Ohio 1978) (ordering the imposition of minority to
nonminority ratios for instructional and administrative staffs); Tasby v. Estes, 412 F. Supp.
1192, 1212-21 (N.D. Tex. 1975) (ordering a desegregation plan that included the creation of
sub-districts to foster a sense of community and the utilization of student assignment criteria,
K-3 early childhood education centers, intermediate school centers, magnet high schools,
career education, bilingual education, special education to address handicapping conditions,
majority to minority transfer programs, minority to majority transfers, curriculum transfers,
transportation, adjustments to attendance zones, student discipline policies, improved school
facilities, improved recruitment and employment policies, personnel competence assessment,
teacher and principal assignments, training, and an accountability system).
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cany out the terms of the contract with the bondholders. In some of the bond
cases, the remedy consisted of simply striking down a statute that prevented the
municipality from raising the taxes it had originally pledged to retire the bonds.357
Thus, the Court order put the local government back in the same position it
occupied at the time of the issuance of the bonds. The efficacy of district court
decrees to spend unprecedented amounts of money to improve the quality of
education in school districts subject to desegregation orders cannot be shown as
readily. For example, the expenditure of $1.3 billion over nine years358 by the
KCMSD failed to improve test scores appreciably over those in other urban areas
not subject to court-ordered taxation.359
3. State Law Limitations Set Aside in the Bond Cases Evaded the
Constitution
The nature of the state law limitations also differs in the bond cases from the
taxation and expenditure limitations posed in cases such as Jenkins. In the bond
cases, the state law limitations that prevented compliance with the Constitution
were deliberately enacted to evade the constitutional prohibition against the
impairment of state or local contracts.360 In Jenkins, the state law limitations at
issue that precluded the school district from raising taxes in an amount sufficient
to carry out the district court's remedial decrees stemmed from the Missouri
taxpayers' revolt against higher taxes in general. These tax limits could not be tied
to a specific desire upon the part of the taxpayers to prevent school desegregation.
The Missouri laws at issue contained no unconstitutional provisions.
4. Local Authorization Existedfor the Taxation Ordered in the Bond
Cases
In Jenkins, the district court's order to increase the levy of school district
357 See infira note 360.
358 According to the State of Missouri, the state reported a cost of $13 billion with the
state's share of the cost totaling $838 million. See Linda Greenhouse, High Court to Review
Kansas City School Desegregation Case, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 27, 1994, at A23. On June 14,
1985, the district court issued its original remedial order. See Jenkins v. Missouri, 672 F. Supp.
400,402 (W.D. Mo. 1987); Jenkins v. Missouri, 639 F. Supp. 19 (W.D. Mo. 1985).
35 9 See Greenhouse, supra note 358, at A23. Student achievement in the school district
had not reached 'national norms as measured by standardized test scores?' Id.; see also supra
notes 201-04 and accompanying text.
360 See Missouri V. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 72 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring). In Von
Hoffman, as Justice Kennedy pointed out, the Court had invalidated a law that prevented the
state from fulfilling its constitutional obligation under the Contract Clause; once the Court
annulled the law, the state had the authority to impose the tax. See il at 72. In contrast to the
law invalidated in Von Hoffman, the neutrally imposed tax limit in Jenkins violated no specific
constitutional provision. See id.
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taxes above that authorized under state law amounted to the enactment of federal
law imposed upon the state's residents. The Court in effect created new
legislation that changed the formula for the amount of taxes that could be raised.
By contrast, all taxation orders in the bond cases could be effectuated under
existing state legislation enacted by the voters' representatives. Minimal comity
concerns arose because all taxation was accomplished pursuant to a local or state
statute.
In one bond case, City of Galena v. Amy, 361 the Court upheld the lower
court's peremptory writ to compel taxation, albeit in an amount insufficient to
cover the payment of the principal of and interest on the bonds. The lower court
decreed a one percent tax on one dollar of assessed valuation because the
municipality originally committed that amount of taxation to retire the bonds.
Counsel did not even argue that a higher amount should be levied. These bond
cases express the clear understanding that all taxes ordered must be authorized
under some existing state law. The Court affimed the imposition of taxation as
originally pledged under laws then in effect to secure payment of the bonds. At
most the Court sanctioned judicial abrogation of a statute that subsequently
limited the ability of the municipality to retire the bonds after they were issued.
Because such statutes impaired the locality's obligation of contract, they
constituted unconstitutional voter expressions.3 62
D. Court-Ordered Taxation in Griffin Distinguished from Taxation
Ordered in Jenkins
Griffin v. County School Board differs from Jenkins in a number of respects.
Griffin, like the nineteenth century bond cases cited in Jenkins, endorsed the
power of the federal judiciary to order taxation to make possible the fulfillment of
a concrete constitutional obligation. Until the county supervisors reopened Prince
Edward County's schools, its school children received unjustified, different
treatment than the school children in other Virginia counties-conduct that
violated the Fourteenth Amendment Like the local entities in the bond cases, the
county engaged in a course of conduct that flagrantly violated the Constitution: it
refused to integrate its school system.
The constitutional violation in Griffin could not be removed without the
taxation ordered because the county's schools needed revenues to reopen. In later
361 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 705 (1866).
362 See, e.g., Louisiana ex rel. Hubert v. Mayor of New Orleans, 215 U.S. 170, 178 (1909)
(finding that subsequently enacted legislation that withdraws or lessens the power of taxation
properly relied upon as securing payment of bonded indebtedness at the time of issuance
impaired the obligation of bondholders' contracts); Von Hoffnan v. City of Quincy, 71 U.S. (4
Wall.) 535, 554-55 (1866) (stating that where a state authorizes local taxation powers to meet
contractual obligations, withdrawal of such powers before the contract is satisfied impairs the
obligation of contract).
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cases involving tax orders to fund desegregated education, the degree of taxation
needed to finance the school desegregation plan, not a total lack of funding,
constituted the pivotal issue. Unlike the county supervisors in Griffin, local
officials in these cases did not refuse to tax; rather, they levied taxes in amounts
the plaintiffs deemed insufficient to achieve a unitary school system. As in
Jenkins, the district court's taxation orders provoked controversy because sharp
disagreement bxisted as to the amount of funding needed to achieve this status.
This situation sets in motion a far more complex pattern of conflicting values and
issues than the Griffin facts, which involved not only deliberate actions to thwart
court-ordered desegregation but also an obvious need for taxation to remedy the
constitutional violation.
Unlike the local authorities in Jenkins, the county supervisors in Griffin
possessed the power to levy the taxes ordered by the federal district court In both
the bond cases and in Griffin, the judicially mandated order to tax did not involve
any recasting of existing state taxation laws.363 In Jenkins, the court's ordered
taxation constituted a legislative act because the KCMSD lacked authority under
the state's laws to tax at the level ordered by the court for the purpose of
implementing a school desegregation plan. In the absence of underlying state
authority for the imposition of the remedial funding tax, the federal decree
rewrites the state's tax laws, intruding deeply upon local and state governmental
operations.
Ill. THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY'S FISCAL REMEDIAL APPROACHES TO
CORRECT CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIoNs
Parts I and II provided historical background for the Supreme Court's
expansive use of equitable powers to fund the implementation of school
desegregation plans. The Court's use of remedial funding and taxation powers
occurs in other areas of institutional reform litigation as well. This Part describes
and analyzes the principles declared by the Court to guide the exercise of its
remedial powers when the Court deems state and local funding necessary to
correct constitutional violations.364 When a court-ordered remedial process either
explicitly or implicitly calls for local or state governmental funding, courts
363 See Jenkins, 495 U.S. at 71 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("Griffin endorsed the power of
a federal court to order the local authority to exercise existing authority to tax.") (emphasis in
the original).
364 See ELY, supra note 14, at 86 (upholding judicial intervention when representative
processes fail to represent minority interests); Gerald E. Frug, The Judicial Power of the Purse,
126 U. PA. L. REV. 715, 715-32 (1978) (describing lower federal court decisions that have
mandated state expenditures, especially in the areas of corrections and the care of the mentally
ill and the mentally retarded); Yoo, supra note 4, at 1122 (pointing out that the federal courts
have imposed broad structural remedies upon state institutions without proper regard for
inherent limitations upon their powers).
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frequently refer to one or all of the following guiding principles:
(1) The cost of a remedy should not impede its use;3 65
(2) State law limitations upon spending do not preclude federal court-ordered
fiscal remedies;36 6 and
(3) Remedies should not be crafted that overly intrude into local government
affairs or otherwise violate the principles of comity and federalism.367
The Court applies principles one and two as categorical rules and disregards
any state and local interests that impede the federal remedial process. These
principles override state and local autonomy in resource allocation and law
making. Principle three, on the other hand, balances the values of federalism
against the need for remedial measures to correct state and local constitutional
violations. It calls for limitations upon the judiciary's federal remedial powers in
keeping with the balance of federal and state power envisioned by the Framers in
the constitutional framework?368
Neither the policy of strict remedial accountability irrespective of available
fiscal resources nor the policy of fashioning a remedy that sensitively takes local
needs and resources into account have reached a stage of development where
systematic application occurs. When addressing resource allocation issues created
by funding orders, the court usually will state tersely that the lack of funds does
not excuse a failure to remedy constitutional violations. A court that devises a
remedy that cuts a smaller slice of the tax dollar than advocated by the plaintiffs
may talk about the court's duty to consider the cost and effect of the proposed
remedies, which should not be more extensive than necessary to correct the
constitutional violation.369 The circumstances under which either policy can be
invoked remain vague, and courts might refer to the two policies interchangeably
3 65 See infra notes 371-80 and accompanying text; see also Frug, supra note 364, at 725,
725 n.71.
366 See infra notes 381-418 and accompanying text.
367 See infra notes 435-65 and accompanying text.
3 68 See Epstein, supra note 87, at 1102 (pointing out that "sometimes proposed remedies
are so excessive they cannot be justified as rectification of past wrongs"); Friedman, supra note
1, at 753-56, 768 (pointing out that courts take cognizance of the political environment when
they devise remedies); Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism: United States v. Lopez, 1995
SUP. Cr. REV. 125, 128 (pointing out that the Court has oscillated between allowing the
exercise of a full range of textual federal powers and limiting power, even if textually permitted,
to preserve the constitutional framework's balance between federal and state authority).
369 See Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1247 (9th Cir. 1982) (opining that courts, in
ordering a remedy to correct Eighth Amendment violations, must consider the cost of
compliance and the effect of the remedy on the legitimate security needs of prisons); LeMaire
v. Maass, 745 F. Supp. 623, 629 (D. Or. 1990) (stating that a court must consider the cost and
effect on prison security needs when fashioning a remedy to correct unconstitutional prison
conditions).
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in the course of an opinion.3 70
A. The Cost of a Remedy Should Not Impede Its Use
The federal judiciary does not hesitate to order state and local governments to
undertake costly remedies once it finds a constitutional violation. 71 The Court
has opined that neither the political question doctrine nor the separation of powers
doctrine applies to the federal judiciary's relationship to the states.372 Federal
courts refer to the Supremacy Clause as support for court-ordered funding that
contravenes a state's laws and a state's constitution.373 Typically, the federal
370 In Jenkins v. Missouri (Jenkins 1), the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals referred to the
choice of remedies to redress racial discrimination as a balancing process within appropriate
limits. See 855 F.2d 1295, 1299 (1988). Later in the Jenkins H opinion, the court took a rights
maximizing point of view and stated that the rights to a public education free of racial
discrimination could not be thwarted by rights granted by the state to its citizenry to limit
taxation by popular vote. See id. at 1313-14. The court next discussed the need to use
minimally obtrusive methods to correct constitutional deficiencies. See id at 1314.
In LeMaire, the district court, in continuous paragraphs, referred to the necessity to
consider the cost of prison security needs in fashioning a remedy, the need to avoid undue
judicial interference, and the court's duty to correct unconstitutional prison conditions each as
applicable legal standards. See LeMaire, 745 F. Supp. at 629. In Knop v. Johnson, 685 F. Supp.
636,638 (W.D. Mich. 1988), the district court referred to both the policy of strict accountability
and federalism concerns in stating that "[c]omity, federalism and appropriate deference to
prison administrators notwithstanding it remains this Court's duty to devise an order which will
promptly and effectively remedy the constitutional inadequacies noted in my opinion of August
10, 1987.'
37 1 In both Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment school desegregation cases,
federal courts have repeatedly ruled that the cost of a remedy should not impede its use to
remedy constitutional violations. See, e.g., Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1110 (9th
Cir. 1986) (upholding district court order to install sound-absorbing wall coverings in prison's
five-tier units as a proper exercise of district court discretion because the fact that a remedy is
costly does not preclude its use); Stell v. Board of Educ., 724 F. Supp. 1384, 1405 (S.D. Ga.
1988) (refusing to accept any financial excuses for the implementation of a desegregation plan
involving educational enhancements that were "ambitious and expensive"); Evans v. Buchanan,
455 F. Supp. 692, 698 (D. Del. 1978) (opining that after North Carolina State Board of
Education v. Swann, the court's inherent power to fashion effective desegregation orders that
encompass adequate funding cannot be disputed and stating that such inherent power precludes
the judiciary's usual deference to a legislature in matters of taxation). But see Little Rock Sch.
Dist. v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 597 F. Supp. 1220, 1224 (E.D. Ark. 1984),
remanded 778 F.2d 404, 408, 433-34 (8th Cir. 1985), in which an interdistrict magnet remedy
was rejected in favor of less intrusive measures.
372 See Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 352 (1976) (plurality opinion).
37 3 See Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 57 (1990) (upholding district court power to
order school districts to levy taxes to implement school desegregation remedies, irrespective of
state law limitations that bar such taxation, because "[t]o hold otherwise would fail to take
account of the obligations of local govemments, under the Supremacy Clause, to fulfill the
requirements that the Constitution imposes on them"); see also Spain v. Mountanos, 690 F.2d
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judiciary will declare that the fiscal consequences of such orders do not excuse
the constitutional violation and should be ignored, even when strained fiscal
resources make the remedy difficult to provide.374 When litigants enter into
consent decrees to correct constitutional violations, the federal courts show
reluctance to impose affirmative funding obligations, however, unless the parties
have expressly agreed to them? 75
742,746 (9th Cir. 1982) (affirming district court's order to the state to pay attorney's fees owed
in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 litigation because under the Supremacy Clause, federal law may be
enforced even though the order contravenes the state's laws and constitution); Evans, 468 F.
Supp. at 949 (finding that school districts and private parties may turn to specific orders of the
district court to carry out duties and rights created by the Supremacy Clause); BERNARD
BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 358 (1992) (presenting
Alexander Hamilton's view that the Supremacy Clause avoids federal and state authority
conflict by binding both state and federal judicial officers to enforce federal law); MCGOWAN,
supra note 85, at 38-39 (arguing that inclusion of the Supremacy Clause in the Constitution
makes conflict between state and federal courts inescapable); Akhil Reed Amar, OfSovereignty
and Federalism, 96 YALE U. 1425, 1458 (1987) (discussing the introduction of the Supremacy
Clause at the Constitutional Convention of 1787).
374 See Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291, 1319-20 (5th Cir. 1974) (finding that a shortage
of state funds did not excuse the enforcement of a district court order calling for hiring new
employees and improving physical facilities to remove constitutional violations occurring in the
operation of the Mississippi State Penitentiary). In Gates, the Fifth Circuit utilized a rights
maximizing approach and opined that a "[s]hortage of funds is not ajustification for continuing
to deny citizens their constitutional rights." Id. at 1320. To support its conclusion, the Gates
court quoted from Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971),
stating that "[o]nce a right and a violation have been shown, the scope of a district court's
equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is broad, for breadth and flexibility are inherent in
equitable remedies." Gates, 501 F.2d at 1320.
In San Francisco NAACP v. San Francisco Unifted School District, 695 F. Supp. 1033,
1041 (N.D. Cal. 1988), rev'd, 896 F.2d 412 (9th Cir. 1990), the court enforced a school
desegregation consent decree that imposed financial obligations upon the state. Finding that
such obligations cannot be excused on the basis of financial inability, the court held that agreed
upon state financial commitments in the decree could be enforced irrespective of subsequent
state legislation limiting the extent of state financing available for school desegregation
remedies. See id. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the
language of the consent decree did not provide an unqualified guarantee of state funding. See
San Francisco NAACP, 896 F.2d at 414.
375 See San Francisco NAACP, 896 F.2d at 414 (finding that state's commitment to
reimburse desegregation costs pursuant to a consent decree could be reduced by subsequently
enacted state law limitations when parties failed to stipulate for an unqualified guarantee of state
funding); New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 631 F.2d 162, 163, 168 (2d
Cir. 1980) (refusing to hold the state governor in contempt if funding failed to be provided to
improve conditions for mentally retarded residents pursuant to a consent decree because the
governor took all actions within his lawful authority, and the consent decree did not
contemplate the payment of unappropriated funds from the public treasury); cf. United States v.
Board of Educ., 717 F.2d 378, 380, 383 (7th Cir. 1983) (upholding the district court's
determination that the United States' obligation under a consent decree extended beyond
assistance to the school board in locating and applying for federal funds when the consent
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Inmates of Allegheny County Jail v. Wecht376 and Tasby v. Edwards377
illustrate the federal judiciary's inclination to disregard the financial impact of its
remedial plans. In Inmates of Allegheny County Jail, the district court, after
stating that the cost of a remedy does not preclude its use, ordered the county to
submit plans for the construction of a new jail facility.378 In Tasby, the court
referred to Jenkins as support for the proposition that a school district subject to a
desegregation court decree could not treat cost as a determinative factor, although
it acknowledged that cost constituted one factor to be considered.379 The Tasby
court rejected a school district's request to lessen overcrowding at three
elementary schools by converting the existing facilities of a magnet montessori
school into an elementary school and relocating the montessori school's
operations to another site. The court stated that the montessori school's population
at the proposed new location would become predominantly minority and that
other solutions to overcrowding should be explored3 80
B. State Law Limitations Do Not Preclude Federal Court-Ordered Fiscal
Remedies
1. Emergence of the Principle That State Law Limitations Do Not
Preclude the Imposition ofFederal Court-Ordered Remedies
Traditionally, federal courts have been loath to set aside neutrally enacted
state laws that impede or prohibit the implementation of remedies that federal
courts might otherwise order.3 81 In 1971, in North Carolina State Board of
decree required the federal government "to make every good faith effort to find and provide
every available form of financial resources adequate for the implementation of the
desegregation plan").
376 699 F. Supp. 1137 (W.D. Pa. 1988); see also Toussaint, 801 F.2d at 1110 (upholding
the power of a district court to order the installation of costly sound-absorbing wall coverings in
California prisons).
377 799 F. Supp. 652 (N.D. Tex. 1992).
378 See Inmates ofAllegheny County Jail v. Wecht, 699 F. Supp. at 1147-48.
379 See Tasby, 799 F. Supp. at 659.
380 See id. at 658.
381 In Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken I), for example, the Court invalidated a district court's
remedial plan to decrease racial imbalances in the Detroit public school system by consolidating
numerous independent school districts. See 418 U.S. 717, 752-53 (1974). The Court found that
the proposed remedy would alter the structure of public education in Michigan and would result
in the restructuring of Michigan laws related to school districts, a remedial measure that the
court rejected. See id. at 742-44. Likewise, in Spencer v. Kugler, 326 F. Supp. 1235, 1240-43
(D. N.J. 1971), af'd, 404 U.S. 1027 (1972), the district court dismissed a complaint that sought
to correct racial imbalances in New Jersey schools by invalidating state statutes that made
school district boundaries coterminous with municipal boundaries. The court acknowledged
that racial imbalances in some New Jersey municipalities resulted in racial imbalances in the
[Vol. 61-483
JUDICIAL FUNDING AND TAXMANDATES
Education v. Swann,382 the Supreme Court ruled, however, that state laws can be
set aside should they hinder the effectuation of court-ordered school
desegregation remedies.383 Federal courts subsequently ruled, in school
desegregation decisions, and in other contexts as well, that state law limitations
cannot impede remedial processes instituted by the federal judiciary.384 Federal
courts have further opined that the federal judiciary possesses the power to enjoin
the operation of state laws that limit revenue sources deemed necessary to remove
the constitutional violation.3 85 Federal courts again cite the Supremacy Clause as
justification for such orders.386
After Swann, the Supreme Court, in Washington v. Washington State
Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Association,3 87 ruled that state agencies
could be ordered, as lawsuit parties, to promulgate regulations to carry out the
Court's decree even if they lacked rule making power under state law. 88 The
municipalities' schools. See id. at 1240, 1242-43.
382 402 U.S. 43 (1971).
383 Seeid. at 45.
384 See, e.g., Arthur v. Nyquist, 712 F.2d 816, 821 (2d Cir. 1983) (rejecting the argument
that the district court's remedial plan as to the hiring of minority teachers was "invalid simply
because it infringe[d] upon statutory and contractual rights (collective bargaining agreements)
of majority teachers who [had] played no role" in the school board's past segregative practices);
Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291, 1319-20 (5th Cir. 1974) (upholding implementation of the
district court's remedial plan to improve a state's prison staff and facilities even in the absence
of the state law requirement of a legislative appropriation).
3 85 See Jenkins v. Missouri, 122 F.3d 588, 603 (8th Cir. 1997) (upholding district court's
power to continue enjoining the enforcement of state laws that impede the KCMSD's ability to
tax at the level deemed necessary to ensure the success of its programs).
Smith v. Sullivan, 611 F.2d 1039 (5th Cir. 1980), illustrates the federal judiciary's
propensity to override state laws that prevent the effectuation of a court-ordered funding
remedy irrespective of the fiscal protective function served by such laws at the local level.
When the defendants raised the issue of compliance with state-law imposed spending limits, the
court said: "[Mt is well established that inadequate funding will not excuse the perpetuation of
unconstitutional conditions of confinement" Id. at 1043-44 (citations omitted).
386 See Spain v. Mountanos, 690 F.2d 742, 744, 746 (9th Cir. 1982) (affirming a district
court order directing the State Controller to issue a warrant on the State Treasurer for attorneys'
fees owed in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 litigation even though the lack of an appropriation for such
purpose violated the California Constitution). The Spain court stated that "[u]nder the
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, a court, in enforcing federal law, may
order state officials to take actions despite contravening state laws." I at 746; see also
Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658,
695 (1979) (finding that the Supremacy Clause commands compliance with a federal court
order that overturns state law).
387 443 U.S. 658 (1979), modified sub nom. Washington v. United States, 444 U.S. 816
(1979).
3 88 See Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. at 695.
The case involved litigation in which the Washington Supreme Court had ruled that the State
Fisheries Department could not comply with a district court injunction that required the
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Court doubted, however, that the resulting regulations would have effect as state
law.389 Nonetheless, the Court stated that if Washington's Game and Fisheries
Departments could not be ordered to promulgate regulations enforceable as a
matter of state law, the district court could "prescind that problem by assuming
direct supervision of the fisheries."390
Federal courts frequently cite Swann and Washington when they uphold
district court remedial orders that set aside state laws found to interfere with the
remedial correction of constitutional violations.3 91 Unlike the mandate in
Washington, in which the Court ordered Washington state departments to adopt
regulations to implement the Court's interpretation of Indian treaty rights, the
state laws curtailing taxation in Jenkins did not conflict with the exercise of
federal power pursuant to a federal statute that preempted state law. Jenkins is
distinguishable also from Swann. The Court's override of state law in Jenkins
made a quantum leap from Swann because the state law limitations set aside in
Department to adopt regulations protecting certain Indian treaty rights. The injunction granted
Indians rights to a 45-50% share of the harvestable fish passing through their recognized tribal
fishing grounds. The state court was of the opinion that, as a matter of federal law, the treaties
did not give Indians a right to a share of the fish runs. The district court then issued orders to
enable it, with the aid of the U.S. Attorney for the Western District of Washington and various
federal law enforcement agencies, to directly supervise those aspects of the state's fisheries
necessary to preserve the treaty fishing rights. See id. at 673. The State and the commercial
fishing associations challenged the legality of the district court's order to a state agency to take
action without state law authorization and its authority to manage the state's fisheries after the
state agencies refused to do so. See id. at 692-93. The Court responded by stating that any
"[s]tate law prohibition against compliance with the District Court's decree cannot survive the
command of the Supremacy Clause... ."Id. at 695.
The Court cited Swann, Gnfin, and City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma, 357 U.S.
320 (1958), as support for its affirmance of the district court's power to order a Washington
state department to prepare a set of rules to implement the Court's interpretation of Indian treaty
rights. See Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass 'n, 443 U.S. at 695. In
City of Tacoma, the Court held that state laws could not bar the city from acting under a federal
license to build a dam on a navigable stream because federal law preempted state law. See 357
U.S. at 341. In the 1990s, the Court ruled that the Constitution's division of power between
federal and state governments bars Congress from "commandeering"' state governments to
enact or enforce a federal regulatory program. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 909
(1992); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 175 (1992). Thus, the Court in Washington
bestowed upon itself a power that it has forbidden Congress to exercise.
389 See Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. at 695.
390.[d.
391 See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 57 (1990); United States v. Yonkers Bd. of
Educ., 902 F.2d 213, 219 (2d Cir. 1990); Jenkins v. Missouri (Jenkins I1I), 855 F.2d 1295, 1313
(8th Cir. 1988); Stout v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 448 F.2d 403, 404 (5th Cir. 1971).
Federal courts also refer to Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken 1), 418 U.S. 717, 744 (1974), as
precedent supporting the rule that state laws cannot prevent the exercise of full remedied power
to remedy constitutional violations. See, e.g., Arthur v. Nyquist, 712 F.2d 816, 821 (2d Cir.
1983).
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Jenkins,392 unlike the Anti-Busing Law in Swann,393 were not enacted to frustrate
federal court remedial measures.394 In Jenkins, the Missouri tax limitations
reflected voter sentiment concerning state and local taxation policies, raising
issues recognized by the Supreme Court as subject to comity principles.3 95
Courts should be cognizant that state law limitations arise in a number of
contexts. Often the nexus between the state law limitation and its ability to
severely thwart the desired federal remedy are far more attenuated than was the
case in Swann and Washington. Unfortunately, Swann's broad rhetoric that state
law limitations 'must give way when [they] hinder vindication of federal
constitutional guarantees"396 may lead courts to overlook both the important
policy considerations underlying state law limitations and the deference those
limitations receive on the basis of comity and federalism concerns. State tax and
expenditure limitations should also be distinguished from other types of state law
limitations because they involve state revenue and fiscal policy, a sensitive area in
which the Court has shown little inclination to intrude.397
2. Categorization of State Law Limits
The federal judiciary most frequently abrogates state law limitations that are
viewed as impeding court-ordered remedies designed to desegregate public
392 The Jenkins Court referred to the following state law limitations:
(1) Mo. CONST. art. X, § 11(b)-(c) (liriting 'ocal property taxes to $125 per $100 of
assessed valuation unless a majority of the voters in the district approve a higher levy, up to
$3.25 per $100" and permitting a levy above $325 per $100 of assessed valuation if two-thirds
of the voters agree). See Jenkins, 495 U.S. at 38.
(2) Mo. CONST. art. X, § 22(a); Mo. REv. STAT. § 137.073.2 (1986) (the Hancock
Amendment) (requiring "property tax rates to be rolled back when property is assessed at a
higher valuation to ensure that taxes will not be increased solely as a result of reassessments").
SeeJenkins, 495 U.S. at 38-39.
(3) Mo. REV. STAT. § 164.013.1 (Supp. 1988) (Proposition C) (allocating "one cent of
every dollar raised by the state sales tax to a schools trust fund and requir[ing] school districts to
reduce property taxes by an amount equal to 50% of the previous year's sales tax receipts in the
district'). See Jenkins, 495 U.S. at 39.
393 In North Carolina State Board of Education v. Swann, the Court affirmed a district
court order enjoining the enforcement of a North Carolina statute, known as the Anti-Busing
Law, that was enacted to thwart school desegregation remedies ordered by the judiciary. See
402 U.S. 43, 44 n2 (1979). Furthermore, the Court found that the activity prohibited by the
North Carolina law was the "one tool absolutely essential to fulfillment of [a] constitutional
obligation to eliminate existing dual school systems." a:I at 46.
394 See La Pierre, supra note 1, at 344 (stating that unlike the statute at issue in Swann, the
Missouri statutes and constitutional provisions restricting the KCMSD's taxation powers were
not enacted to impede the implementation of a school desegregation plan).
395 See Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 109-16 (1981).
396
,Swann, 402 U.S. at 45.
397 See infra notes 670-73,762-63 and accompanying text.
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schools or correct Eighth Amendment 398 violations occurring in prisons. State
law limitations that hamper court mandated reapportionment to cure Equal
Protection Clause violations also have been struck down.399 These state law limits
take a variety of forms. In the school desegregation area, federal courts disregard
state appropriation processes4 00 limitations on local taxing authority 4 01 statutes
that allocate the portion of school desegregation costs that the state should
bear,4 02 and statutes that support a seniority system in the retention of public
school teachers 403 State law fiscal restrictions include limitations upon property
tax rates, property tax levies, revenue generation, expenditures, increases in
property assessments, and the creation of debt 40 4 In one instance a federal court
398 U.S. CoNsT. amend. VIII.
39 9 See Board of Estimate of City of New York v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688, 690 (1989)
(holding that membership apportionment of the New York City Board of Estimate violated the
equal protection guarantee of one-person, one-vote).
400 See, e.g., Arthur v. Nyquist, 712 F.2d 809, 814 (2d Cir. 1983) (upholding the power of
the district court to order the expenditure of funds to implement desegregation remedies). But
see State ex rel. Sikeston R-VI Sch. Dist. v. Ashcrof1, 828 S.W.2d 372, 376-77 (Mo. 1992)
(refusing to provide equitable relief that would set aside state constitutional appropriation
requirements).
401 See Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 56-57 (1990) (holding that a local government
may be ordered to levy taxes greater than the limit set by state statute when there is a
constitutional reason).
4 02 See United States v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 677 F2d 1185, 1187 (7th Cir. 1982)
(requiring the state to pay the full cost of a metropolitan-wide desegregation remedial plan
when a state statute required only state payment of one-half of the desegregation remedial
costs).
403 In Arthur v. Nyquist, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a district court order
mandating one-for-one hiring to reach a 21% minority target goal that violated the seniority
system established by state law. The Second Circuit Court stated that the district court's
remedial plan was not "invalid simply because it infringe[d] upon statutory and contractual
rights (collective bargaining agreements) of majority teachers who played no role in the Board's
past practices of segregation." 712 F.2d at 821.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals took a different position in People Who Care v.
Rockford Board of Education School District No. 205, 961 F.2d 1335 (7th Cir. 1992). The
Seventh Circuit invalidated portions of a consent decree that altered seniority provisions
incorporated in a collective bargaining agreement having the force of an entitlement under state
law. See id. at 1339. The appellate court expressed the view that parties to a consent decree
cannot agree to disregard valid state laws. See id. at 1337. It showed irritation at the Board of
Education's agreement to eliminate the seniority provisions through the vehicle of the consent
decree after it had found a buyout of such entitlements too expensive. See id. at 1338-39; see
also Kasper v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 814 F.2d 332, 341-45 (7th Cir. 1987) (affirming a
district court's refusal to approve a consent decree that would violate state law).
4 0 4 See STEVEN D. GOLD, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATUREs FINANCE
NO. 5, REsULTS OF LOCAL SPENDING AND REVENUE LIMrATIONS: A SURVEY 1-3 (1981) (on
file with the Joyner Library, East Carolina University).
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declined to ignore a state law calling for balanced budgets. 40 5
In Jenkins, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the district court's set
aside of state law constraints upon the KCMSD's taxation powers because it
viewed these limits as placing too great a handicap upon the KCMSD's ability to
remedy constitutional violations4 06 Although the adoption of state and local
taxation, expenditure, and debt limitations has been widespread for decades, a
wave of new limitations swept the country in the 1970s and 1980s that limited the
maximum revenue that a jurisdiction's property taxation could generate3 07 Prior
to 1970, the majority of limitations restricted the rate of taxation, a restraint that
does not limit revenues if assessments are rising.408
This latest tax revolt has been attributed to the public's demand for property
tax relief, distrust of elected officials, dissatisfaction with government, and
discontent with the public school system4 09 An argument can be made that these
new tax limitations, such as Missouri's 1980 Hancock Amendment,4 10 reflect
voter reluctance to fund needed improvements for school children trapped in
poor, segregated urban schools. Racist sentiments may accompany an
unwillingness to finance these schools adequately, but it would be difficult to
prove that the voters' primary concerns were other than financial. 411 State
4 0 5 See United States v. Board of Educ., 11 F.3d 668,671-74 (7th Cir. 1993).
4 0 6 See Jenkins v. Missouri, 855 F2d 1295, 1311-13 (8th Cir. 1988).
4 0 7 See DANIEL R. MANDELKER Er AL, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN A FEDERAL
SYsTEM: CAsEs ANDMATERIALs 413 (1996).
4 0 8 See GOLD, supra note 404, at 4. Further research is needed to quantify better the effect
of state law limitations upon taxation and revenue generation. See id. at 48--54; see also Allan
Odden, Public School Finance: Fine-Tuning the System, in CONFERENCE ON ALTERNATIVE
STATE & LOCAL POLICIES, STATE & LOCAL TAx REVOLT: NEW DIRECfONS FOR THE '80s, at
187 (Dean Tipps et al. eds., 1980). Sometimes the effect of the limitations is mitigated by
increased aid or new taxes. See GOLD, supra note 404, at 49.
4 0 9 See MANDELKER ET AL., supra note 407, at 413; see also George G. Kaufman,
Inflation, Proposition 13 Fever, and Suggested Relief in THE PROPERTY TAX REVOLT: THE
CASEOFPROPOSMON 13, at 215 (George G. Kaufmarn & Kenneth T. Rosen eds., 1981).
4 10 Mo. CONST. art. X, §§ 16-24.
411 In Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982), the Court
invalidated a Washington state initiative that terminated mandatory busing for the purpose of
achieving greater integration in public schools. The Court found that the initiative was racially
motivated and restructured the decision-making process to burden minorities. See id. at 470-71.
It is more difficult to prove that the expenditure and taxation limitations adopted by many states
in the 1970s and 1980s are racially motivated because generally they restrict funding at all
levels of government and do not focus solely on education fiding. See, e.g., Mo. CoNsT. art.
X, §§ 16-24 (Hancock Amendment). The United States Supreme Court has upheld voter
adopted measures that affect the ability of local governments to generate tax revenues. In
Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 18 (1992), the Court found that California's Proposition 13
(restricting property tax rates to 1% of market value, rolling back assessed values to 1975-76
levels, placing a 2% cap on annual increases in property assessments, prohibiting the imposition
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financial restraints existed in the nineteenth century long before the federal courts
were engaged in structural reform or school desegregation. 412
Federal courts exhibit more reticence in overriding state law limitations in
prison reform litigation than in school desegregation lawsuits. This result may
stem from a greater willingness to disregard state law fiscal restraints than state
laws regulating the management of prisons. Recent decisions emphasize that a
neutral state law hindering a swift judicial remedy to correct Eighth Amendment
violations can be set aside only when the district court makes findings that other
remedial alternatives provide inadequate corrections and fashions a remedy that
does not create too great an intrusion upon local and state functions 13 Prison
reform litigants frequently seek to establish a cap on the number of prisoners who
may be housed in a particular facility for the purpose of alleviating overcrowding.
In Smith v. Sullivan,414 the district court imposed a five hundred inmate
population cap for the El Paso county jail, overriding a state law that required
county officials to accept all prisoners. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals found
the order unwarranted in the absence of evidence showing the totality of
circumstances required such remedial action 4 5
Federal courts have refused to enjoin state laws in other instances involving
Eighth Amendment remedial measures. In Stone v. City and County of San
Francisco416 decided after Jenkins, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed
district court orders that reduced prison overcrowding by empowering a
of new taxes on property, and requiring a 2/3 vote for other taxes) did not violate the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by the imposition of differential assessments
and taxation on properties of comparable worth.
4 12 See Gelfand, supra note 292, at 546-55 (providing historical background on the
origins and purposes served by debt ceilings, tax limitations, and expenditure limits).
413 See, e.g., Stone v. City & County of San Francisco, 968 F.2d 850, 864 (9th Cir. 1992)
(overturning a district court order pennitting the sheriff to release prisoners in violation of state
law because the district court did not make findings that other less intrusive alternatives were
unavailable to reduce jail overcrowding); Woodson v. Sully, 801 F. Supp. 466,470-71 (1992)
(rejecting a proposed amended consent judgment that called for a Jail Control Authority and a
Jail Administrator because the creation of these remedial measures was not authorized by state
statutes and would be too intrusive upon the county government).
In Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1086 (9th Cir. 1986), a class action involving
the conditions of confinement in segregated prison units, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
stated that the protection of inmates' constitutional rights does not vest the judiciary with the
power to manage prisons. The Ninth Circuit admonished that federal courts must abide by a
policy of minimum intrusion into state prison administration and "may not enjoin a state official
to follow state law." Id. at 1087.
414 611 F.2d 1039 (5th Cir. 1980).
4 15 See id. at 1044-46 (invalidating a district court order imposing a 500 inmate limit on
the jail population at the El Paso county jail in view of the fact that such an order could not be
imposed until the court had conducted a hearing and evaluated evidence relating to the totality
of conditions at the jail).
416 968 F.2d 850 (9th Cir. 1992).
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California sheriff to release prisoners contrary to state law. The appellate court
ruled that the district court's order violated federalism principles because the court
reallocated power from the state legislative body to the executive branch and
failed to ascertain the availability of alternative remedies before proceeding with
its early release orders4 17 Federal courts also hesitate to impose remedial prison
reform actions unauthorized by state law. In Woodson v. Sully, a federal district
court rejected a proposal to transfer jail administration duties from the sheriff to a
proposed public authority in the absence of state law authorization 418
3. Reluctance to Modify Consent Decrees to Override State Law
Limitations
Federal courts generally decline to adopt proposed consent decree
modifications that override state law because parties should not be empowered to
agree contractually to disregard valid state laws.4 19 In People Nho Care v.
Rockford Board of Education School District No. 2054 20 the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals invalidated portions of a consent decree that altered seniority
provisions incorporated into a collective bargaining agreement. A unilateral
4 17 See ia at 864 (ruling that the district court should not have authorized the sheriff to
release prisoners in violation of a state law that barred such early release until the court had
made findings that other remedial alternatives were inadequate to rectify the constitutional
violations); see also Badgley v. Santacroce, 800 F.2d 33, 37-38 (2d Cir. 1986) (upholding the
terms of a consent decree that established an inmate population limit in which county
defendants suggested, but did not show conclusively, that compliance with an inmate cap might
violate state law).
4 18 See 801 F. Supp. 466, 470-71 (D. Kan. 1992) (rejecting a proposed amendment to a
consent decree that called for the creation of a Jail Control Authority to assume some of the
exclusive duties given to the county sheriff under Kansas statutes). The Woodson court cited
Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33 (1990), for the principle that "a court's equitable remedial
power must be tempered by a 'proper respect for the integrity and function of local govemment
institutions."' Id. at 470. It cited Jen/dns for the principle that a neutral state law cannot be set
aside unless the district court has first assured itself that other permissible alternatives are
nonexistent See id
4 19 See LaShawn A. v. Barry, 144 F.3d 847, 852-55 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (rejecting a district
court's modification of a consent decree that authorized a general receiver, appointed by the
court to oversee consent decree implementation, to disregard local law that interfered with the
receiver's discharge of its responsibilities); Stone v. City & County of San Francisco, 968 F2d
850, 863-64 (9th Cir. 1992) (rejecting a district court's modification of a consent decree that
authorized the sheriff to disregard state laws restricting the participation of inmates in furlough
programs and their early release); cf United States v. Alex Brown & Sons, Inc., 963 F. Supp.
235, 240-42 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (upholding proposed consent provision that barred taped
recordings of stock trader conversations made for law enforcement purposes from admission as
evidence in civil processes and stating that parties to consent decrees cannot agree to disregard
valid state laws).
420 961 F.2d 1335 (7th Cir. 1992).
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change in the terms and conditions of employment by the consent decree parties
was found to abrogate the unions' entitlement status under Illinois state law to
bargain collectively.421 The court emphasized that "altering the contractual (or
state-law) entitlements of third parties"422 could not be done in the absence of a
district court finding that the "change [was] necessary to an appropriate remedy
for a legal wrong."423 Similarly, in United States v. Board of Education4 24 the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals refused to modify a thirteen-year consent
decree to override a state balanced budget requirement 425 The Chicago Board of
Education had argued that it could not comply with this law and simultaneously
remedy racial and ethnic segregation in Chicago's public schools pursuant to the
consent decree.426
4. The Judiciary Assumes a Legislative Role in Overriding State Law
Limitations
A federal court decree that empowers local officials to take actions
unauthorized or prohibited by state law remains troubling because the judiciary in
effect assumes the role of a state legislative body. In Jenkins, the Court upheld the
power of a district court to compel local officials to order unauthorized taxation
that contradicted state law4 27 The Court stated that "a local government with
taxing authority may be ordered to levy taxes in excess of the limit set by state
statute where there is reason based in the Constitution for not observing the
statutory limitation."428 The Court failed to admit, however, that the taxation
upheld in Jenkins could only emanate from the federal judiciary because local
officials lacked taxation powers in the absence of state law authorization.4 29
421 See id at 1336.
422 Id. at 1339.
423 Id.
424 11 F.3d 668 (7th Cir. 1993).
425 The court found that the consent decree did not specifically require the schools to
remain open, and had the parties desired such an obligation, they should have stated in the
consent decree. See Board of Educ., 11 F.3d at 670-71, 673. See also United States v.
Michigan, 940 F.2d 143 (6th Cir. 1993) (decided after Jenkins), where the Sixth Circuit
invalidated the district court's modification of a consent decree to incorporate program
needs, such as vocational guidance and educational counseling. The State of Michigan
claimed it had intentionally excluded these programs from the earlier consent decree
because program needs were already accommodated and not constitutionally required. See
id. at 147-48.
426 See Board of Educ., 11 F.3d at 670; see also infra notes 504-09 and
accompanying text (providing a more complete discussion ofBoard ofEducation).42 7 See supra notes 332-34 and accompanying text.
42 8 Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 57 (1990).
429 The Court cited Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, as authority for empowering the
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Federal courts are loath to acknowledge that their expansive remedial powers now
embrace the exercise of legislative power4 30
In Jenkins, the Court overlooked the effect of its ruling upon a vast body of
the states' common law that defines the scope of local power. This law, in effect
for well over a century, rests upon a foundation that treats a local government as a
creature of a state that lacks power to act without state authorization.431 Local
governments, as agents and political subdivisions of a state, enjoy only those
powers that the state delegates to them4 32 In many states, the operation of a strict
construction rule, known as "Dillon's Rule," further circumscribes local
governmental power433 This rule permits a local government to exercise only
those powers expressly delegated to it or those that can be implied fairly from the
expressly granted powers. Dillon's Rule and the concept of plenary state control
over local governments constitute the "formal background norms for state-local
relationships.1434 By mandating unauthorized taxation, the Court in one sweeping
blow severely undermined the structural principles, derived from nineteenth
century legal theorists, that lay the foundation for the nation's law of state and
local relations.
C. Comity and Federalism Principles Bar the Imposition of Overly
Intrusive Judicial Remedies
The principles of comity and federalism impel federal courts to show
sensitivity to the concerns and needs of local and state governments when
ordering fiscal remedies 435 These principles underlie the proposition that the
federal judiciary to order unauthorized state taxation to remedy constitutional violations. See
Jenkins, 495 U.S. at 56. The Von Hoffman decision, however, does not support that proposition.
See supra note 330 and accompanying text
430 Justice White's majority opinion has been criticized for failing to acknowledge that the
removal of the state law limits in Jenkins eliminated the KCMSD's grant of authority to tax and
resulted in the federal judicial expansion of the KCMSD's taxation powers beyond those
authorized by state law. See La Pierre, supra note 1, at 343-45; Brocker, supra note 1, at 758-
89,759 n.157.
4 3 1 See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I-The Structure of Local Government
Law, 90 COLuM. L. REv. 1, 7-9 (1990).
4 32 Local governments must be empowered by the state's constitution or laws before they
may exercise power legitimately. See Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178-79
(1907) (holding that the state legislature is vested with full power to provide for the organization
of and allocation of powers to local entities); see also MANDELKER Er AL., supra note 407, at
103.
43 3 See MANDELKERET AL., supra note 407, at 107-08.
434 Briffault, supra note 431, at 9.
435 See, e.g., United States v. Michigan, 940 F.2d 143, 155 (6th Cir. 1991) (stating that the
state's sovereign authority to operate its penal institutions is anchored in sensitive federalism
principles); Jenkins v. Missouri (Jenkins II), 855 F.2d 1295, 1314 (8th Cir. 1988) (stating that
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judiciary should fashion the least intrusive remedy that will remove the
constitutional violation.4 36 Although federal courts refer to their remedial powers
as broad, they repeatedly hold that injunctive relief against a state or local agency
should be no broader than necessary to remedy the constitutional violation.437
Some courts entreat that measuring a remedy's effectiveness should be foremost
on the minds of the federal judiciary.438
This principle of judicial restraint from imposing overly intrusive remedies
precludes the federal judiciary from assuming the management of a local body's
affairs or directing how it should administer its local functions.439 This restraint
on judicial oversight of local institutions does not necessarily limit a court-ordered
funding program designed to remedy a constitutional violation. The court could
order local funding in general terms, thereby giving the locality considerable
discretion to correct the constitutional violations through the expenditure of the
additional funding ordered. An order to fund a program in a specific way,
however, could be construed as overly intrusive.
An argument can be made that all funding orders involve micro-management
on the part of the court and therefore should be barred as overly intrusive. The
widespread application of this principle, however, would prevent the federal
judiciary from entertaining the bulk of institutional reform litigation that seeks to
vindicate individual rights through governmental spending-funding that may be
principles of federal-state comity apply to the process of imposing federal judicial remedies);
Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 778 F2d 404, 434 (8th Cir.
1985) (rejecting the district court's remedial consolidation plan in school desegregation case
because other remedies that take into consideration the interests of the three school districts in
managing their own affairs better remove the constitutional violations); Hoptowit v. Ray, 682
F.2d 1237, 1246 (9th Cir. 1982) (opining that "federal courts must be cognizant of the
limitations of federalism and the narrowness of the Eighth Amendment!' when "entertaining a
cause of action alleging Eighth Amendment violations in a state prison").
436 See, e-g., Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 379-80 (1976) (invalidating a district court
order that required the city's executive branch to submit guidelines for police handling of
civilian complaints for the court's approval because principles of federalism restrain judicial
interference in a city's governance of its internal disciplinary affairs); Jenkins 11, 855 F.2d at
1314 (directing the district court to use minimally obtrusive methods in its school desegregation
remedial orders); Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115, 1126, 1145 (5th Cir. 1982) (opining that the
court's duty to protect constitutional rights of prisoners does not confer power to administer
prisons because the allocation of functions in a federal system as well as comity toward the state
require a policy of minimum judicial intrusion into the management of state prisons).
437 See Touissaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1086-87 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing Milliken
v. Bradley (Milliken II), 433 U.S. 267, 280 (1977); Swarm v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of
Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971)).
43 8 See Touissaint, 801 F.2d at 1087.
43 9 See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 562 (1979) (opining that federal courts should not
become enmeshed in the minutiae of prison operations unless they clearly violate the
Constitution and stating that "[t]he wide range of 'judgment calls' that meet constitutional and
statutory requirements are confided to officials outside of the Judicial Branch of Govemmenf').
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neglected by majoritarian rule. When the federal judiciary issues funding orders,
it continues to be cautious about foreclosing a local government from pursuing a
suggested remedial course viewed as effective. Far less judicial restraint,
however, exists with respect to school desegregation remedial orders. Because
these orders typically mandate detailed remedial measures, including specific
programmatic and capital facilities improvements, as well as the funding orders to
finance them, the equitable principle barring overly intrusive intervention in the
day-to-day management of a local facility generally does not apply to the school
desegregation remedial process. 4 0 The Court's 1995 Jenkins decision did,
however, signal the need for district courts to place more emphasis upon the goal
ofreturning control to school districts. 441
1. Application ofLeast Intrusive Remedy Principle to School
Desegregation Remedial Processes
Arthur v. Nyquist442 graphically depicts how judicially ordered funding
remedies in school desegregation cases can clash with federalism concerns. The
district court ordered Milliken If-type remedies, including magnet schools, that
were designed to encourage greater racial balance in Buffalo, New York schools
through voluntary rather than mandatory pupil assignments.4 43 The district court
judge recognized the diffictilty of properly deciding the amount of funding
required to implement the court's remedy without overly intruding into the
administration of Buffalo's school system.444 When an agreement could not be
reached between the plaintiff and the city defendants on requisite funding in the
440 For example, in Liddell v. Missouri (Liddell VII), the court acknowledged that
"detailed guidelines for desegregating the city schools over the next four years" had been
established by the settlement agreement, district court orders, and both district court and Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeal opinions. 731 F.2d 1294, 1323 (8th Cir. 1984) (emphasis added). The
Eighth Circuit referred to numerous committees that had been created to assist in the
desegregation plan:
They include the Desegregation Monitoring and Advisory Committee, the Magnet Review
Committee, and the Voluntary Interdistrict Coordinating Council. The finction of the latter
committee is to coordinate and administer the student transfers, the voluntary teacher
exchanges and the part-time educational programs. A Recruitment and Counseling Center
has also been established. Each of these committees and the Center fulfill important
functions in the desegregation process and may be continued and funded in accordance
with the settlement agreement at the discretion of the district court.
Id.
441 See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 102 (1995); Morantz, supra note 111, at 262.
442 712 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1983).
443 See id. at 811-13.
444 See id. at 812-13.
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1981-82 school year, the city appealed the district court's order for additional
funding. 445
On appeal, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals first noted the sizable cost of
a magnet school plan that did not rely on extensive busing.446 The court
recognized the extra budgetary strain placed upon Buffalo taxing entities resulting
from the remedial order that required a "combination of magnet schools, early
childhood centers, and special academies; pairing and clustering of schools; and a
general upgrading of the school system to provide appropriate educational
opportunities." 447 The court further acknowledged that the imposition of these
costs forced the judiciary to mediate differences between the Board of Education
and the city's taxing entities.448 Noting the trend of school authorities to use
desegregation lawsuits as leverage to secure additional funding otherwise
unavailable due to taxpayer resistance, the court examined whether findings
supported the Board of Education's claimed financing needs4 49
Second, the Court of Appeals in Arthur v. Nyquist recognized the legal
difficulties inherent in the implementation of a quality education plan. A district
court judge cannot easily determine whether the quality related remedies sought
by school district officials solely address the constitutional violations or whether
they constitute additional, desirable funding not needed to implement the court's
remedy.450 The court suggested the district court take these following steps to
determine the amount of mandatory school desegregation funding: (1) analyze
whether the requested funding level and plan fulfills desegregation remedial
needs or whether it may generally be characterized as requests for improvements
unrelated to school segregation and (2) make detailed findings of the remedial
purposes served by the sought funds in order to facilitate appellate court
review.451 To evaluate the justification for the proposed financing, the court
expressed the desirability of itemizing both the requested additional funding and
the expenditures planned in the absence of the requested funding.4 52
445 See id at 8l10-11.
44 6 See id at 811. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed an order of the district
court that the City of Buffalo be required to appropriate an additional $7.4 million for inclusion
in the city's board of education budget to implement school desegregation remedies. See id. at
814.
447 Id. at 811.
448 See id. at 813.
449 See id. at 812-13.
450 See id. The court also expressed concern that ascertaining the correct amount of
remedial funding could involve excessive intrusion into school administration operations and
details. See id. at 812.
451 See id. at 813.
452 See id at 814.
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2. Application ofLeast Intrusive Remedy Principle to Eighth Amendment
Remedial Processes
Whereas the federal judiciary's school desegregation decrees involve judicial
oversight of minute public school operations, as seen in Jenkins.4 53 federal courts
frequently state that the implementation of a remedy for an Eighth Amendment
constitutional violation should avoid judicial micro-management. 454 District
courts overseeing mandated prison reforms are admonished not to order overly
intrusive remedies, which include the judicial commitment of local resources 455
453 In Jenkins v. Missouri, District Court Judge Russell G. Clark acknowledged that the
remedial part of a school desegregation case exceeds all other forms of litigation in complexity
and duration. See 639 F. Supp. 19, 23 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (citing Armstrong v. Board of Sch.
Directors of City of Milwaukee, 616 F.2d 305, 324 (7th Cir. 1980)). The Jenkins remedial plan
included the goal of increasing the KCMSD's rating of AA to AAA. See id. at 26. To achieve
AAA standards, the court specified that the KCMSD needed to take the following actions: (1)
hire 13 certified librarians for the elementary school libraries, (2) increase the amount of time
allocated to teacher planning by hiring additional teachers, (3) schedule art, music, and physical
education classes for at least 60 minutes a week taught by teachers with the proper subject
matter certification, (4) hire a total of 54 additional art/PE/music teachers, and (5) hire
elementary and secondary level counselors. See id. at 26-28.
Other remedial steps included the following: (1) reducing elementary and secondary
school class size, (2) implementing a summer school program to provide additional leaming
time, (3) providing full day kindergarten throughout the KCMSD to all willing to participate,
(4) implementing early childhood development programs that incorporated early language
development and other specific components, (5) implementing plans to foster real educational
change by cooperation among patrons, parents, teachers, and administrators at the local school
level, (6) implementing magnet school programs, (7) establishing a staff development program,
(8) implementing a reasonable student reassignment plan, (9) seeking voluntary interdistrict
transfers of students, (10) making capital improvements, (11) hiring additional administrators to
implement the desegregation plan, and (12) creating a Monitoring Committee to oversee school
desegregation implementation. See id. at 28-43. The court further ordered that specific amounts
of money be allocated by the state and the KCMSD for each of the components of the
desegregation plan over several years. See id. at 43-44.
454 ,See, e.g., Thomburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401,404,407-08 (1989) (upholding federal
regulations that authorized withholding outside publications from prisoners who were deemed
detrimental to prison security because deference should be accorded to the expertise of prison
officials and opining that the validity of such regulations should be based on whether they
reasonably relate to legitimate penal interests); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 561-62 (1979)
(holding that constitutional rights of incarcerated pretrial detainees may be limited by the
legitimate policies of penal institutions to maintain internal security and opining that prison
officials' decisions should be granted deference because they, rather than the judiciary, are
charged with the duty to administer prisons).
455In United States v. Michigan, 940 F.2d 143 (6th Cir. 1991), for example, the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals held that the district court overly intruded upon the sovereignty of
Michigan by ordering modifications to a consent decree that mandated the incorporation of
certain program requirements into Michigan's security classification system for inmates and
dictated new validation procedures. See id. at 157-60. Quoting in part from Procunier v.
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In Newman v. Alabama,456 for example, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
struck down a district court order mandating the release of prisoners to relieve
overcrowding in Alabama county jails4 57 The court concluded that the district
court impermissibly interfered with the state's prerogative to administer its prison
system when it determined which prisoners should be released.458
In remedying prison deficiencies, courts consistently refer to the limitations
imposed by comity and federalism principles as necessitating deference to prison
administrators in devising an order that will remedy constitutional violations 459
Several federal courts have ruled that although the cost of a remedy to correct
unconstitutional prison conditions cannot preclude its use, the federal judiciary
should make a cost impact analysis before imposing an expensive remedy.460
Martinez, 416 U.S. 396,405 (1974), the appellate court opined that district courts should "avoid
intrusion, either directly or indirectly through special masters, independent experts, or other
extraneous participants, into the realm of 'expertise, comprehensive planning, and the
commitment of resources, all of which are peculiarly within the province of the [state]
legislative and executive branches of government."' Id. at 160 (citation omitted).
456 683 F.2d 1312, 1321 (11th Cir. 1982).
457 See id at 1314, 1321.
4 58 See id. at 1321 (stating that equitable relief in the form of an injunction should not
have been ordered before utilization of the district court's less intrusive contempt power). In
Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080 (9th Cir. 1986), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
stated: "[tlhe duty to protect inmates' constitutional rights, however, does not confer the power
to manage prisons, for which courts are ill-equipped, or the capacity to second-guess prison
administrators. Federal courts should not ... become enmeshed in the minutiae of prison
operations." Id. at 1086; see also Bell, 441 U.S. at 562 (warning that discarding a "hands off'
approach to prison administration could dislodge the authority that the Constitution places in the
nonjudicial branches of government to operate prisons); Morgan v. McDonough, 540 F.2d 527,
534-35 (1st Cir. 1976) (upholding school desegregation remedies that displaced some decision-
making power of elected school committees, but indicating that this step was warranted only by
the "most compelling circumstances," which were found in the local officials' failure to give
effect to the court's desegregation orders).
459 See Michigan, 940 F.2d at 167 (holding that the district court had imposed overly
intrusive prison administrative procedures). The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals further opined:
"The unabridged teachings of the Court convey the Court's own unequivocal commitment to
and its adamant recognition of the state's sovereign authority to operate its penal institutions.
Anchored in the sensitive principles of federalism, this sovereign authority is a prerogative of
the state, not a privilege recognized through comity." Id. at 155. See also Knop v. Johnson, 685
F. Supp. 636, 637 (W.D. Mich. 1988), in which the district court judge acknowledged that in
imposing the least intrusive remedy available to correct unconstitutional conditions in prisons
he attempted "to abide by the... precepts of comity and federalism... "
460 See Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F2d 1237, 1247 (9th Cir. 1982) (ruling that federal courts,
in framing a remedy to correct unconstitutional prison conditions, must consider the cost of
compliance and legitimate prison security needs); Wright v. Rushen, 642 F.2d 1129, 1134 (9th
Cir. 1981) (ruling that a reviewing court must have evidence that the district court focused on
the impact of its remedies on prison security and the resources of the state in correcting
unconstitutional prison conditions).
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Such an analysis forces a district court to evaluate both the expense of the
proposed remedial plan and its effectiveness in redressing the plight of the
plaintiffs.a61
3. Greater Recognition ofFederalism and Comity Principles Needed in
Devising Remedial Action to Desegregate Public Schools
Why does the federal judiciary stress greater judicial restraint in devising
remedies to address Eighth Amendment violations than in seeking to implement
school desegregation plans? One answer may be that racial segregation
constitutes a far more intractable problem to rectify than does the correction of
prison conditions 4 62 The pernicious effects of racial discrimination remain highly
visible. In contrast, the fear of crime continues to traumatize the nation, and the
protection of prisoners' rights does not receive strong voter support. The
appointment of more district court judges with conservative views, however, may
decrease federal court interventionist remedies on behalf of public school
children4 63
Swann's rhetoric offers another explanation for the paucity of comity and
federalism concerns expressed by federal court judges when ordering school
desegregation remedial guidelines. This opinion ushered in authorization for the
exercise of broad remedial powers to achieve school desegregation without
referring to policies supporting comity and federalism.46 The Supreme Court's
pronouncements on permissible remedial processes to correct Eighth Amendment
violations, however, have affirmed the necessity to take comity and federalism
policy issues into consideration.465
4 61 See Wright, 642 F.2d at 1134.
4 62 See ELY, supra note 14, at 78, 80-82, 86 (supporting the power of the Court to protect
minority rights from majority rule).
463 See, e.g., Mickey Edwards, The Need to Understand the Conservative Identity,
CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Sept. 5, 1997, at B4-B5 (asserting that conservatives oppose the
concept ofredistributing wealth and are less inclined to strive for equal outcomes or progressive
taxation); Rorie Sherman, The Lawyers in the Three-Decade Effort to Desegregate Schools
Have Staying Power, NAT'L LAW J., Dec. 3, 1990, at 1, 31 (asserting that plaintiff lawyers in
desegregation cases face a generally conservative federal judiciary that they view as hostile to
civil rights now that school desegregation efforts have passed through the following three
phases: liability (early 1960s), remedy (begun in early 1970s), and compliance (further
expansion of the remedy phase through enforcement of standards and allocation of costs for
integration and educational enhancement)).
464 See, e.g., United States v. Missouri, 515 F.2d 1365, 1372 (8th Cir. 1975) (relying upon
language in North Carolina State Board of Education v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43, 45 (1971), to
disregard state law limitations in devising school desegregation remedies).
465 See Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367,392-93 (1992) (overturning
the district court's denial of a sheriff's request to modify a consent decree to allow double
bunking in some newly created jail cells); Knop v. Johnson, 685 F. Supp. 636,637 (W.D. Mich.
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The Court's admonitions about overly intrusive Eighth Amendment remedies
seem equally applicable to school desegregation court decrees designed to
equalize educational opportunities for racial minorities because those remedies
are by nature intrusive. Even public school experts are unable to agree on the
standardization of methods necessary to meet the goals so eloquently set forth in
Brown I. In fact, imposing programmatic remedies, whether to improve the
quality of public education or prison conditions, involves more infingement upon
local discretion than improving the physical and environmental conditions in
school or prison facilities. Prison reform litigation focuses more frequently,
however, on the improvement of prison facilities than on the psychological well-
being or rehabilitation of prisoners.
IV. THE STATE JUDICIARY'S FISCAL REMEDIAL APPROACHES TO CORRECT
CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS
Part III evaluated the federal judiciary's fiscal remedial approaches. Part IV
examines and contrasts the principles constructed by state judiciaries to guide
their imposition of fiscal remedies. The state courts adhere more closely than their
federal counterparts to separation of powers principles when remedying state and
local constitutional violations. Consequently, state court correction of
constitutional violations requiring public expenditures results in far less intrusion
upon the legislative processes than the imposition of federal fiscal remedies.
A. State Monetary Remedies Ordered Only for Clear Constitutional
Violations
In the absence of a clear constitutional violation, state courts refrain from
ordering the appropriation of money to meet litigants' appeals for judicially
ordered ftmding. 66 In this era of reduced public funding, individuals, interest
1988) (holding that the precepts of comity and federalism are applicable in devising the least
intrusive remedy available to correct unconstitutional conditions in prisons). The Court in Ru b
admonished the district court to take a flexible approach in tailoring modifications to consent
decrees in institutional reform litigation. See Rufo, 502 U.S. at 391-93. The Court stated that the
public interest and the separation of powers within the federal system require district courts to
defer to local government administrators who have primary responsibility for solving problems
addressed in institutional reform lawsuits. See id. at 392. District courts appropriately should
consider the impact of financial constraints in tailoring a consent decree modification. See id. at
392-93.
466 See, e.g., State v. Brooke, 573 So. 2d 363 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that the
court would have exceeded its authority if it had ordered funding in excess of amounts
appropriated by the legislature for placement of children in psychiatric/therapeutic residential
facilities); State ex rel. Marshall v. Blaeuer, 709 S.W2d 111 (Mo. 1986) (holding that a circuit
judge lacked authority to order the state to provide legal services to inmates in the absence of a
statutory or common law rule authorizing such assistance).
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groups, and local governmental units institute lawsuits against the state, or its
subdivisions, hoping that the judiciary will order the defendants to fund services
the plaintiffs deem necessary. By adhering to separation of powers principles,
state courts steer away from performing legislative functions that involve the
allocation of scarce public dollars.4 67 Federal courts remain much more
susceptible to such appeals in adjudicating institutional litigation claims against
state and local governments. Relying upon its perceived power under the
Supremacy Clause, the federal judiciary overlooks how the intrusive nature of
some remedial actions expands judicial power into the legislative realm. When
asked to order the expenditure of unappropriated federal funds, federal courts
traditionally show, however, as much deference to Congress's power of the purse
as state courts give to their state legislatures. 68 The federal courts' deference to
Congress likewise extends to local governmental requests of the federal judiciary
to order congressional spending for favored local projects. 69
467 See Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth. v. Association of Community Orgs. for Reform,
563 A.2d 565 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989) (overnling a court of common pleas order enjoining
transit fare increases because the judiciary had no power to perform the legislative role of
determining the amount of the transit subsidy). The court stated that "[t]he judiciary cannot
grant [the transportation authority] the power to tax, nor can it impose a tax itself." Id. at 573.468 See Rochester Pure Waters Dist. v. EPA, 960 F.2d 180 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (overturning a
district court order to an executive agency to allocate funds for the construction of a sewage
treatment plant). Because Congress rescinded the appropriation for this grant program, such an
order, according to the appellate court, would in essence constitute an appropriation for which
the judiciary lacks authority. See id. at 184. The court stated:
The Appropriations Clause of the Constitution vests Congress with exclusive power over
the federal purse: "No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of
Appropriations made by Law.". .. The clause 'neans simply that no money can be paid
out of the Treasury unless it has been appropriated by an act of Congress."
Id. at 185 (quoting Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United States, 301 U.S. 308, 321 (1937) and U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7); see also NAACP, Boston Chapter v. Kemp, 721 F. Supp. 361, 367-68
(D. Mass. 1989) (refusing to order HUD to fund affordable desegregated housing and
additional rent subsidies as a remedy for HrD's failure to administer in compliance with Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968). The court stated that a federal court order to provide such
funding is barred by sovereign immunity and opined that the appropriation of funds rests
exclusively in Congress. See id. at 367-68. Likewise, in Sodus Central School District v. Kreps,
468 F. Supp. 884 (W.D.N.Y. 1978), the district court held that it lacked power to issue a
mandatory injunction directing the Secretary of Commerce to award funds under a federal grant
program to plaintiff school district because the power of appropriation is vested solely in
Congress. See id. at 885-86.
469 In Kreps, a local school district sued the Secretary of Commerce alleging that its
application for funding under the Local Public Works Capital Development and Investment Act
of 1976 had been arbitrarily denied. See Kreps, 468 F. Supp. at 886. The court found that the
secretary had discretionary authority to make these statutory grant awards. See id. Any court
order that awarded plaintiff a grant was viewed as violating Congress's constitutional power to
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B. Compliance with State Fiscal-Law Limitations
1. State Legislative Appropriation Requirement Limits State-Court
Remedial Processes
Generally, all states require an appropriation by their legislative bodies prior
to the expenditure of funds. The appropriation limits spending to a specific
amount for a stated purpose 470 Simply stated, the legislative appropriation sets
the maximum dollar amount that may be spent for a particular purpose. Absent
authorization, funds may not be expended. The appropriation requirement stems
from the public policy to make known the purposes for which public funds are
spent and to ensure that expenditures are made only for authorized purposes
pursuant to an adopted budget and revenue plan.
State courts have ruled steadfastly that under no circumstances may the
judiciary direct the legislative branch to appropriate funds to rectify an
adjudicated duty.471 These courts take a strict separation of powers approach,
holding that the power and authority to appropriate funds lies exclusively within
the legislative branch. 472 Although a substantive right to receive payment of an
make appropriations. See id.
470 See In re Karcher, 462 A.2d 1273, 1277 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1983) (defining an
item of appropriation as authorization for "the spending or disbursement from the treasury of
money for a specific purpose").
471 See, eg., City of Ellensburg v. State, 826 P.2d 1081, 1084 (Wash. 1992) (holding that
while the state had a statutory obligation to reimburse a city that provided fire protection
services to protect state property located in the city, the court, in the absence of constitutionally
mandated funding, will not direct the legislature to act because the extent of such funding is a
legislative prerogative); City of Camden v. Byme, 411 A.2d 462,470 (N.J. 1980) (affirming the
denial of a court order directing the legislature to appropriate funds for anticipated statutorily
funded state aid to municipalities because courts cannot redress the legislature's refusal to
exercise its constitutional power over appropriations).
State courts also reason that state constitutional provisions barring the payment of state
monies from the treasury in the absence of an appropriation interdict judicial appropriation. In
Gallena v. Scott, 94 A.2d 312 (NJ. 1953), an employee sought an order from state judicial and
budgetary officials for the payment of alleged additional back wages after the legislature had
appropriated a sum to be paid to him. See id. at 313. The court affirmed the dismissal of the
complaint holding that the state constitution prohibited the payment of money from the state
treasury unless appropriated by law. See id. at 315. The court stated that judicial authority
cannot "compel an appropriation." Id. But see Salinas Union High Sch. Dist. v. Honig, 5 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 626, 633-35 (Cal. CL App. 1992) (upholding court-ordered payments from available
appropriations to reimburse school districts for driver's training program when political
infighting between the executive and legislative branches caused the state to abandon a 37 year
reimbursement practice authorized by state statutes). The court found that the school districts
had vested rights to such reimbursement. See id. at 633.
472 See, e.g., McDunn v. Williams, 620 N.E.2d 385, 396 (11. 1993) (holding that lower
court's decision to permit two judicial candidates in an election contest to fill one judicial
vacancy raised serious separation of powers problems because unless the legislature created an
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adjudicated obligation against a state or local government may exist, state courts
continue to rule that the judiciary lacks the power to order the legislative branch to
make such a payment As a result, no other practical remedy exists unless the
legislature willingly appropriates funds for payment of the obligation.4 73
State courts perceive that their role lies in pointing out a governmental
entity's breach of legal duties or its unauthorized actions rather than in directing
the legislative branch to appropriate funds to meet these obligations. 74 The
judiciary recognizes that orders to make an appropriation lead to a direct
confrontation between the legislative and judicial branches because the legislature
may refuse to appropriate the funds. State courts also express concern that a
judicial order to appropriate funds is fiscally unsound because the existing state
budget may not contemplate or include judicially ordered expenditures.475
Although the judiciary does not possess the power of appropriation,4 76 a
judicial order to appropriate funding may be upheld if necessary to preserve the
integrity of the judicial branch. Some state courts will order legislative
appropriations deemed essential to preserve the independence of the judicial
branch. For example, state courts have ordered appropriations to fund otherwise
additional circuit court position, no appropriated funds existed to pay both candidates); Rolla 31
Sch. Dist. v. Missouri, 837 S.W.2d 1, 3-4 (Mo. 1992) (affirming trial court's decision that it
lacked authority to direct the legislature to fund special educational services, an area in which
the legislature is entitled to supremacy by reason of the separation of powers doctrine).
473 See State ex rel. Dep't of Corrections v. Pefia, 855 P.2d 805, 808-09 (Colo. 1993)
(holding that trial court lacked power to order a legislative appropriation to satisfy a judgment
against the State in favor of the City of Denver, which was entitled to $835,136 for housing
state-sentenced prisoners pursuant to a statutory reimbursement plan).
474 See Rolla, 837 S.W.2d at 7-8 (holding that while the judiciary may point out how the
legislature's funding of a mandatory preschool special program is invalid, it may not dictate that
the legislature fund the program in a certain way); County of Gloucester v. New Jersey, 606
A.2d 843, 848 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992) (giving the State defendant a one-year period in
which to remedy overcrowded prison facilities and stating: "Our function is to point out when
legal authorization has been exceeded, not to direct what is essentially a legislative or executive
remedy.").
475 In City of Camden v. Byrne, 411 A.2d 462 (NJ. 1980), the court stated that a judicial
order to appropriate money would be a fiscally imprudent measure that would "tend to tilt the
budget toward imbalance" and would create debt in violation of the state's constitutional debt
limit. Id. at 471-72.
476 In State v. Brooke, for example, the court held that separation of powers principles
prohibited the state judiciary from ordering a state department to provide funding for the
placement of emotionally disturbed children when appropriations were insufficient to cover
such expense. See 573 So. 2d 363, 369 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991). The court stated that such an
order was in "derogation of the legislature's prerogative to make appropriations." Id 370; see
also Franklin v. New Jersey Dep't of Human Servs., 543 A.2d 56,63 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1988) (upholding a state regulation that established a five month maximum for emergency
shelter assistance and opining that courts lack power to require executive departments to seek
appropriations, a power reserved exclusively to the legislature).
2000]
OHIO STATE LAWJOURWAL
inoperable judicial functions477 or to ensure payment of adjudicated monetary
obligations4 78 including both the payment of legal fees479 and arbitration
477 State courts have held that an inherent power lies in the judiciary to order the
legislative branch to appropriate the funds necessary to make the judiciary operable as the third
branch of government. This inherent power, however, exists only to rectify a minimal level of
operation; it does not exist to give the judiciary its funding wish list. See Morgan County
Comm'n v. Powell, 293 So. 2d 830 (Ala. 1974) (holding that circuit judges lack inherent
powers to order the county's legislative body to put in effect the secretarial salary scale
proposed by them). Different jurisdictions have established similar guidelines as to when this
inherent power to order appropriations may be exercised. In In re Alamance County Court
Facilities, 405 S.E.2d 125 (N.C. 1991), the Supreme Court of North Carolina stated:
The court's judicious use of its inherent power to reach towards the public purse must
recognize two critical limitations: first, it must bow to established procedural methods
where these provide an alternative to the extraordinary exercise of its inherent power.
Second, in the interests of the future harmony of the branches, the court in exercising that
power must minimize the encroachment upon those with legislative authority in
appearance and in fact.
Id. at 133. Further, the court stated that adherence to established procedural methods must occur
unless they "stand in the way of obtaining what is reasonably necessary for the proper
administration ofjustice." Id.
The reasonable necessity requirement confines the exercise of the judiciary's inherent
power to those situations in which the appropriation is shown to be "for the immediate,
necessary, efficient and basic finctioning of the court." Webster County Bd. of Supervisors v.
Flattery, 268 N.W.2d 869, 877 (Iowa 1978) (annulling judicial order for the employment of an
investigator to be attached to county attorney's office because no evidentiary record of the
necessity of such employment existed); see also Judges for Third Judicial Circuit v. County of
Wayne, 172 N.W.2d 436, 441 (Mich. 1969) (holding that the spring board for the inherent
power test lies not in the "relative need, but practical necessity" for the state funding) (emphasis
in the original); John C. Taggart, Note, Judicial Power-The Inherent Power of the Courts to
Compel Funding for Their Own Needs-In re Juvenile Director, 87 Wash. 2d 232, 552 P.2d
163 (1976), 53 WASH. L. REV. 331 (1978) (discussing the strict standard established by In re
Juvenile Director to meet the reasonable necessity requirement); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. et al.,
Comment, Court Finance and Unitary Budgeting, 81 YALE L.J. 1286, 1287-91 (1972)
(discussing the limited application of the inherent power doctrine and arguing that constitutional
issues would be raised by its expansion).
478 Impossibility of performance excuses the obligation to make payment for an
adjudicated obligation if severe financial hardship makes payment impossible. See Garcia v.
City of S. Tucson, 663 P.2d 596, 598 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983). In Garcia, the court stated:
"Although mere financial hardship is insufficient as a defense, a complete want of funds and
inability to raise them is a defense to mandamus." Id. at 598 (citation omitted). The court in
Garcia ruled that the lower court should have permitted the City of Tuscon to present evidence
as to its ability to levy additional taxes to pay a tort judgment rendered against it. See id. The
city claimed that it had not budgeted funds to pay for the judgment in the 1981-82 fiscal year.
See id. at 597.
4 79 In Mandel v. Myers, 629 P.2d 935 (Cal. 1981), the Supreme Court of California
upheld a trial court's order to an appropriate state official to pay court-awarded attorney fees
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awards 480 Courts also have ordered a local government to make expenditures
mandated by the legislative branch 48 1
from funds that the legislature had already appropriated even though the legislature had deleted
a proposed appropriation for this particular purpose. The court emphasized that such
constitutionally entitled fees constituted an essential part of the California justice system. See id.
at 948. The underlying rationale, as in the payment of necessary judicial expenses, lay in the
need of the judiciary to protect its functioning. See id. at 945-46. The court specifically stated
that otherwise "our system of justice would be subordinated to the popular vote of legislators,
and our constitutional bed-rock principle of separation of powers would become a shattered
mass of scattered fragments?' Id. at 948. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court of California pointed
out that the order was directed to a state official, not to the legislature to "pass an appropriations
bill or to undertake any other legislative act" Id. at 947; see also Mark J. Coleman, Note,
Mandel v. Myers: Judicial Encroachment on Legislative Spending Powers, 70 CALIF. L. REv.
932(1982).
480 Arbitration awards have been categorized as binding contractual obligations that are
enforceable against governmental bodies. See AFSCMEIowa Council v. State, 484 N.W.2d
390, 395 (Iowa 1992) (holding that an arbitrator's award constituted an enforceable collective
bargaining award). In AFSCMElowa Council, the court was presented with a conflict between
Iowa statutes, providing that an arbitrator's award constituted a collective bargaining agreement
between the parties that was enforceable as a final and binding contract and Iowa constitutional
provisions prohibiting the payment of funds from the state treasury without an appropriation
policy. See id. at 393-95. The court found that the state's obligation to perform on its
contractual obligations outweighed statutory and constitutional fiscal limitations because the
state's ability to function depended upon reliance that its contracts would be enforced. See id. at
395; see also Tate v. Antosh, 281 Al.d 192, 199 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1971) (ordering the city to
pay arbitration awards, incorporated into collective bargaining agreements, for the payment of
disability benefits to city employees).
The payment of pension benefits to state employees likewise fits into the category of an
enforceable contractual obligation between the legislature and public employees that cannot be
impaired. See Kosa v. Treasurer of Michigan, 292 N.W.2d 452,465 (Mich. 1980) (stating that
the legislature cannot impair its contractual obligation to make pension benefit payments).
481 Cities with a limited tax base often face mandates from state legislatures regarding the
required level of services to be provided to needy residents. Should a municipality fail to
provide the level of funding required by the state, some state courts will enter an order for the
funding regardless of the capabilities of the municipality to fund the mandate. See, ag., City of
New Haven v. Connecticut State Bd. of Educ., No. 309427, 1992 WL 369607, at *12 (Conm.
Super. Ct. Dec. 2, 1992), aftd, 638 A2d 589, 601 (Conn. 1994) (upholding State Board of
Education order to the city to fund a $2 million projected shortfall to meet the state's Minimum
Expenditure Requirement for education and finding evidence to support the Board's
conclusions including the Board's finding that the city had "failed to appropriate sufficient
funds... to meet its legal obligation"); Greve v. County of DuPage, 532 N.E2d 1000, 1004
(ill. App. Ct. 1988) (upholding a writ of mandamus ordering county officials to pay vouchers
incurred for the support of minors placed under the state's Juvenile Court Act after the
exhaustion of the amount requested by the judiciary for inclusion in the county's appropriation
ordinance); State ex rel. Milligan v. Freeman, 285 N.E.2d 352, 354-55 (Ohio 1972) (ruling that
mandamus will be allowed to compel a board of county commissioners to annually appropriate
the sums necessary to fulfill a statutory mandate to meet the administrative expenses of the
county's Domestic Relations and Juvenile Court). But see Rolla 31 Sch. Dist. v. State, 837
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In the unusual event a state court orders a legislative appropriation to carry
out a judicial function, as indicated above, the court generally refuses to be
specific about how the funds should be raised.482 This lack of direction
acknowledges that the legislature must make the appropriation itself before any
monies may be expended to provide a judicial remedy4 83 Furthermore, state
courts will attempt to avoid a direct clash with the legislative branch by ordering
funding to come from a category already included as an appropriated budgetary
S.W.2d 1, 7 (Mo. 1992) (holding that the court cannot order the legislature to fund a state
mandated program in a particular way because Missouri's Constitution prohibits the state from
either mandating the provision of new local services unless the state funds them or from using
unrestricted funds for state mandated programs).
When the state legislature enacts legislation that establishes funding mandates for itselt as
opposed to one of its local units, state courts are loath to order the state to appropriate funds to
fully meet the mandate. In City of Ellensburg v. State, 826 P.2d 1081, 1082-83 (Wash. 1992),
the Washington Supreme Court found that a statute providing for state contracts with
municipalities to pay a share of fire protection services for the protection of state property did
not establish a mandate to cover the full cost of the fire protection services. The court held that
the trial court erred in granting a monetary judgment for past fire services provided and in
ordering full funding under a formula devised by the trial court. See id. at 1085. The court
opined that the power of appropriation, being vested in the Legislature, precluded the court
from ordering a specific level of funding in the absence of a constitutional mandate. See id. at
1084-85.
482 See, e.g., In re Mandate of Funds for Gary City Ct. v. City of Gary, 489 N.E2d 511,
512-13 (Ind. 1986) (upholding an order for an appropriation of $30 million for the repair of
court facilities and requiring the presiding court to meet with city officials before the issuance of
the order to consider its impact upon other interests of the unit from which the funds would be
appropriated); Judges for Third Judicial Circuit of Michigan v. County of Wayne, 190 N.W.2d
228, 229-31 (Mich. 1971) (opining that the judicial branch possesses the power to mandamus
an appropriation of county funds to enable the judiciary to perform its duties and upholding
lower court order that simply directed county officials to "take all requisite action to
appropriate, provide or make available the funds required to permit such immediate
appointment and compensation of such personnel").
483 See Essex County Bd. of Taxation v. City of Newark, 353 A2d 535, 537, 540 (NJ.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976), modified, 372 A2d 607 (NJ. 1977), in which the court held thatthe
city had an obligation to reevaluate its property even if a special emergency appropriation was
required. The court stated:
We are satisfied that a court may not-as the trial judge did here by authorizing seizure of
moneys belonging to the municipality and ordering its application to payment of the cost
of the revaluation and tax map contacts--ignore the legislatively declared public policy
that an appropriation by the municipality's governing body precede any disbursement of
municipal funds.
Id. at 540.
The United States Supreme Court made a comparable distinction in Missouri v. Jenkins,
495 U.S. 33, 51 (1990), when it ruled that the district court should have ordered the school
district to levy atax rather than impose the tax directly from the bench.
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item.4 84As a result, the legislature need not make a new appropriation for the
judicially determined funding.
Although state courts generally decline to order state legislative
appropriations, they do impose orders that, as a practical matter, force state
legislative bodies to devise funding plans. For example, in Robinson v. Cahill,4 85
New Jersey's Supreme Court enjoined any school expenditures throughout the
state after July 1, 1976, unless the legislature improved the state's system of
financing public education so as to meet the state constitutional mandate to
"provide for the maintenance and support of a thorough and efficient system of
free public schools... ."486 Since legislators found the closing of the public
schools to be politically unpalatable, the court, without ordering an appropriation,
had accomplished its initial funding goal 487
2. State Law Taxation and Expenditure Limitations Limit State-Court
Remedial Processes
To encourage fiscal prudence and curtail governmental spending, voters have
imposed state law and constitutional limitations upon legislatures' spending, debt
484 See, e.g., Mandel v. Myers, 629 P.2d 935, 941 (Cal. 1981) (holding that although the
separation of powers doctrine may preclude the court from ordering the legislature to enact an
appropriation order, the doctrine was not violated by a judicial order to state officials to pay a
specified sum out of funds that the legislature had already appropriated to fund court-awarded
attorney fees); Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist. v. State, 225 Cal. App. 3d 155, 180 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1990) (holding that while the judiciary cannot order the legislature appropriation of finds
to reimburse a school district for state-mandated expenditures to alleviate public school
segregation, as required by the California Constitution, it can order reimbursement from
unexpended appropriated funds generally related to the nature of the costs incurred without
violating the separation of powers doctrine); State e rel. Sikeston R-VI Sch. Dist. v. Asherot,
828 S.W.2d 372, 376-77 (Mo. 1992) (upholding the state governor's withholding of amounts
appropriated for free public schools as funds to be used to cover court-ordered school
desegregation expenditures because desegregation expenditures constitute state expenditures for
free public schools).
In Butt v. State, 842 P.2d 1240, 1260 (Cal. 1992), the Supreme Court of California
reconfirmed that Mandel is a narrow and limited exception to the general rule that the judiciary
cannot order appropriations. In Butt, the court held that the trial court invaded the exclusive
legislative power of appropriation when it ordered the diversion of appropriated funds for
purposes other than those intended by the legislature. See id. at 1262--64.
485 358 A.2d 457 (NJ. 1976).
4 86 Id. at 459-60; see also NJ. CONST. art. VII, § IV, 1.
487 See Crain v. Bordenkircher, 376 SE.2d 140, 142 (W. Va. 1988) (ordering the closing
of a state penitentiary by July 1, 1992 in the face of eight years of legislative and executive
inaction to correct Eighth Amendment constitutional violations); County of Gloucester v. State,
606 A.2d 843, 848 (NJ. Super. CL App. Div. 1992) (placing a one year limit on the state's
practice of treating overcrowded prison conditions as an emergency under a state statute that
authorized the housing of state prisoners in county prisons).
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creation, and taxation powers. State courts' adherence to separation of powers
principles dictates caution before the imposition of any judicial remedies that
abrogate neutrally enacted tax and expenditure limitations. State supreme court
justices frequently defer to such statutes and search for ways to craft judicial
remedies to rectify constitutional violations within the existing state fiscal
structure.4 88 State courts have ruled that they lack the power to impose judicial
remedies that would cause taxation to exceed tax limits set by state law.489
When state taxation and expenditure limitations hinder the judicial remedial
process, state courts evaluate the public policies effectuated by the fiscal
limitations and thwarted by such state law limitations. If a state court believes that
the policy reasons supporting the funding of remedies to correct constitutional
violations merit as much weight as the policy expressed in fiscal state law
limitations, it makes every attempt to avoid a ruling that sets aside the state law
limitation. Instead, the court strives to find a way to reconcile the two competing
policy choices.490
When a state tax limitation prevents a municipality from satisfying a tort
judgment against it, courts must reconcile the conflicting policy of fiscal prudence
488 See Magnolia Sch. Dist. No. 14 v. Arkansas State Bd. of Educ., 799 S.W.2d 791,793
(Ark. 1990) (upholding the legislature's inclusion of a line item appropriation for funding
federal court mandated desegregation costs as part of the Public School Fund Act so as to avoid
a conflict with a prescribed state statutory formula); Duran v. Lamm, 701 P.2d 609, 613 (Colo.
CL App. 1984) (upholding a trial court order requiring state officials to pay 42 U.S.C. § 1988
attorney fees out of funds already appropriated as compatible with existing state law because
the state legislature was not ordered to appropriate money and the state constitution provided
that monies in the state treasury could be disbursed if "otherwise authorized by law....)
(quoting COLO. CONST. art. V, § 33).
489 In State ex re. Emerson v. City of Mound City, 73 S.W.2d 1017 (Mo. 1934), the
Missouri Supreme Court pointed out that whereas a tax limit is no barrier to the imposition of a
tort judgment against a municipality, it bars every kind of taxation beyond the limit set
including taxes levied for the collection of a judgment. See id. at 1021-22. The court endorsed
the policy reasons state tax limits effectuate: they limit taxation rates and the power to incur
debt beyond the annual revenue stream raised by taxation so that the municipality stays within
its budget. See id. at 1024. The court noted that only the state legislature could vest
municipalities with the power to tax above the limit, a power that was not exercised in this case.
See id. at 1025-27.
4 90 See San Francisco Taxpayers Ass'n v. Board of Supervisors, 828 P.2d 147, 155-56
(Cal. 1992) (holding that the city was barred from excluding its contributions to employees'
retirement fund from the state constitutional spending limit because the limitation's purpose
was to limit the overall growth of governmental appropriations); State x rel. Nat'l City Bank v.
Board of Educ. of Cleveland City Sch. Dist., 369 N.E2d 1200, 1203-04 (Ohio 1977) (holding
state fiscal policy requiring govemmental entities to pay debt service on indebtedness before
paying operating expenses enhanced entities' credit standing and did not hinder the
implementation of a constitutionally mandated school desegregation plan); Savage v. Munn,
856 P.2d 298, 304 (Or. 1993) (upholding constitutional tax limit upon the amount of taxes
allowed to be raised for public schools against an Equal Protection Clause challenge because
property tax limits serve a legitimate state interest and are entitled to deference by the courts).
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against the desirability of making municipalities responsible for the payment of
their tort judgments. A municipality that can escape the payment of judgments
against it offers fewer incentives to its employees or agents to minimize negligent
acts. Rather than set tax limits aside, a few courts have either held that tax
limitations do not apply to such judgments491 or have interpreted such limitations
to include an exception for the collection of judgments in tort.4 92 The latter
disregard of state law restrictions to satisfy tort judgments, occurring in only a
handful of states, has been cited as support for the federal judiciary's order of
taxation in excess of state law in Jenkins and Liddel4 93 No federalism issues are
raised, however, by these state court decisions interpreting state law.
3. Fiscal Crises Do Not Excuse Adherence to Taxation and Expenditure
Limitations
When a municipality pleads that a fiscal crisis should excuse it from
compliance with a state constitutional limitation upon its taxing and expenditure
powers, the judiciary generally refuses to relax the constitutional prohibition. 494
For example, when the municipal bond market refused to open its doors to New
York City in the 1970s, causing a severe financial crisis that reverberated around
the world, New York's Court of Appeals interpreted state constitutional restraints
to mean what the state constitution's plain language dictated 4 95 The court's
agreement with the policy expressed in the limitations was clear: strict
interpretation of the restraints gives investors greater confidence that
municipalities will not be excused from abiding by the fiscal practices the state
constitution prescribes. 496
491 See Garcia v. City of S. Tucson, 663 P.2d 596, 598 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983) (holding
constitutional tax limitations on property tax increases inapplicable to involuntary indebtedness
created from a tort judgment); La Pierre, supra note 1, at 373-75.
492 See City of Catlettsburg v. Davis Adm'r, 91 S.W.2d 56, 60 (Ky. Ct. App. 1936)
(writing an exception into the constitution for the collection of tort judgments from the
otherwise operative prohibition against a levy by fourth class cities of a tax in excess of $.75 on
$100 of taxable property because a contrary ruling would remove incentives to prevent
negligent municipal acts); La Pierre, supra note 1, at 373-75.
4 93 See La Pierre, supra note 1, at 373-75.
494 See Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Board of Educ. of City Sch. Dist. of Lackawanna, 378
N.E.2d 115, 116-17 (N.Y. 1978) (declaring statutes unconstitutional that authorized
municipalities and school districts to treat certain expenses as capital items in order to
circumvent the constitutional limitation upon the amount of revenue that may be raised by real
property taxation).
495 See Flushing Nat'l Bank v. Municipal Assistance Corp. for City of New York, 358
N.E.2d 848, 854-55 (N.Y. 1976) (invalidating the New York City Emergency Moratorium Act
because the Act barred enforcement of the city's obligations to note holders in violation of a
constitutional requirement that the city pledge its faith and credit to the payment of its notes).
4 96 Mid-nineteenth century municipal corporations frequently loaned their credit to or
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4. State Expenditure Mandates Do Not Excuse Compliance with State
Fiscal-Law Limitations
If a state statute clearly mandates the expenditure of local funds, and the local
governmental body fails to show why the mandate cannot be fulfilled within
existing state law fiscal requirements, state courts usually will not excuse
compliance with the mandate because the municipality lacks adequate funds to
comply with it 497 As state legislatures augment the number and amount of
funding mandates passed on to different levels of government, the opportunity
increases for the state courts to become enmeshed in the following controversies
involving: (1) whether the state mandate has been met, (2) whether additional
funding is required to meet the state requirements, and (3) whether state law tax
and expenditure limitations impede the local governments' ability to fulfill such
mandates.498
5. Compliance with State Fiscal-Law Limitations in School Desegregation
Cases
In specific instances, state courts-and even the federal judiciary--have
upheld compliance with state fiscal limitations even though the limitations made
guaranteed the debt of railroads and other private entities to induce them to invest in their
communities. When these private entities defaulted on their obligations, the governmental entity
suffered financial losses that led to the enactment of state constitutional restrictions upon the
creation of municipal indebtedness and the loan of credit. See Gerald E. Frug, The City as a
Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1059, 1110-12 (1980) (describing Judge John Dillon's
advocacy of constitutional limitations and the impact of his treatise on the formation of
municipal law); Gelfand, supra note 292, at 546-50 (explaining the origins of debt ceilings).
Restrictions upon taxation date to the second half of the nineteenth century and were also aimed
to curb the growth of public expenditures. See id. at 551-52.
497 See Blaney v. Commissioner of Correction, 372 N.E.2d 770, 773-74 (Mass. 1978)
(opining that Commissioner of Correction's unwillingness to incur special costs needed to
improve prison conditions for inmates held in protective custody and his failure to show a lack
of appropriated funds for such costs violated state mandate to treat prisoners equally). But see
State ex rel. Hart v. Gleeson, 64 P.2d 1023, 1024 (Wash. 1937) (ruling that the mandatory duty
to provide relief to blind persons could not be excused by exhaustion of funds levied up to the
maximum amount set by the statutory tax limit and opining that only the state legislative body,
not the judiciary, could relieve the county of mandated obligations).
498 See, e.g., San Francisco Taxpayers Ass'n v. Board of Supervisors, 828 P.2d 147, 155-
56 (Cal. 1992) (finding that the city's annual, legally required contributions to city's employee
retirement find were includable categories of appropriations for the purpose of calculating the
city spending limit imposed by Proposition 4 because the manifest purpose of the Proposition
was to limit the growth of governmental appropriations); City of Worcester v. Governor, 625
N.E.2d 1337, 1338, 1342 (Mass. 1994) (finding that various state statutes and regulations
imposing public educational expenses and obligations upon municipalities were not unfunded
local mandates within the meaning of a tax limitation measure known as Proposition 2 1/2).
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it more difficult to effectuate school desegregation remedies. These courts
expressed the view that funding to correct constitutional violations could proceed
best within the state's existing fiscal structure and that deviations from that
structure could undermine the state's fiscal stability, thereby impairing the state's
ability to correct the constitutional violations. The courts thus endorsed the policy
reasons underlying state fiscal requirements and decided to abide by them even if
the issue at hand could not be resolved completely.
State ex rel. National City Bank v. Board of Education499 typifies state court
reluctance to override state law limitations in the process of correcting
unconstitutional school segregation. The issue before the court involved a state
law limitation that required all taxing authorities, including boards of education,
to give priority to the payment of debt service over general operating expenses.50 0
In a school desegregation lawsuit, a federal district court had ordered the
Cleveland Board of Education to keep its public schools open. Facing a cash-flow
deficit forecast, the relator bank sought an order to allocate sufficient advanced
tax payments to retire tax anticipation notes issued by the Board to maturity as
required by state law. 01 The Ohio Supreme Court pointed out that this neutral
state law limitation, if ignored, would impede school desegregation by crippling
the school district's ability to borrow money.502 The Ohio Supreme Court upheld
compliance with the state law limitations because it believed that ignoring them
would eviscerate the desegregation process by impairing the borrowing power of
the state.503
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in United States v. Board of
Education, also upheld state law fiscal restraints that affected a school
desegregation remedial process. The Chicago Board of Education, while
operating under a thirteen-year old consent decree that required it to remedy racial
and ethnic segregation in Chicago public schools, experienced difficulties in
negotiating labor contracts.5°4 A state law required the Board to operate under a
499 369 N.E.2d 1200 (Ohio 1977).
500 See id at 1203. The Ohio Constitution imposed a "mandatory duty upon the state and
its political subdivisions to pay the interest and principal of their indebtedness before... current
operating expenses." Ia
501 See id at 1201.
502 See id at 1204. The court described the state law limitation as a "vital tool in school
financing because of the uneven and staggered distribution of tax revenues." Id.503 See id ("It is the duty of this court to uphold state laws and state constitutional
provisions designed to protect the financial integrity of state bodies."). The court further
elaborated: "We cannot conceive of a power in any court to ignore neutral state law under the
guise of implementing desegregation, when its action, in fact, would denigrate the
desegregation process by crippling the borrowing power of the entire school system." Id. at
1204.
504 See United States v. Board of Educ., 11 F.3d 668, 675 (7th Cir. 1993) (Cudahy, J.,
dissenting).
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balanced budget.5 05 The Board requested the district court to issue a restraining
order to prohibit enforcement of this state law mandate. It argued that it had to
keep its schools open, albeit without revenues to cover its expenditures, to comply
with the school desegregation consent decree.506 The district court entered the
political imbroglio and granted a temporary restraining order against the
enforcement of the balanced budget law.507 The Seventh Circuit, in an opinion by
Chief Judge Richard A. Posner, ruled that the issuance of the preliminary
injunction constituted an abuse of discretion and vacated the injunction with
instructions to dismiss the request for relief.50 8 Ironically, the state legislature
passed legislation resolving the impasse two days after the termination of the
district court's order.509
V. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS UPON THE EXERCISE OF FEDERAL
JUDICIAL POWER
Brown I sparked a civil rights revolution that aspired to achieve cherished
dreams for equal treatment under the law.510 The immediate goal was to
terminate state-enforced discriminatory practices.51' Many argue that without the
intervention of the United States Supreme Court, this movement would not have
occurred.512 The problems of overcoming racial discrimination cannot be
disassociated, however, from enduring federalism issues.5 13 While the Court's
institutional reform rulings unquestionably advanced rights in need of protection,
505 See i at 669-70.
506 See id. at 670.
507 See id. at 671.
508 See id. at 670. The court opined that the district court judge "hoped to foster a political
solution to what is, after all, a political dispute." Id. at 672.509 See id. at 670. Perhaps the judiciary's decision to step out of the political arena served
as a catalyst for the legislature to act.
510 The decision set the stage for outlawing segregation in all areas of life-from parks
and other public areas to interstate transportation and interstate commerce facilities. See
HASKINS, supra note 15, at 141-42. Congress responded by enacting civil rights legislation. See
id. at 143.
511 See ARCHIBALD Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT
57-58 (1976). The memoirs of an African-American teacher describe what life was like as the
13th child of a sharecropper farmer who grew up in segregated, northeastern Georgia during the
1920s. See RUTH BURTON CRAWFORD, THE WOODS AFIRE: THE MEMOIRS OF A GEORGIA
TEACHER BEFORE AND AFR DE SEGRFGATION 1-59 (1996). The pattern of segregation
remained the same in the 1940s and 1950s in the South. Coach Sank Powe, growing up as the
son of a Mississippi Delta sharecropper, was not allowed to watch his white playmates play
baseball in Little League games in a segregated white park. See POWE, supra note 181, at49.
5 12 See Cox, supra note 511, at 88.
5 13 SeeDANIELJ. ELAZAR, AMERICAN FEDERALISM: A VIEWFROM THE STATES 10 (3d ed.
1984).
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they required unprecedented judicial control of both state and local governmental
functions. 514 Today, the Court wields enormous power,515 both through its power
ofjudicial review516 and its enforcement of equitable remedies, which shape state
and local governmental policy and frequently diminish the prerogatives of state
legislators and officials.5 17
5 14 See Cox, supra note 511, at 77. The states are least able to induce federal self-restraint
and protect themselves when issues are handled outside of regular political channels. See
ELAZAR, supra note 513, at 174.
515 Although the Constitution's Framers viewed the Court as the least dangerous branch
of government, its power has expanded steadily. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST
DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLMCS 1 (1962) ("The least
dangerous branch of the American government is the most extraordinarily powerful court of
law the world has ever known."); ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES:
PROMISE AND PERFORMANCE 197 (Morton Grodzins ed., 2d ed. 1972) (finding no political
system with a measurable amount of democracy that has granted power to its "highest court as
broad as that exercised by the Supreme Court of the United States"); ELAZAR, supra note 513,
at 174 (stating that the Supreme Court is the federal institution that has done the most to limit
the states' powers); ELY, supra note 14, at 45 (pointing out that the Court greatly influences
how the nation functions); MCGOWAN, supra note 85, at 103-04 (arguing that due to the
enlarged scope of equal protection and due process judicial power has become a major
instrument of public policy formulation and a resource for many more citizens than in the past);
Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One: The Road to
Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 333, 354 (1998) (explaining how the public's
disapproval of techniques to control the judiciary, such as court packing and jurisdiction
stripping, resulted in the achievement of greater judicial supremacy in the post New Deal era
than existed in earlier times); Frug, supra note 364, at 718-32 (discussing the massive impact of
federal court orders upon state govemments to raise or reallocate expenditures for the
administration of institutions for the mentally ill or retarded, prisons, and juvenile detention
systems, as well as the impact caused by the detailed judicial supervision entailed in such
orders).
516 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). For a discussion of the
counter-majoritarian difficulty, see BICKEL, supra note 515, at 16-23; DAHL, supra note 515, at
187-99; ELY, supra note 14, at 44-48. For a discussion of colonial views on the role of the
judiciary, see WOOD, supra note 7, at 282-305. The legislative body was viewed as the sole
source of law. See id. at 302.
517 See ELAZAR, supra note 513, at 193. United States Supreme Court decisions have
removed state prerogatives in a variety of areas, including "Bible reading and school prayer,
abortion policy, regulation of morals, censorship, libel, criminal rights, and environmental
pollution control.' Id. at 176 (footnote omitted). Further, the Court has made localities
vulnerable to damage suits covering a wide range of subjects on the grounds of civil rights
violations. See id. at 177.
Dean Diver concluded that institutional litigation casts the judge in the role of a
powerbroker who reallocates power among private and govemmental actors. See Diver, supra
note 4, at 64, 77. This role "sanctions a degree ofjudicial intrusion into the political process that
conflicts sharply with values inherent in federalism and separation of powers.' Id. at 89; see
also Philip B. Kurland, Federalism and the Federal Courts, 2 B'INCHMARK 17, 21-24 (1986)
(showing how the Supreme Court has contributed to the demise of federalism through rulings
that limit state action).
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This Part argues that the constitutional design places limitations upon the
Court's choice of remedial actions.518 Recognizing the federalism issues raised
by the exercise of expansive Commerce Clause powers,5 19 the Court has sought
to fashion affirmative limits upon congressional regulation of the states5 20
Likewise, the Court should acknowledge that its remedial powers can be
amplified so greatly as to upset the constitutional structure that separates powers
among the branches and between the federal and state governments. Federalism
requires the Court to set limits, albeit absent from the constitutional text, upon
governmental regulatory power so as to maintain the institutional design of the
constitutional structure5 21 The values served by federalism are important enough
518 In designing the Constitution, the Framers separated powers among the three branches
of the federal government and between the states and the federal government to prevent tyranny
and to make governmental operations more efficient. See Ann Stuart Anderson, A 1787
Perspective on Separation ofPowers, in SEPARATION OF POWERS-DOES IT STILL WORK? 138,
138-39, 142-44 (Robert A. Goldwin & Art Kaufman eds, 1986); Donald L. Robinson, The
Renewal of American Constitutionalism, in SEPARATION OF POWERs-DoEs IT STILL WORK?,
supra, at 38,48. The Framers feared oppression when powers were united in one place. See id
at 48. They also feared tyranny from the will of the people and accordingly devised a republican
government covering a large population to check smaller interest groups and incorporating a
complex structure that combined separation of powers, bicanmeralism, judicial review, and
federalism as safeguards. See id. at 49.
In 1978, Professor Gerald E. Frug argued that the expansion of lower federal courts'
power "to remedy constitutional violations by requiring significant additional government
expenditures" would require the Supreme Court "to decide what limits, .. .if any" exist upon
"the judicial power of the purse...." See Frug, supra note 364, at 717. Those limits have not
been forthcoming, however. Professor Frug concluded that the courts would be exercising all
three types of governmental power-judicial, legislative, and executive-if possessed with
plenary power "to define constitutional values, command sufficient appropriations to support
those values, and then control by equitable decree the spending of the money appropriated." Id.
at 733.
5 19 See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528,587 (1985) (O'Connor,
J., dissenting). The Commerce Clause grants Congress the power "[t]o regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tnbes." U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 8,cl.3.
520 See Printz v. United States, 521 US. 898, 935 (1997) (barring Congress from
commandeering state officials to enforce federal regulatory programs); New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992) (barring Congress from commandeering the states to enact or
administer a federal regulatory program); Gregory v. Ashcrof , 501 U.S. 452, 470 (1991)
(refusing to apply federal employment regulations to the states in the absence of a plain
statement indicating congressional intent to make the regulations applicable to the states);
Jackson, supra note 94, at 2213 (noting "drarmatic reinvigoration by the Court of federalism-
based limits on national power"); H. Jefferson Powell, The Oldest Question of Constitutional
Law, 79 VA. L. REV. 633, 639-52 (1993) (describing Justice O'Connor's development of an
"autonomy of process principle" calling for judicial oversight of congressional power to
preserve the integrity and autonomy of state governmental processes).
521 See Lessig, supra note 368, at 192-93. Professor Jackson supports a limited judicial
role in the enforcement of federalism limits. See Jackson, supra note 94, at 2224. She argues
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to preserve.5 22 The challenge for the Court is to articulate workable limits upon its
remedial powers in a way that can be applied without inconsistency or the
appearance of political influence.5 23
This Section examines the following four distinct doctrinal limitations upon
the Court's remedial powers: the Constitution's federal design, separation of
powers principles, comity, and the Constitution's guarantee to the states of a
representative democracy. Each of these doctrines calls for equanimity in the
imposition of remedial measures that severely affect state and local financial
resources. While the Court acknowledges that considerations emanating from
either federalism, comity, or the Constitution's separation of powers bind the
judiciary to some extent, it has not ruled whether federal structural limitations or
the Guarantee Clause restrict judicial power. The taxation order upheld in Jenkins
set aside state tax law, ultimately ignoring each of these limitations upon federal
power.
that such judicial review upholds the Constitution as the rule of law and provides an incentive
for Congress to weigh the impact of federal legislation upon the federal structure. See id. at
2224-28.
522 See Jackson, supra note 94, at 2213-15 (summarizing the values of federalism as (1)
providing opportunities for political participation, diverse cultures, experimentation, and
innovation, (2) providing checks on federal government oppression, (3) maximizing choice
through government competition, and (4) enhancing personal and group empowerment by
providing an appellate process through multiple govemmental layers); Friedman, supra note 94,
at 389-405 (cataloguing the values of federalism as (1) increasing public participation in
democracy, (2) ensuring accountability, (3) providing laboratories for experimentation, (4)
protecting citizens' health, safety, and welfare, (5) preserving cultural and local diversity, and
(6) diffusing power to protect liberty); Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State
Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 3-10 (1988) (finding that
federalism serves the following four principal values: (1) providing a dual system of checks on
abusive governmental power, (2) increasing the opportunities for citizen participation in
democratic processes, (3) creating diverse cultural and political environments, and (4)
enhancing the opportunities for innovation and experimentation). But see Richard Briffault,
"W7at About the 'sm'?" Normative and Formal Concerns in Contemporary Federalism, 47
VAND. L. REV. 1303, 1322-28 (1994) (arguing that federalism's role in securing liberty,
representing minorities, and providing opportunities for participation and innovation remains
debatable).
523 See Jackson, supra note 94, at 2215-16, 2225-26; Lessig, supra note 368, at 192-93.
When changed circumstances, more than 200 years after the framing of the Constitution, no
longer provide implicit limits on federal and state power, Professor Lessig argues that the Court
does and should create affirmative, implied limits, even though unsupported by the
Constitution's text, in order to reconstruct the envisioned structural balance of power at the time
of the Constitution's franing. See id at 127-32, 214. He suggests that federalism interests can
be protected from Congress's over reaching Commerce Clause power by (1) requiring
Congress to be clear when it intends to intrude upon areas of intrastate economic activity, (2)
inviting Congress to establish its own regime of restraint, (3) allowing states to opt out of
federal regulation to preserve autonomy, but permitting other states to enjoy the benefits of
federal regulation, and (4) removing jurisdiction of Commerce Clause claims from lower
federal courts to one court, a commerce court, to achieve consistency. See id. at 206-14.
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During the 1990s, the Court curbed Congress's exercise of powers that
command states to take actions commensurate to those ordered by the Court.524
In contrast to the expansive reading of its own powers in Jenins, the Court has
elevated federalism principles by ruling that the Tenth Amendment 525 the
Eleventh Amendment 5 26  and federal structural considerations527  limit
Congress's power to interfere with state autonomy.528 In effect, the Court has
contained Congress's exercise of powers that command the states to take certain
actions comparable to judicially ordered taxation.529
524 SeePrintz, 521 U.S. at 925-35; New York, 505 U.S. at 174-183.
525 U.S. CONST. amend. X.
526 U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
527 See Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2251, 2254, 2256, 2266 (1999) (finding that the
Constitution's structure preserves the states' traditional sovereign immunity from private suits
in their state courts); Printz, 521 U.S. at 905 (stating that constitutional challenges to a federal
statute requiring local officials to conduct background checks on firearms purchasers should be
resolved by an examination of the Constitution's structure, as well as historical understanding
and practice and the Court's jurisprudence). For the Printz Court's discussion of the
Constitution's structural protections to preserve the federal system established by the
Constitution and the effect that federal control imposed by the statute would have upon state
law enforcement officers, see id at 918-25.
528 See, e.g., Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631 (2000) (holding that the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act's waiver of the states' sovereign immunity from private
suits did not constitute a valid exercise of Congress's power under section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment); Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2269 (ruling that Congress's Article I powers do not include
the power to remove the states' sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment from
private suits to enforce federal law in state courts); College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S. Ct. 2219,2233 (1999) (ruling that Congress's Article
I powers do not include the power to remove states' sovereign immunity under the Eleventh
Amendment from private suits to enforce federal trademark law provisions); Pintz, 521 U.S. at
935 (ruling that Congress lacks power to require local officials to conduct background checks
on firearms purchasers in furtherance of a federal regulatory program); Seminole Tribe of
Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 56 (1996) (ruling that Congress's Article I powers do not
include the power to remove the states' sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment
from suits by Indian tribes to enforce federal law in federal courts); New York v. United States,
505 U.S. 144, 177, 186 (1992) (ruling that Congress lacks power to compel the states to
implement federal legislation by taking title to nuclear waste).
529 Judicial taxation to increase public school revenues commands the states in a manner
comparable to the congressional command to the states to take title to nuclear waste found
unconstitutional in New York v. United States. In Alden, Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court,
acknowledged that the judiciary possesses coercive powers that "may threaten the financial
integrity of the States" through the imposition of compensatory damages, attomey fees, and
punitive damages. 119 S. Ct. at 2240, 2264. Alden invalidated Congress's attempt to further its
Commerce Clause powers by abrogating state sovereign immunity under the Eleventh
Amendment in suits brought by private parties in state courts. Congress retains the power to
engage in enforcement activity under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See College
Savings Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2224. Nonetheless, the Alden Court's acknowledgment that judicial
processes have an impact upon the allocation of scarce resources, a process that should be left to
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Because the Court restrains congressional action believed to upset the balance
of state and federal power implicit in the federal structure,530 it follows that the
judiciary should be mindful as well of its own power to destroy this delicate
balance 5 31 Likewise, federalism, separation of powers, and comity principles
remain no less applicable to the judiciary than to the other branches.5 32
Furthermore, the Guarantee Clause,533 which guarantees a republican form of
government to the states, restrains all three federal branches, including the
judiciary, from unduly interfering with state and local representative
government. 534 The Court has acknowledged that constitutional federalism
restraints exist, but in Jenkins, when upholding the deeply intrusive judicial
imposition of taxation not authorized by state law, it failed to address such
limits.5 35 The Court has opined, however, on more than one occasion that the
Constitution's federal design contains postulates of limitation and control.536
the political branches, casts doubt upon the Jenkins Court's approval ofjudicial taxation. Justice
Kennedy implied that states are bound only by obligations that "comport with the constitutional
design." Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2266; see also Printz, 521 U.S. at 935 (requiring state officers to
perform background checks on handgun purchases pursuant to federal statutory law found
incompatible with the Constitution's dual sovereignty structure).
530 See Pr'ntz, 521 U.S. at 935 (concluding that provisions of a federal statute that
commanded state officers to conduct background checks on firearms purchasers were
incompatible with the Constitution's federal structure of dual sovereignty); New York, 505 U.S.
at 177 (finding the "take title" provision of a federal statute that required states to accept
ownership of nuclear waste to be inconsistent with the federal structure established by the
Constitution). But see Kurland, supra note 517, at 20 (stating that throughout the Court's
history, it has seldom limited congressional authority).
531 See ELY, supra note 14, at 46 (pointing out that the formal constitutional checks on the
Court, including Congress's budgetary control, impeachment provisions, withdrawal of
jurisdiction over certain classes of cases, and the possibility of constitutional amendment, have
been of little consequence).
532 Professor Gerald E. Frug has analyzed the following four restraints upon judicial
power the democratic process, the federal system, the allocation of power within the federal
government itself, and the Eleventh Amendment. See Frug, supra note 364, at 732-57.
533 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
534 The clause states that the "United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a
Republican Form of Government .. "' U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. If the Framers of the
Constitution intended to exclude the federal judiciary from the strictures of the clause, it is
unlikely that the encompassing language "United States" would have been used. See Merritt,
supra note 522, at 75 (concluding that the reference to the "United States" in the Guarantee
Clause "plainly encompasses the judicial branch").
535 See Frug, supra note 364, at 717 (pointing out that as lower federal courts increasingly
order significant government expenditures, the Court 'vill have to decide what limits there are,
if any, to the judicial power of the purse").
536 The Court's references to the existence of federalism restraints include the following.
(1) "The actual scope of the Federal Government's authority with respect to the States has
changed over the years .... but the constitutional structure underlying and limiting that
authority has not" New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 159 (1992); (2) "[T]he text of the
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A. The Constitution's Federal Structural Framework as a Principle of
Limitation
1. Evolution of a Federal Structural-Framework Test
The New Deal marked the beginning of an era in which the Court generally
refrained from restraining the exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause powers
that reduced state and local power.537 The Court's 1976 ruling in National
League of Cities v. Usery5 38 departed from this trend, holding that the Tenth
Amendment protected the states' integral and traditional governmental powers
from congressional authority under the Commerce Clause.5 39 But in the decade
that followed, the Court failed in its endeavor to give content to an embattled
Tenth Amendment "zone of protection" from congressional intrusions. 540 In
Constitution provides the beginning rather than the final answer to every inquiry into questions
of federalism, for 'behind the words of the constitutional provisions are postulates which limit
and control."' Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 547 (1985) (citation
omitted); and (3) "No fixed or even substantially fixed guidelines can be established as to how
far a court can go [to remedy public school segregation on the basis of race], but it must be
recognized that there are limits." Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 28
(1971); see also Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken I), 418 U.S. 717, 763 (1974) (White, J.,
dissenting) (opining that "[tlhere are undoubted practical as well as legal limits to the remedial
powers of federal courts in school desegregation cases").
5 37 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 573 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(opining that the deference given to Congress began in 1937 with the decision ofNLRB v. Jones
& Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. I (1937)); see also Lynn A. Baker, Federalism: The
Argument from Article V, 13 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 923, 923 (1997); Erwin Chemerinsky,
Formalism and Functionalism in Federalism Analysis, 13 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 959, 959-60
(1997); Diamond, supra note 94, at 1283 (finding an erosion in confining Congress's powers to
its enumerated powers since the New Deal); Lessig, supra note 368, at 176 (finding a waning of
the Court's activism in advancing federalism interests at some time late in the 1930s or early
1940s); Powell, supra note 520, at 667 (stating that from the "New Deal to National League of
Cities the Supreme Court... [denied] the existence of implied federalism limits on national
power, a denial substantially revived by Garcia").
538 426 U.S. 833 (1976). The Court invalidated minimum wage and overtime provisions
of the Fair Labor Standards Act that applied to state and local governments. See id. at 851-52.
539 The Court in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264
(1981), summarized the prerequisites for state immunity under National League of Cities as
encompassing the following four conditions: (1) the federal statute at issue must regulate the
states as states; (2) the statute must address matters that are indisputable attributes of state
sovereignty; (3) compliance with the statute must directly impair the states' ability to structure
integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions; and (4) the relation of state
and federal interests must not be such that the nature of the federal interest justifies state
submission. See id. at 287-88.
540 See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 530-31 (1985); Lessig,
supra note 368, at 182-83 (arguing that the tools used by the Court in National League of Cities
to impose limits upon federal power produced inconsistencies in application because
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1985, the Court pointing to its unsuccessful attempts to define an area of saved
integral and traditional governmental functions,541 expressly overruled National
League of Cities in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authorit5 42 and
returned to its post-New Deal federalism posture.
In Garcia, the Court held that Congress's Commerce Clause powers do not
face substantive constitutional restraints. 43 If such limitations on congressional
authority do exist, the Court opined, they are inherent in the political processes
and cannot be derived from judicial decrees. 54 The Court expressed its belief that
the structure of the federal government itself served as the primary protector of
the states' continued role in the federal system.545 By relying upon the federal
government's structural processes as the rationale for its ruling, the Court elevated
the role played by the Constitution's federal structure to a tool for constitutional
analysis.546
The Garcia decision left the Tenth Amendment functionally dead.547 In New
York v. United States,5 48 however, the Court breathed new life into the Tenth
Amendment when it invalidated provisions of a federal statute that required states
determining which functions were "traditional" proved unclear given the radical changes in
technology since the Constitution's franing).
541 See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 539, 547.
542 See id. at 557.
543 See id. at 550,554. The Court stated.
[W]e are convinced that the fundamental limitation that the constitutional scheme imposes
on the Commerce Clause to protect the "States as States" is one of process rather than one
of result. Any substantive restraint on the exercise of Commerce Clause powers must find
its justification in the procedural nature of this basic limitation, and it must be tailored to
compensate for possible failings in the national political process rather than to dictate a
"sacred province of state autonomy."
Id. at 554; see also Jackson, supra note 94, at 2224 ("Garcia was read to mean there would be
no judicial enforcement against Congress of the law of federalism.") (footnote omitted).
544 See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 550-52,554 (1985).
5 45 See id. at 550-52.
54 6 See John C. Yoo, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 70 S. CA. L. REv. 1311,
1327-31 (1997).547 See Richard B. Cappalli, Restoring Federalism Values in the Federal Grant System,
19 URB. LAW. 493, 509 (1987) (concluding that only "political federalism" survived Garcia);
Powell, supra note 520, at 634 (stating that Garcia "rendered explicit the New Deal rejection of
federalism as a legal principle").
54 8 For a discussion of the New York decision, see Powell, supra note 520, at 635-39;
Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Field Office Federalism, 79 VA. L. REV. 1957 (1993); Martin H.
Redish, Doing It with Mirrors: New York v. United States and Constitutional Limitations on
Federal Power to Require State Legislation, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 593 (1994); Mark
Tushnet, Khy the Supreme Court Overruled National League of Cities, 47 VAND. L. REV.
1623, 1634-55 (1994).
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to "take title" to low-level nuclear waste generated within state borders if no other
provision for its disposal were made.549 Justice O'Connor, writing for the
majority, stated that despite the fact that the Tenth Amendment lacks substantive
content, it "confirms that [federal] power ... is subject to limits that may, in a
given instance, reserve power to the States. '550 She opined that the Tenth
Amendment directs the Court "to determine ... whether an incident of state
sovereignty is protected by a limitation on an Article I power."551
Before New York, the Tenth Amendment was treated as a residuary clause,
only prompting an inquiry as to whether the challenged congressional action fell
within a delegated or enumerated power.552 After New York, even Congress's
549 Justice O'Connor, writing for the Court, in New York, stated that when a litigant
challenges the exercise of federal power, the Court could examine the issue in either of two
ways that follows: (1) whether the congressional action fell within Congress's constitutionally
delegated powers or (2) whether the action invaded state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth
Amendment. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 155 (1992). Justice O'Connor
opined: "In a case like this one, involving the division of authority between federal and state
governments, the two inquiries are mirror images of each other." Id. at 156. O'Connor further
commented:
In the end, just as a cup may be half empty or half full, it makes no difference whether one
views the question at issue in this case as one of ascertaining the limits of the power
delegated to the Federal Government under the affirmative provisions of the Constitution
or one of discerning the core of sovereignty retained by the States under the Tenth
Amendment
Id. at 159.
New York incorporated into law Justice O'Connor's distinctive view of federalism that (1)
requires the federal government to respect state autonomy in the exercise of governmental
processes even when the federal government possesses the power to preempt and (2) obligates
the judiciary to restrain congressional intrusions on state autonomy that violate the spirit of the
Tenth Amendment. See Powell, supra note 520, at 639; Yoo, supra note 546, at 1312 (finding
that the Court has reasserted judicial review's applicability to questions concerning federalism
issues and stating "Garcia is no longer the controlling theory concerning judicial review of
federalism questions").
55 0 New York, 505 U.S. at 157. Other Supreme Court justices continue to assert that the
Tenth Amendment places no limits upon Congress's exercise of its enumerated powers. See
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 941-42 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
551 New York, 505 U.S. at 157.
552 See Candice Hoke, State Discretion Under New Federal Welfare Legislation: Illusion,
Reality and a Federalism-Based Constitutional Challenge, 9 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 115, 121
(1998) (describing how New Yorkv. United States transformed Tenth Amendment justiciability
by subjecting Congress's enumerated powers to affirmative limits).
Powers delegated to Congress are not reserved to the states. See U.S. CONST. amend. X.
Federalism has been described as involving the division of power between (1) the states and the
federal government and (2) the federal elements contained in the central government See
Diamond, supra note 94, at 1282. The modem theory of federalism, as well as the Supreme
Court's constitutional law jurisprudence, has concentrated on the allocation of powers between
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enumerated powers do not escape judicially imposed affirmative limits. 53 The
Tenth Amendment now directs the Court "to determine ... whether an incident of
state sovereignty is protected by a limitation on an Article I power."554 The New
York Court concluded that the take title provision failed to constitute one of
Congress's enumerated powers, infiinged on the "core of state sovereignty
reserved by the Tenth Amendment," and conflicted with the Constitution's
federal governmental structure.555
While New York v. United States departed from Garcia, its unique facts make
it readily distinguishable.5 56 The 1997 decision in Printz v. United States557
confirmed, however, that New York's application of a structural test558 cannot be
viewed as an aberration. The Printz decision demonstrates that the present
members of the United States Supreme Court will invalidate congressional
enactments that they consider inconsistent with the federal governmental structure
created by the Constitution.5 59 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, relied
the federal government and the states. See id. at 1282-83.
553 See Hoke, supra note 552, at 121.
554 New York, 505 U.S. at 157.
555 See id. at 177.
55 6 The take title provisions of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments
Act of 1985 at issue in New York gave the states no options other than to adopt congressional
regulations or take title to low-level radioactive waste. See id. at 176. The Court concluded that
Congress lacked power to compel the states to take title to the waste, which amounted to "a
congressionally compelled subsidy from state governments to radioactive waste producers." Id.
at 175. The take title provision only applied to the states, not to private parties.
In Printz v. United States, Justice Stevens, in his dissenting opinion, distinguished New
York from Printz as disapproving a "particular method of putting [a cooperative federalism
program] into place, not the existence of federal programs implemented locally." 521 U.S. 898,
960 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis in the original).
557 See 521 U.S. at 960. For a discussion of Printz, see generally Kevin Todd Butler,
Printz v. United States: Tenth Amendment Limitations on Federal Access to the Mechanisms of
State Government, 49 MERCER L. REV. 595 (1998); Evan H. Caminker, Printz, State
Sovereignty, and the Limits of Formalism, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 199 (1997); Hills, supra note
229; Jackson, supra note 94; David Liechty, Recent Development, H. Jay Printz v. United
States: Supreme Court Declares Brady Act's Review of Handgun Application Requirement
Unconstitutional, 24 J. CONTEMP. L. 178 (1998).
558 The Court found the take title provision as "inconsistent with the federal structure of
our Government established by the Constitution." New York, 505 U.S. at 177.
559 In Printz, plaintiffs challenged the validity of provisions of the Brady Handgun
Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 Stat. 1536 (1993), that mandated local law
enforcement officers to conduct background checks in connection with the transfer of a
handgun. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 898. Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, stated that the
Court should examine historical practice, the Constitution's structure, and the jurisprudence of
the Court to decide the issue in the absence of constitutional text directly covering the question.
See id. at 905. Thus, the Court made the Act's conformance or lack of congruence with the
federal constitutional structure one of three central inquiries; see also Alden v. Maine, 119 S.
Ct. 2240, 2246-47 (1999) (referring to "the Constitution's structure, and its history,
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heavily upon structural framework considerations as the rationale for invalidating
provisions of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act.5 60 Similarly, Justice
O'Connor, in a concurring opinion, stated that the invalidated provisions of the
Act "utterly fail[ed] to adhere to the design and structure of our constitutional
scheme. '561 In 1999, the Court again confirmed, in Alden v. Maine, that "the
structure of the original Constitution itself' protects a sphere of state
sovereignty. 562 The Court held that Congress's Article I powers "do not include
the power to subject nonconsenting States to private suits for damages in state
CoUrtS." 563
New York established an anticommandeering rule that prohibits Congress
from commandeering the states to enact and carry out a federal regulatory
program.564 Printz extended the anticommandeering principle by holding that
Congress is barred affirmatively from commanding state executive officials to
administer a federal regulatory program.565 Like Garcia, both New York and
Printz, emphasize process-oriented judicial review in the federalism context 566
These decisions support the proposition that Congress in exercising its Commerce
and ... interpretations by this Court" as the source of the states' sovereign immunity from suit);
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452,460 (1991) (finding that congressional regulation of state
judicial qualifications "upset the usual constitutional balance of federal and state powers").
560 Because no constitutional text defines the essential elements of the constitutional
scheme, the Court in Printz concluded that guidance as to the constitutionality of the Brady Act
"must be sought in the historical understanding and practice, in the structure of the Constitution,
and in the jurisprudence of this Court." Printz, 521 U.S. at 905.
561 Id. at 936.
562 Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2254. In Alden, the Court relied upon 'history, practice, precedent,
and the structure of the Constitution" to hold that Congress lacks power to abrogate state
sovereign immunity from private suits in state courts. Id. at 2266.
563 Id. at 2246.
564 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992). Professor Lawrence Lessig
views the anticommandeering rule as both an under and over inclusive rule that can be applied
effectively to advance federalism values even though it does not directly do so. See Lessig,
supra note 368, at 191-92. He finds the prohibition against commandeering, as well as the plain
statement rule and the Court's recent formulation of limits upon the spending power, as
"second-best tools" not derived from the Constitution's text, but imposed "in the name of a
deeper fidelity with the Constitutional structure." Id. at 193. Professor Tushnet has predicted
that New Yorlks anticommandeering rule will fail to create a solid foundation for revitalizing
constitutional federalism. See Tushnet, supra note 548, at 1654. Butsee Hills, supra note 229, at
824-28 (criticizing the political accountability theory as a justification for the
anticommandeering rule in New York v. United States and in United States v. Printz because
this theory requires strict separation of state and federal functions to prevent voter confusion
about which government mandates a certain policy, a separation contrary to today's cooperative
federalism practices).
565 See Printz, 521 U.S. at 934-35.
566 See Jackson, supra note 94, at 2230 (supporting a "process-oriented, deliberation-
forcing form of doctrine" in the judicial enforcement of federalism limits).
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Clause powers cannot disrupt the Constitution's federal design by placing overly
burdensome regulations upon the states 67 This process based concern contrasts
with the overruled National League of Cities' substantive approach that restrained
Congress from acting in areas traditionally occupied by the states5 68
In summary, the Court's recent federalism decisions reject Garcia's sole
reliance upon political processes to protect state and local governments5 69 But
the Court continues to abide by Garcia's use of structural analysis 70 When
faced with the question of whether a particular congressional act invades a state's
sphere of autonomy, the Court now routinely examines whether the act at issue
upsets the balance of power between the federal government and the states
embodied in the Constitution's federal structure.5 71 By focusing on the
5 67 See Prakash, supra note 548, at 2035 ("Congress simply cannot command a state
legislature to legislate"). Although it is argued that the Constitution's text and structure suggest
that Congress lacks power to commandeer state legislatures, state courts are bound to enforce
the federal Constitution and laws. See id. at 1967-74, 2012. The Court in Alden, in preserving
state sovereign immunity against private suits in state courts, also expressed concern about
protecting the states from coercive congressional action. The Court stated-
A power to press a State's own courts into federal service to coerce the other branches of
the State, furthermore, is the power first to turn the State against itself and ultimately to
commandeer the entire political machinery of the State against its will and at the behest of
individuals.
Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2264.
568 See supra note 539 (presenting National League of Cities' substantive principles); see
also Jackson, supra note 94 (rejecting the substantive enclave theory of United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549 (1995), as one that cannot be sustained on a principled, coherent basis); Lessig,
supra note 368, at 196-97 (predicting that the limits established in Lopez upon Congress's
Commerce Clause powers cannot be consistently applied).
569 See, e.g., Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2260 (examining "history, practice, precedent, and the
structure of the Constitution" to determine whether "Congress has authority under Article I to
abrogate a State's immunity from suit in its own courts"); Printz, 521 US. at 905 (resolving
challenge under the Commerce Clause to Brady Act's handgun transfer restrictions by
examination of "historical understanding and practice,. . . the structure of the Constitution,
and... the jurisprudence of this Courf); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559 (stating that Congress's power
to regulate under the Commerce Clause is measured by "an analysis of whether the regulated
activity 'substantially affects' interstate commerce"); New York, 505 U.S. at 149 (determining
the constitutionality of Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 by
"discerning the proper division of authority between the Federal Government and the States").
570 See, e.g., Alden, 119 S. CL at 2265-67; Printz, 521 U.S. at 905, 918-25; New York
505 U.S. at 177.
571 See, e.g., Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2268 (stating that "[tIhe principle of sovereign
immunity... strikes the proper balance between the supremacy of federal law and the separate
sovereignty of the States"); Pfintz, 521 U.S. at 919-21 (holding that the Brady Act's
impressment of local law enforcement officers to fulfill federally created duties upsets the
Constitution's federal structure by unconstitutionally augmenting federal power); Seminole
Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 56 (1996) (citing Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223
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Constitution's structure, the Court seeks to conceptualize any meaning that can be
derived from the Constitution's creation of two levels of governments, each with
sovereign but sometimes overlapping powers.572
2. Application of a Federal Structural-Framework Test to Congress's
Exercise ofPower
The federal structural-framework test requires the judiciary to decide when
one of the federal branches breaches the boundary lines implicit in the
Constitution's federal design.5 73 The application of this test will prove no easier
than determining the occurrence of a Tenth Amendment constitutional
violation 74 The Tenth Amendment provides a textual reminder that powers not
granted to the federal government are reserved to the states, and the jurisprudence
created by it has concentrated on the Constitution's scheme of shared power
(1989)) (noting that Congress's powers to abrogate the states' immunity from suit are tempered
by the "Eleventh Amendment's role as an essential component of our constitutional structure'9;
New York 505 U.S. at 177 (finding take title provisions of Low-Level Radioactive Waste
Policy Amendments Act of 1985 to be "inconsistent with the federal structure of our
Government established by the Constitution").572 See Jackson, supra note 94, at 2246 (pointing out that the Constitution explicitly
provides for the existence of state govemments, each with a legislature, an executive authority,
and courts, and imposes affirmative duties upon them).
573 The Court has applied the structural framework test only to congressional and state
relations. The test prohibits Congress from destroying the states' concurrent authority over the
citizenry. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 919-21. In Alden, the Court reiterated this sentiment in its
statement that "our federalism requires that Congress treat the States in a marner consistent
with their status as residuary sovereigns and joint participants in the governance of the Nation."
119 S. Ct. at 2263. Further, a structural framework test protects a core of state sovereignty. See
id. at 2246-47 (noting that congressional removal of state sovereign immunity from private
suits in state courts impinges upon a 'Tutndamental aspect of the sovereignty which the States
enjoyed before the ratification of the Constitution, and which they retain today"); New York
505 U.S. at 177 (invalidating "take title" provision in the federal act regulating the disposal of
nuclear waste as infringing upon state sovereignty and contrary to the federal structure);
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452,460 (1991) (upholding the power of states to prescribe state
judicial qualifications without congressional intrusion). The test restrains the states as well as
Congress. In U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995), the Court ruled that
the Constitution's structure precludes the states from adding qualifications to congressional
offices.
574 See Carrminker, supra note 557, at 201-02 (arguing that identifying essential postulates
governing federal-state relations from the Constitution's structure embraces a formalist
approach to interpreting the Constitution, an endeavor unlikely to succeed due to the dearth of
textual and structural guidelines); Powell, supra note 520, at 674 n.199 (concluding that the
structural inference of significant state govemmental autonomy must be reconciled with the
structural inference of national power obligating the states to execute congressional choices
"within the outer limits of federal authority').
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between the states and Congress.575 A structural test focuses more singularly on
the impact made by a questionable action upon the Constitution's federal
structure.57 6 This test could expand beyond the Tenth Amendment's present
arena of congressional and state relations to cover any governmental action that
disturbs the balance of federal and state power, whether initiated by Congress or
by another source of power. It makes little difference in evaluating federal-state
power allocation contests, however, whether one refers to the Tenth
Amendment 577 or to the Constitution's inherent structural protections as symbolic
of limitations imposed upon Congress's exercise of Commerce Clause powers.578
Both limitations represent concern for the protection of the states' continuing
integrity in a federal system.
The application of a structural test requires the Court to define structural
safeguards that protect the states from Congress's undue interference.5 79 Whereas
the Court in Garcia believed that the federal structure itself would shield the
states from destructive congressional initisions, the Court, as expressed in Alden,
Printz, and New York, now professes that the structural framework does not
sufficiently protect state autonomy.580 Thus, the Court through its exercise of
5 7 5 See WILLIAM WINSLOW CROSSKEY, 1 POLrTcs AND THE CONsTIrruTION 677-78
(1953) (stating that the Framers believed that the structural checks and balances built into the
Constitution would protect liberty without the Tenth Amendment provisions, which were
adopted only to provide assurance of the states' continued existence to the citizenry).
576 Professor Briffault has described the state's place in the federal structure as follows:
The federal Constitution secures the continuing existence of the states within their
existing boundaries. It makes the states the basic component units for the structure of the
federal government and for the amendment of the federal Constitution. It also rests on the
assumption that the states have inherent autonomous governmental power, that is, it
assumes and, through the Tenth Amendment, assures that the states may, in general,
legislate, regulate, and raise and spend revenue without having to look to the federal
government or the federal Constitution for authority.
Briffault, supra note 522, at 1335.
5 77 See New York 505 U.S. at 159 (1992). Justice O'Connor opined that limitations upon
power delegated to the federal government can be ascertained by "discerning the core of
sovereignty retained by the States under the Tenth Amendment" Id.
57 8 See Amar, supra note 373, at 1466 ("The language of the Tenth Amendment simply
distilled the underlying structural logic of the original Constitution... ").
579 Professor Briffault argues in support of judicial intervention to protect the formal
features of the federal structure. See Briffault, supra note 522, at 1350-51. He identifies these
features as "the guarantee of state existence, nonoverlapping boundaries, the use of states as the
basic constitutive units in the national government, and the inherent law-making power of the
states"; and "the protection of the states as exclusive, autonomous decision makers within
guaranteed borders... "Id. at 1351. Professor Briffault rejects a normative approach to federal-
state disputes based on the values federalism serves. See id. at 1349-50.
580 The Seventeenth Amendment foreclosed representation of the states in Congress, and
dependence upon states as units of representation does not guarantee that members of Congress
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judicial review will invalidate congressional enactments it views as
compromising the integrity of the Constitution's federal structure.581
Garcia, New York, Pnntz, and Alden, as well as Gregory v. Ashcroft, 5 82 all
agree that the application of a federal structural test requires the Court to identify
the elements of political sovereignty that ensure the states' separate existence.5 83
Printz makes the principle of dual sovereignty the core of its structural
principle.584 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority in Printz, opined that states
retain a residual and inviolable sovereignty reflected in the constitutional text.585
The central inquiry is whether the congressional action compromises the
structural framework of dual sovereignty.586 Attempts to isolate the essence of
state sovereignty echo the federalism constraints set in motion by National
League of Cities, which carved out a protected zone of state immunity based on
the preservation of "attributes of state sovereignty. '587 In Alden, for example, the
represent the states' interests. See Briffault, supra note 522, at 1351.
581 See Briffault, supra note 522, at 1351 (finding judicial action appropriate when
national actions threaten the federal structure, but acknowledging the difficulty of applying this
standard). For Professor Briffault's identification of the federal structure's features, see supra
note 579.
582 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
583 See Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240,2246-47 (1999) (stating that immunity from suit
is a "fimdamental aspect' of state sovereignty that is implicit in the Constitution's structure);
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 917-23 (1997) (stating that the Constitution established a
system of dual sovereignty and this separation of powers constitutes one of the Constitution's
structural protections of liberty); U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 806 (1995)
(finding that the structure of the Constitution precludes the states from establishing
congressional qualifications); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 177 (1992) (finding
take title provisions in a federal law regulating nuclear waste to be inconsistent with the
Constitution's federal structure because they infringed upon the core of state sovereignty
retained by the states under the Tenth Amendment); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460
(1991) (upholding a state's power to set judicial qualifications as an incident of state
sovereignty); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 547-48 (1985) (stating
that the identification of the elements of political sovereignty deemed essential to the States'
existence constitutes one approach to defining the limits upon Congress's Commerce Clause
powers).
5 84 The Supreme Court stated as follows: "We turn next to consideration of the structure
of the Constitution, to see if we can discern among its 'essential postulate[s],' a principle that
controls the present cases. It is incontestable that the Constitution established a system of 'dual
sovereignty."' Printz, 521 U.S. at 918 (citation omitted). The Court launched into a discussion
of dual sovereignty immediately after stating that it was next examining the essential postulates
derived from the structure of the Constitution. Therefore, the articulation of the attributes of
state sovereignty remain a central task in further applications of the federal structural test. See
id at 918-25.
585 See id at 918-19.
586 See id. The Court examined whether the Brady Act intruded upon state sovereignty.
5 87 In Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Association, 452 U.S. 264, 287-
88 (1981), the Court further elaborated upon its decision in National League of Cities v. Usery
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dissenting justices sharply disagreed with the Court's characterization of the
states' immunity from suit as a "fundamental aspect" of state sovereignty,588
faulting this conclusion as a natural law "conception."58 9
The Alden majority opinion, written by Justice Kennedy, did not elaborate on
why the states' sovereign immunity constituted an essential element of the states'
residuary sovereignty. Instead, the Court concentrated on process based concerns
to support its holding that the Constitution's structure shields the states from
Congress's abrogation of their immunity from suit in state courts by private
parties to enforce federal law. The Court emphasized that Congress should
respect the states' "status as residuary sovereigns and joint participants in the
governance of the Nation."590 It characterized the congressionally triggered
private suits against states as coercive commandeering of state governmental
processes, pointing to the impact such suits could have upon the states' treasuries
and the allocation of state resources5 91 The congressional abrogation of state
sovereign immunity was viewed as an intervention in the states' political
processes that struck at "the heart of political accountability so essential to
our... republican form of government." 592
Because the United States Constitution does not contain textual direction as
to how the balance of power between the federal government and the states
should be maintained, the Court considers historical understanding, the structure
of the Constitution, and prior jurisprudence to determine whether Congress has
unconstitutionally invaded a sphere of state autonomy.593 The federal judiciary
enjoys stronger textual support for intruding upon state functions than does
Congress. For example, judicial power extends to all cases in law and equity,594
giving the federal judiciary the power to resolve disputes arising under the
Constitution, federal laws, and treaties. The Constitution further directs that the
Constitution shall be the supreme law of the land and that the judges in every state
shall be bound by it.595 Unlike Congress, the federal judiciary lacks power,
by holding that federal commerce power legislation is invalid under the reasoning of National
League of Cities, if the challenged statute (1) regulates the states as states, (2) addresses matters
that are indisputably attributes of state sovereignty, (3) directly impairs the states' ability to
structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental fimctions, and (4) does not
advance a federal interest that necessitates state compliance. The second condition, protection
of "attributes of state sovereignty" is similar to the emphasis in Printz upon preserving the
states' separate and inviolable sovereignty. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 918-19.
5 88 SeeAlden, 119 S. Ct. at 2246-47.
589 See id. at 2269--70 (Souter, J., dissenting).
59 0 Id at 2263.
591 See id. at 2263-65.
592 Id. at 2265.
593 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 905 (1997).
594 U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 2, cl.l.
595 See U.S. CONST. art VI, § 2. For a discussion of the Supremacy Clause, see Alden,
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however, to levy and collect taxes, to preempt state or local laws, or to regulate
state and local governments in the manner permitted by Congress's Commerce
Clause powers. The Court's remedial powers, on the other hand, frequently
command a state or local government to take certain actions that the Court would
consider forbidden "commandeering" if undertaken by Congress.5 96
A narrowly constructed structural test protects the states from congressional
intervention that impairs their ability to function. Today's most difficult
federalism issues are not confined, however, to the survival of the states that is
assured even under Garcia.597 Left unanswered is the role, if any, the federal
judiciary should play in the proper allocation of power between the states and the
national government.598 Under a structural test, courts will be compelled to
decide the point at which a particular federal activity or command bends the
structure so far out of shape as to curtail meaningful state participation.599 This
line will be difficult to draw. If drawn narrowly, a federal structural test would
preserve the states existence, but would leave the allocation of power to the
political processes so long as the states possess the ability to play some role, albeit
an insignificant one. A more broadly drawn structural test would require greater
judicial involvement in defining and protecting core areas of state responsibility.
119 S. Ct. at 2254-56, 2266; New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 178-79 (1992). The
Court opined that while the Supremacy Clause empowers federal courts "in proper
circumstances" to order state compliance with federal law, the clause imparts no authority on
Congress to mandate state regulation. See id. at 179.
Professor Akhil Reed Amar has emphasized that "[t]he Supremacy Clause does not make
federal statutes or federal executive policy supreme; it makes the federal Constitution
supreme...." Akhil Reed Amar, Using State Law to Protect Federal Constitutional Rights:
Some Questions and Answers About Converse-1983, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 159, 163 (1993). He
has argued, however, that "Article III requires that the last word on 'all cases arising under the
Constitution of the United States' be vested in thefederaljudiciary." Id. at 164 (emphasis in the
original). The clause "[a]t a minimum.., suggests that federal law and the Constitution have
become part of the law of the state.' Prakash, supra note 548, at 2011. State court judges thus
have a constitutional duty to enforce the federal constitution and laws. See id. at 2012.
596 See Printz, 521 U.S. at 933-35; New York 505 U.S. at 145-46, 175-76; David
Schoenbrod & Ross Sandler, In New York City, the Jails Still Belong to the Judges, WALL ST.
J., Sept. 10, 1997, at A23. Professor Yoo has argued that the Court's upholding of judicial
taxation in its 1990 Jenkins decision seems inconsistent with New York See Yoo, supra note 4,
at 1134-35.
597 See Larry Kramer, UnderstandingFederalism, 47 VAND. L. REv. 1485, 1513 (1994).
598 See id. (expressing the view that because judicial review will assure the states'
survival, the goal of protecting the states should focus on exploring the role the states can play
in the efficient delivery of services).
599 Further, it has been argued that the Constitution's structure forbids one governmental
branch from engaging in functions outside its defined textual authority. See Yoo, supra note 4,
at 1148.
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3. Argument for Applying the Federal Structural-Framework Test to the
Judiciary
Because the Court believes that the Constitution protects the structural
fiamework of dual sovereignty, it should make such a principle equally applicable
to itself as well as to the Congress.60 0 The Court's view that judicial review
encompasses a duty to protect the Constitution's federal structure must surely
extend to all governmental branches powerful enough to disable that structure.60 1
The proposition that the judiciary may exercise greater power over the states than
the other federal branches of government lacks credibility.60 2 The judiciary's
imposition of broad, structural remedies to reform state institutions has been
labeled inconsistent with the Constitution's structure and beyond the judiciary's
inherent powers.603 More than one commentator believes that antifederalists
could argue plausibly for the extension of the Court's New York ruling to cover
judicial as well as congressional acts that transgress state sovereignty.60 4
The Court in Alden highlighted the power that the judiciary exercises in our
federalist government. The Court held that "an unlimited congressional power to
authorize suits in state court[s] to levy upon the treasuries of the States for
compensatory damages" did not comport with the constitutional design.60 5
According to the Court, such power denigrates the separate sovereignty of the
states.606 The Court discussed how "the coercive process of judicial tribunals at
600 The principle behind the holding in New York that the congressionally mandated take
title provision violated the Constitution due to its inconsistency with the "federal structure of
our Government established by the Constitution," should apply to judicial orders that disable
the federal structure. See 505 U.S. at 177. In Printz, the Court reaffirmed its belief that the states
are an essential element of the federal structure in its statement that: "It is an essential attribute
of the States' retained sovereignty that they remain independent and autonomous within their
proper sphere of authority." 521 U.S. at 928. In Alden v. Maine, the Court reected
congressional power to override state sovereign immunity, stating that "the question is not the
primacy of federal law but the implementation of the law in a manner consistent with the
constitutional sovereignty of the States?' 119 S. Ct. 2240,2255-56 (1999).
601 As to thejudiciary's powers, see supra notes 514-17, 530-36 and accompanying text.
602 See Laura S. Fitzgerald, Beyond Marbury: Jurisdictional Self-Dealing in Seminole
Tnbe, 52 VAND. L. REV. 407, 409-17, 486-87 (1999) (criticizing the Court's exercise of
judicial power to assert subject matter jurisdiction in suits brought by private parties seeking
state compliance with federal law while limiting, through its recent Eleventh Amendment
jurisprudence, Congress's power to grant such subject matter jurisdiction); see also Robert F.
Nagel, Separation of Powers and the Scope of Federal Equitable Remedies, 30 STAN. L. REv.
661,670-72 (1978); Yoo, supra note 4, at 1165.
603 See Yoo, supra note 4, at 1149-50.
604 See Robert F. Nagel, Real Revolution, 13 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 985, 1004 (1997); Yoo,
supra note 4, at 1134-35.
605 Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2264.
606 See id.
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the instance of private parties" could subject a state to a "levy on its treasury or
perhaps even government buildings or property which the State administers on
the public's behalf."607 Finding that private suits for money damages could
"threaten the financial integrity of the States," the Court denied Congress's power
to authorize such suits because they could pose a "severe and notorious danger to
the States and their resources."6S08
Noting that the allocation of scarce resources lies at the heart of the political
process, the Alden Court cautioned that "suits for money damages would place
unwarranted strain on the States' ability to govern in accordance with the will of
their citizens. '609 The Court further expressed alarm that disregarding the states'
immunity from private suits would subject the states to the "mandates of judicial
tribunals" in favor of private interests and erode the states' autonomy and
decision-making ability.610 Although the Court in Alden addressed the issue of
Congress's power to abrogate state sovereign immunity from suit, each of the
policy concerns expressed in Alden applies with equal force to the Court's
institutional reform remedial measures.611 The Court's remedial measures in
institutional reform litigation both impact upon state and local governmental fiscal
resources and representative government
In Jenkins, the Court upheld the power of a district court to act as a state
legislature, dictating unauthorized state taxation. The Constitution's structure of
enumerated powers and separation of powers among the governmental branches
does not support this exercise of remedial power that disrupts existing taxation
procedures and functions. Judicial actions that displace or intrude upon a state's
core functions certainly distort the Constitution's federal structure.
B. The Separation ofPowers as a Principle ofLimitation
1. Horizontal and Vertical Separation ofPowers
Because the Framers reasoned that no branch of government could be trusted
607 Id. (quoting In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 505 (1887)).
608 Id.
609 Id.
6 10 See id at 2264-65.
611 The origin of the plaintiffs' rights constitutes the only difference between the two
forms of litigation. In Alden, the plaintiffs possessed rights granted by a federal statute whereas
in Jenkins the plaintiffs possessed rights granted by the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution. In Alden, the Court made it clear that its holding was not applicable to the
protection of Fourteenth Amendment constitutional rights. See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2267. The
Court also pointed out that the sovereign immunity granted states does not extend to a local
government or other governmental entity that is not an arm of a state. See id. The Alden Court
objected to Congress's authorization of private suits to enforce a federal statute in lieu of direct
federal enforcement activity on the part of the national government. See id. at 2269.
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to exercise absolute power, they developed a series of complex checks and
balances612 among the branches of government and delegated distinct powers to
each branch. 613 The division of powers into legislative, executive, and judicial
spheres both promotes efficiency and "precludes the exercise of arbitrary
power. '614 The vertical separation of powers crafted by the Framers serves the
6 12 See W.B. GwYN, THE MEANING OF THE SEPARATION OF POwERS: AN ANALYSIS OF
THE DOCMINE FROM ITS ORIGIN TO THE ADOPTION OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTflUrION 109-
13 (1965) (distinguishing the separation of powers doctrine from constitutional checks and
balances, which is based on the theory that officeholders will seek more power unless checked
by other power holders). John Adams embraced the concept of balancing each of the three
powers-legislative, executive, and judicial, against the other two powers. See id. at 116-17.
See generally GWYN, supra; WOOD, supra note 7, at 151-61 (discussing the origins and
development of the separation of powers doctrine).
The colonists included the judicial branch of government into the balance of power
arrangement recognizing that the judiciary had a role to play in preserving the governmental
balance of power, although doubtful about its strength to withstand legislative attack. See id. at
125; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 464-72 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
The judiciary's power in this system of checks and balances increased greatly once it
assumed the power to review the acts of the other branches for consistency with constitutional
law. See GWYN, supra, at 125; see also Anderson, supra note 518, at 139-40 (criticizing the
Court's decision in 1NSv. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), for failing to follow the admonition in
The Federalist to refrain from exercising an "overruling influence over the others in the
administration of their respective power") (citing TIM FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 308 (James
Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
613 See BAILYN, supra note 373, at 371 (stating that the Constitution's Framers believed
that the Constitution's checks and balances would prevent the citizenry's self-interest, greed,
and quest for power from destroying the republic created); THE FEDERALST No. 48, at 308
(James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("It is agreed on all sides that the powers properly
belonging to one of the departments ought not to be... administered by either of the other
departments.); THE FEDERALis NO. 51, at 321 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(arguing that government should be structured for the "separate and distinct exercise of the
different powers of government" to preserve liberty); GWYN, supra note 612, at 11 (stating that
the earliest versions of the separation of powers doctrine maintained that it was a prerequisite
for civil liberty); WOOD, supra note 7, at 150 (presenting the founders' view that separating
power constituted an additional device to ensure the maintenance of liberty in a republican
government by distributing power in different people to check each other); Philip B. Kurland,
The Rise and Fall of the "Doctrine" of Separation of Powers, 85 MICH. L. REv. 592, 593
(1986) (arguing that the Framers' notions of the division of powers among the federal branches
was based on the concept of balanced government and checks and balances as well as
separation of powers with the mistrust of concentrated governmental authority as the underlying
premise); Robinson, supra note 518, at 48 (stating that the Framers separated federal
governmental powers to promote vigorous administration and to prevent tyranny).
6 14 Kathleen M. Sullivan, Dueling Sovereignties: U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 109
HARV. L. REv. 78, 92 (1995); see also William B. Gwyn, The Separation of Powers and
Modern Forms of Democratic Government, in SEPARATION OF POWERS-DOES IT STILL
WORK? 65, 68-71 (Robert A. Goldwin & Art Kaufman eds., 1986) (presenting early versions
of the separation of powers and arguing that the separation of powers framework acts as an
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same goals as the horizontal distribution of power.615 Dividing governmental
powers among the states and the national government further promotes liberty
and curbs tyranny.6 16 The Court's reliance in Alden, Printz, and New York upon
federal structural principles signifies a new shift in the post-New Deal era toward
placing greater emphasis upon the vertical separation of powers.
The federal judiciary creates tensions in both the vertical and the horizontal
separation of powers when it orders state and local governments to undertake
large-scale remedial programs. Institutional litigation affects the vertical
separation of powers through its use of federal judicial power to reconstitute state
and local institutions and programs to meet constitutional requirements. When the
federal judiciary's supervision of the equitable remedial process causes it to
perform duties of a nonjudicial nature at the state and local governmental levels,
the Constitution's division of horizontal powers is upset.617
In Jenkins, the lower court's detailed oversight of the remedial process
involved the use of executive and administrative power. The district court
specified, for example, the number of certified librarians the KCMSD should hire
and the number of minutes each day that teachers should devote to planning and
instruction. 618 The district court's fiscal and taxation orders reallocated local and
state fiscal resources, a legislative function.619 When the judiciary performs
powers delegated to the other governmental branches, it acts without textual
support and contrary to the Constitution's structure of separated power. Further, it
prevents democratic processes from operating.620
auxiliary safeguard to achieve liberty with primary dependence upon the people to control
government). Hamilton and Madison expressed the view that the separation of powers doctrine
required that the three powers of government be exercised by different office holders, but they
also stressed the need for each branch to exercise some of the powers granted to the other
branches in order to check encroachments on it from the other branches. See id. at 74.
6 15 See Sullivan, supra note 614, at 95 (finding that both the division of power within the
federal government and the division of power between the states and the federal government
preserve liberty and prevent tyranny).
6 16 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992); THE FEDERALST NO. 51, at
323 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); Amar, supra note 373, at 1450.
6 17 See Yoo, supra note 4, at 1140-41 (criticizing the federal judiciary's performance of
executive and legislative functions in the supervision of judicially mandated state institutional
reforms as circumventing democratic processes).
618 See Jenkins v. Missouri, 639 F. Supp. 19,26 (W.D. Mo. 1985).
6 19 See id. at 45 (overturning Missouri state law to enjoin a tax levy rollback for the
purpose of raising $4,000,000 to implement the court-ordered desegregation plan).
620 See Yoo, supra note 4, at 1149 (noting that "when the Constitution removes certain
decisions from the democratic processes of the states, it does so explicitly in the Constitution's
text').
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2. Elrod v. Burns-Nonapplicability of the Separation ofPowers Doctrine
to the "Federal Judiciary's Relationship to the States'"
In Elrod v. Burns,621 the Court, in a plurality opinion, maintained that
separation of powers principles do not apply to the federaljudiciary's relationship
to the states.622 Elrod invalidated a Cook County Sheriff s discharge of noncivil-
service employees on the basis of their political affiliation. Justice Brennan,
writing for the plurality, opined that the political question doctrine and the
principle of separation of powers had no applicability to the '"federal judiciary's
relationship to the States,"' but applied only to the relationship of the judiciary to
the other coordinate branches of the national government.6 23 He argued that no
judicial impairment of state executive power could exist when the exercise of that
state power was impermissible under the Constitution.624 The plurality viewed
the question presented in Elrod as involving only a question of constitutional
interpretation, which was within the province of the Court.625
Elrod pertained to the use of state executive power ultimately found
unconstitutional 626 When the Court orders state and local governments to
undertake extensive remedial actions, it is the equitable remedies, not the
underlying unconstitutional actions, that result in the judicial performance of
legislative and executive functions. Justice Brennan's argument that the removal
of an unconstitutional condition necessitates judicial interference irrespective of
vertical separation of powers considerations does not necessarily extend to the
judiciary's remedial course of action. The Court may choose from a broad range
of equitable remedies, some of which may avoid vertical and horizontal
separation of powers issues. Further, the reasoning of the Court's 1999 opinion in
Alden casts doubt upon the Elrod plurality position that the judiciary may act
without regard to any limitations imposed by the vertical separation of powers.
The Alden Court objected to the displacement of state governmental processes
and the reallocation of scarce resources resulting from Congress's removal of
621 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
622 See Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 352 (1976); see also Nagel, supra note 602, at 665-
67 (disagreeing with the conclusion in Elrod v. Bums that the separation of powers does not
apply to the relationship between the federal judiciary and the states).
623 See Elrod, 427 U.S. at 351 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,210 (1962)); see also
MCGOWAN, supra note 85, at 39 (stating that Justice Brennan did not view the Supremacy
Clause as minimizing the importance of state courts or as solely defining the legal relationship
between federal and state courts).
624 See Elrod, 427 U.S. at 352.
6 25 See id. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Powell wrote that local legislative
deterninations regarding patronage hiring practices should receive as much weight as the Court
accords to congressional legislation that increases political discourse, but adversely affects some
First Amendment interests. See id. at 386 n.9 (Powell, J., dissenting).
626 See id at 372-73.
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state sovereign immunity to facilitate federal law enforcement in state courts by
private parties seeking compensatory damages.627
Typically, the Court relies upon the Supremacy Clause as the justification for
its command of remedial actions that disturb state autonomy 628 The assumption
that the Supremacy Clause is inconsistent with applying vertical separation of
powers limitations upon the judiciary has been termed incorrect.629 This clause
only provides that the Constitution, federal laws, and treaties "shall be the
supreme Law of the Land 630 The clause does not address specifically the
imposition of equitable remedies that violate the Framers understanding of
separated powers while attempting to remove state and local constitutional
violations.631
When federal law supremacy values clash with separation of powers values,
the possibility of at least three different outcomes exists. One option presented by
the plurality opinion in Elrod posits that vertical separation of power constraints
are inapplicable to the federal judiciary. Conversely, as a second option, one can
argue that the federal judiciary lacks authority to exercise powers not
contemplated by the Constitution's federal design even if constitutional violations
remain incompletely redressed.632 The Court's opinions in Alden and Printz
support this position.633 Because Article fT vests the judiciary only with judicial
power, the separation of powers doctrine prevents it from exercising nonjudicial
power not delegated to it.634
The application of a balancing test constitutes a third option. Separation of
627 See Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240,2264-65 (1999).
628 See supra note 373 and accompanying text. The Supremacy Clause has been described
as the Constitution's most explicit and significant statement concerning federalism. See
Chemerinsky, supra note 537, at 975.
6 29 See Nagel, supra note 602, at 667.
630 U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
631 This dilerma has been described as the "tension ... between the possibility that a
clearly subordinate state policy might infringe a federal constitutional right, and the possibility
that the method of protecting that right might itself violate the Constitution' See Nagel, supra
note 602, at 678. Professor Nagel concludes that "[t]he proper resolution of this dilemma cannot
be to abandon the constitutional decision-making struecture.'Id.
6 32 See Nagel, supra note 602, at 678-81.
633 See Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2255 (1999) (stating that only federal law in
accord with the constitutional design qualifies as binding upon the states pursuant to the
Supremacy Clause); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 924-25 (1997) (finding that laws
that violate state sovereignty are not in accord with the Constitution, rendering them
unenforceable under the Supremacy Clause). Justice Souter in his dissenting opinion in Alden
criticized the Court for abandoning the principle that the existence of a right assures a remedy.
See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2295 (Souter, J., dissenting).
634 Professor Nagel has argued that the Framers intended to protect states from separation
of powers violations at the hands of the federal governmental branches through the Tenth
Amendment. See Nagel, supra note 602, at 667-68.
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powers values protecting the states' integrity in a federal structure can be weighed
against the value of fully remedying all constitutional violations irrespective of
the corrective action's effect upon the Constitution's federal structure. It remains
unclear how the Court would determine which of the competing values bears the
strongest weight in a particular case. In Printz, Justice Scalia, writing for the
Court, rejected the use of balancing analysis to determine whether a congressional
enactment compromised the federal structural framework.635 He viewed laws that
upset the "structural framework of dual sovereignty" as unconstitutional. 636
3. Formalistic and Functional Approaches to the Separation ofPowers
Doctrine
Supreme Court decisions defining the parameters of the separation of powers
doctrine oscillate between a formalistic and a functional approach.637 Under a
635 Justice Scalia opined that the Supremacy Clause applies only to laws in accord with
the Constitution. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 924-25. Thus, if the remedial action violated the
Constitution's federal structure, it would be unconstitutional and bereft of Supremacy Clause
protection. See Jackson, supra note 94, at 2194 (noting that Prntz applied a categorical
principle barring Congress from enlisting state officers to administer a federal regulatory
program, thereby rejecting an approach marked by balancing the states' temporary enforcement
burden against the importance of the federal interest).
636 ptntz, 521 U.S. at 932. The Court took a similar position in Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct.
at 2255-56. The Court stated that "the question is not the primacy of federal law but the
implementation of the law in a manner consistent with the constitutional sovereignty of the
States." ld.; see also Jackson, supra note 94, at 2195-97 (criticizing the theory of dual
sovereignty as inconsistent with the Court's constitutional jurisprudence and contrary to the
federal government's supremacy when acting within its sphere of authority).
637 See Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers
Questions-A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488, 489 (1987) (finding that the
Supreme Court has vacillated between perceived necessity of maintaining three distinct
branches of government and a flexible approach that stresses core function and relationship);
Sullivan, supra note 614, at 91-92 (pointing out that structural analysis involving the
relationship between the federal government and states parallels the horizontal separation of
powers in oscillating between a formal and functional mode).
Recently, the Court took a functional approach in Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988)
(upholding the creation of independent counsel to investigate and prosecute executive branch
officials) and in Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (upholding sentencing
commission, comprised in part of federal judges, to draft sentencing guidelines). The Court's
formalism approach is seen in Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998) (invalidating
the Line Item Veto Act); see also U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thomton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995)
(finding that states lack power to fix restrictions upon congressional qualifications); Bowsher v.
Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (invalidating the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act); INS v. Chadha,
462 U.S. 919 (1983) (invalidating the legislative veto); Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v.
Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982) (invalidating Congress's grant of power to
bankruptcy judges to exercise jurisdiction over all matters arising under the bankruptcy laws as
an inf-ingement upon the powers of Article Im courts).
2000]
OHIO STATE LAWJOURMAL
formalistic approach, the Court prohibits one branch from assuming functions
assigned to another branch irrespective of whether the incursion promotes
efficiency or fulfills a sound governmental need.63 8 Formalism fosters a literal
reading of the Constitution.639 When the Court takes a functionalist posture, it
refuses, however, to invalidate one branch's assumption of functions outside its
literal parameters-unless the power exercised unduly impairs another branch's
ability to function.640 Less emphasis is placed upon rigidly keeping the powers of
each branch separate and distinct so long as governmental accountability and
practical efficiency are maintained.641
Supreme Court rulings on the Constitution's vertical division of powers
between Congress and the states embrace both formalism and functionalism.
642
Formalism is demonstrated when the Court preserves a zone of protected state
sovereignty and refuses to examine the degree of federal intrusiveness caused by
the contested federal legislation. When the Court examines the effect of the
federal encroachment upon the states' ability to function in a federal system, it
takes a functionalist approach, often characterized by the use of a balancing test to
weigh both federal and state interests.
Commentators have argued that National League of Cities v. Usery supports
both formalistic and functional platforms. The decision's protection of
"traditional" and "integral" state functions from congressional invasion, later
overruled in Garcia, upheld formalism values.643 The Court's willingness, on the
other hand, in National League to examine both federal and state interests has
638 See Sullivan, supra note 614, at 92 (concluding that the formal approach presumes that
trespass by one branch into another's functions is unconstitutional irrespective of whether the
trespass threatens the functionality of the other branch or concentrates excessive power in a
branch).
639 See Suzanna Sherry, Separation of Powers: Asking a Different Question, 30 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 287,289 (1989) (stating that formalism, as themodem approach to separation of
powers questions, views the Constitution's literal language itself as authoritative).
640 See Sullivan, supra note 614, at 93 (stating that the functional approach is pragmatic
and rests on a theory of balancing powers rather than upon a strict separation of powers).
641 See id at 106 (stating that "[a] functional approach defers to the political resolution of
structural controversies, unless some political-process defect is apparent"').
642 See George D. Brown, Article IlI as a Fundamental Value-The Demise of Northern
Pipeline and Its Implications for Congressional Power, 49 OHio ST. LJ. 55, 78 (1988)
(characterizing the period from 1976 to 1988 as one in which "the Court moved away from the
apparent formalism of its original decision [National League of Cities], which rested in part on
notions of zones of state autonomy, to a pragmatic approach balancing state and national
interests").
643 See Brown, supra note 642, at 78 (seeing formalism in National League of Cities'
reliance "in part on notions of zones of state autonomy"); Sullivan, supra note 614, at 95
(arguing that National League of Cities comes closest to formalism in the modem vertical
separation of powers context).
[Vol. 61:483
JUDICIAL FUNDING AND TAX MANDATES
come to symbolize the Court's use of a balancing test, a functionalist tool.644
The Court returned to a more formalistic mode, in New York v. United States
and in Printz v. United States, finding that the practical efficiency of the federal
legislation invalidated in both cases did not suffice against Tenth Amendment
challenges.645 In US. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton,646 the Court upheld,
however, federal power against state encroachments, ruling that state term-limits
laws barring certain congressional incumbents from re-election were
unconstitutional. 647 The above decisions relate only to clashes between Congress
and the states. They offer little guidance as to whether the Court, if challenged,
would apply vertical separation of powers values to itself or how it would apply
them. In Mistretta v. United States65 the Court, in a functionalist posture, upheld
the constitutionality of service by federal judges on the United States Sentencing
Commission, opining that Congress may delegate some non-Article I functions
to Article III judges.6 49 The Court takes a functionalist stance in institutional
reform litigation, as in Jenkins, assuming powers vested in state and local
legislators and officials to expedite the remedial process.
4. Argument for Applying the Separation ofPowers Doctrine to the
Judiciary
Removing the judiciary's enforcement powers from separation of powers
restraints, while subjecting the executive and legislative branches, to such
limitations results in a lack of constitutional coherency and violates the Framer's
belief that these structural limitations should apply to all federal branches. 650
644 See Caminker, supra note 557, at 247 (contrasting the formalist approach in Printz
with the "National League of Cities balancing test').
645 In Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 932 (1995), the Court rejected a pragmatic
balancing approach as inappropriate in which the federal legislation "compromise[d] the
structural framework of dual sovereignty." See also Caminker, supra note 557, at 245.
646 514 U.S. 779 (1995).
647 See Sullivan, supra note 614, at 103 (finding that the majority in U.S. Tenn Limits
supported the more traditional view that the role of the Court lies in defending federal power).
After comparing the votes of the United States Supreme Court justices in US. Term Limits and
Lopez, Professor Sullivan concluded that four justices will strike down a state encroachment
upon the federal government, but not a federal intrusion upon the states whereas an equal
number ofjustices will do the opposite-strike down a federal encroachment upon the states,
but not a state intrusion upon the federal government. See Sullivan, supra note 614, at 103.
Only Justice Kennedy, who took the majority view in both U.S. Term Limits and Lopez, views
federalism as holding both the states and federal government within the bounds of their spheres
of authority. See id.
648 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
64 9 See id at 665-68, 671-74,676.
650 See Nagel, supra note 602, at 663 (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 326 (James
Madison) (J. Cooke ed., 1961)); see also Anderson, supra note 518, at 138, 140 (arguing that
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Structural limitations inherent in the Constitution's separation of powers among
the federal branches limit the scope of federal judicial remedial processes to some
degree.651 The Court should acknowledge that functional limitations upon the
judiciary's authority do exist. Accordingly, the Court should not uphold the
enforcement of remedies that cause it to assume executive and legislative
functions at the state and local levels of govemment.652 Clearly, the judiciary can
invalidate an unconstitutional state tax. But the creation of taxation and the
modification of a legally binding state tax to remedy constitutional violations, as
in Jenkins, thrusts the judiciary into a legislative role for which it lacks experience
or legitimacy under the separation of powers doctrine.653 The Constitution's
division of power into judicial, legislative, and executive spheres does not support
the federal judiciary's assumption of non-Article II powers.654
the Court should be bound by the separation of powers doctrine and that the majority opinion in
INS v. Chadha indicates a view that the Court is exempt from such doctrine).
651 See Anderson, supra note 518, at 138, 141 (arguing that the separation of powers is a
structural device designed to remedy the defects of democratic government with the expectation
that the other branches will check the power of a branch that abuses its power); Rebecca L.
Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1513, 1514 (1991)
(arguing that the Constitution's separation of powers should not be treated as an isolated area of
the law, but rather should be seen as a vital part of the Constitution's structure); Kurland, supra
note 613, at 602 (arguing that the separation of powers is a construct on which a constitution
was framed rather than a rule of decision).
Professor Yoo argues that the federal courts lack inherent authority to undertake the
structural remedial reform of state institutions because the exercise of such equitable remedies
are inconsistent with the Constitution's text, the Constitution's structure of federalism and
separation of powers, and the original understanding of the Constitution. See Yoo, supra note 4,
at 1140-42,1149-51,1166.
652 See Anderson, supra note 518, at 138, 139 (pointing out the irony in the Court's
guardianship of separation of powers through judicial review when it has been the branch most
guilty of violating the doctrine); Kurland, supra note 613, at 593 (1986) (arguing that separation
of powers encompasses the notion that the fundamental differences in governmental functions,
whether legislative, executive, or judicial, must be maintained as separate and distinct). But see
DAHL, supra note 515, at 197 (arguing that the legitimacy ofjudicial review that negates federal
rather than state and local legislation can be challenged more readily because overturning the
preferences of national majorities is more problematic than negating the laws of a ninority of
the citizenry).
653 Professor Neil Kinkopf has argued that Congress is bound by an antiaggrandizement
principle, as well as the general separation of powers principle, that prohibits the Congress from
"aggrandiz[ing] itself by claiming power beyond its constitutionally assigned sphere." Neil
Kinkopf, Of Devolu'on, Privatization, and Globalization: Separation of Powers Limits on
Congressional Authority to Assign Federal Power to Non-federal Actors, 50 RUTGERs LJ. 331,
345 (1998). An antiaggrandizement principle applies to the allocation of power among the three
federal branches. See id. at 347. It thus forbids the judiciary from exercising taxation, a
legislative power. Bowsher v. Symar and its progeny clearly confirm the existence of an
antiaggrandizement principle. See id. at 345-47.654 See YoO, supra note 4, at 1123-24, 1140-42, 1144-48, 1150.
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C. Comity and Federalism as Principles ofLimitation
Comity may be described as the practice of treating another equal jurisdiction
or nation with courtesy and good will. It rests upon a moral rather than a legal
duty.655 In the international arena, comity principles impose an obligation upon
nations to give effect to foreign laws when appropriate.6 56 Similarly, comity
underlies choice of law principles when the law of one state is applied to a case in
another state.657 Comity principles also apply to federal-state relations dictating
proper respect in the division of federal and state judicial functions.6 58
Notions of comity support the federal judiciary's longstanding policy of
restraint from interference with state court proceedings.659 For example, in
Younger v. Hari,6 60 the Court confirmed that equity, comity, and federalism
considerations restrain federal courts from granting injunctive relief against state
criminal prosecutions absent extraordinary conditions. 661 Under the abstention
doctrine, federal courts may abstain from exercising jurisdiction in cases in which
a federal constitutional question cannot be resolved without clarifying unsettled
state law.662 The underlying policy is that federal courts should not take
655 See Ernest G. Lorenzen, Story's Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws-One
Hundred Years Later, 48 HARV. L. REV. 15, 35 (1934).
656 See Holly Sprague, Comment, Choice of Law: A Fond Farewell to Comity and Public
Policy, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1447, 1448-50 (1986); see also Lorenzen, supra note 655, at 19-29,
34-38 (describing Justice Story's introduction of comity principles in Anglo-American law to
resolve choice of law issues).
657 See JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAW 33-37, 232 (Amo
Press 1972) (1834).
658 See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37,44 (1971); see also Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct.
2240,2268 (1999) (stating that when Congress legislates in matters affecting the states, it"must
respect the sovereignty of the States"); Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n v. McNary, 454
U.S. 100, 119 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring) (stating that "the 'principle of comity' refers to
the 'proper respect for state functions' that organs of the National Government, most
particularly the federal courts, are expected to demonstrate in the exercise of their own
legitimate powers').
659 See Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-44; see also O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 501-02
(1974) (barring federal injunctive relief against state officials engaged in the administration of
state criminal laws because relief sought would cause continuous supervision over state court
proceedings contrary to the principles of comity); Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman,
319 U.S. 293, 298 (1943) (withholding declaratory relief to employers seeking to enjoin the
enforcement of Louisiana's state unemployment law because public policy grounds dictate
against federal judicial interference with a state's domestic policy).
660 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
6 61 See Younger,401 U.S. at 43-45.
6 62 See Harris County Comm'rs Court v. Moore, 420 U.S. 77, 87 (1975) (holding that
abstention is appropriate in an action contesting the constitutionality ofjustice of peace precinct
redistricting because unsettled state law precluded the resolution of constitutional issues raised
by displaced justices of the peace and constables); Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S.
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jurisdiction of a case until state courts have the opportunity to decide the
underlying state law questions.663
The Court consistently considers comity restraints when it contemplates
exercising intrusive forms of equitable power.664 Premised upon the belief that
the federal judiciary must show proper respect for the integrity and proper
functioning of local governments when exercising equitable powers, the Court
endorses the use of minimally intrusive methods to remedy constitutional
violations.665 This so-called "overly intrusive" principle of limitation causes the
federal judiciary to show sensitivity toward state autonomy in such diverse areas
as local school funding 666  remedial funding orders, 667  and prison
administration,668 as well as state taxation matters.669
Federal courts, citing federalism and comity concerns, are particularly
deferential in matters involving state tax systemns.670 In Fair Assessment in Real
496, 499-500 (1941) (applying abstention in action contesting an order of the Railroad
Commission of Texas because the Supreme Court of Texas rather than the district court should
decide whether the Commission acted within its scope of authority); see also MCGOwAN, supra
note 85, at 64-71 (discussing the historic development of the concept of abstention and giving
the author's view of its status).
663 See Harris County, 420 U.S. at 87-89.
664 See Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 119-20 (Brennan,
J., concurring).
6 65 See Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 51 (1990).
666 See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 58-59 (1973) (finding
that Texas's plan for financing public education did not violate the Equal Protection Clause and
opining that fundamental reforms with respect to state education and taxation must come from
state lawmakers); West Virginia Educ. Ass'n v. Legislature of West Virginia, 369 S.E.2d 454,
454 (W. Va. 1988) (deferring a writ of mandamus on grounds of comity so the Governor and
state legislature could remedy unconstitutional cuts in state expenditures for education); see also
infra note 726 and accompanying text.
667 See Bradley v. Baliles, 639 F. Supp. 680, 689-90 (E.D. Va. 1986) (denying a request
for additional state funding in school desegregation action because unless the funding remedies
the effects of past state-imposed school segregation, the court lacks authority to order it). In
Bradley, the court, citing Arthur v. Nyquist, 712 F.2d 809, 813 (2d Cir. 1983), opined that it
should exercise restraint from using its broad equitable powers to upgrade an educational
system in ways not related to the desegregation remedial process. See Bradley, 639 F. Supp. at
690.
668 See supra notes 453-61 and accompanying text.
669 See Tatten Partners, L.P. v. New Castle County Bd. of Assessment Review, 642 A2d
1251, 1263-64 (Del. Super. Ct. 1993) (holding that the intrusive nature of challenges to state
tax administration under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 bar this form of action if state remedies afford
taxpayers an opportunity for relief).
670 See National Private Truck Council, Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 515 U.S. 582,
590-92 (1995) (barring injunctive relief under Section 1983 action brought by nonresident
motor carriers who challenged state taxes as unconstitutional); Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co.
v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293, 300-02 (1943) (holding that federal courts are barred from rendering
declaratory judgments as to the constitutionality of state tax laws); In re Gillis, 836 F2d 1001,
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Estate Association v. McNary,671 the Court held that comity principles barred
state tax payers from suing in federal court under civil rights legislation to redress
the alleged unconstitutional administration of Missouri's tax system. 672 The Court
reasoned that comity principles applied because the intrusive nature of federal
court interference with state tax enforcement disrupted the state's revenue
collection system and interfered with the 'rightful independence of state
governments. ' 673
Both the majority and the concurring opinions in Missouri v. Jenkins
recognized the role comity and federalism play in limiting judicial interference in
sensitive state-federal relations. The Court ruled that principles of federal-state
comity prohibited the federal judiciary from directly imposing remedial property
taxation.6 74 Justice White, writing for the majority, opined, however, that the
district court could order the school district to impose such taxation as well as
enjoin the operation of state law that hindered such local taxation.675 Justice
Kennedy, in his concurring opinion, disagreed with this posture, finding no
distinction between the direct imposition of a tax by the judiciary and an order
directing the school district to impose the tax.676
The application of comity principles has been criticized as indeterminate and
overly broad.677 Typically the Court rules that one area of federal-state relations,
such as the administration of a state's tax system, must be treated with respect and
concern. Thus, until the Court so rules, the applicability of the doctrine remains
uncertain. In Jenkins, the Court had the opportunity to extend the comity principle
applied in the McNary case to cover judicially ordered taxation as well as judicial
interference with a state's tax administration. The Court chose not to do so, but it
may be persuaded otherwise in the future.6 78
1005-09 (6th Cir. 1988) (upholding on comity principles a district court's refusal to hear a
claim alleging that Kentucky's property tax assessment policies relating to coal, oil, and gas
property interests violated equal protection principles).
671 454 U.S. 100 (1981).
672 See id at 107 (holding that comity bars federal courts from granting injunctive and
declaratory relief in challenges to state tax systems); see also Great Lakes, 319 U.S. at 300-01
(holding that federal courts are restrained by equitable principles from rendering declaratory
judgments as to the constitutionality of state tax laws).
673 McNary, 454 U.S. at 113-16.
674 See Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 50 (1990).
675 See id. at 50-51.
676 See id. at 63-64.
677 See Sprague, supra note 656, at 1452; see also Louise Weinberg, Against Comity, 80
GEo. LJ. 53,94 (1991) (viewing comity as an abstraction).
67 8 In Missouri v. Jenkins, Justice Thomas, in a concurring opinion, for example, criticized
the Court's broadened exercise of equitable power through the use of structural injunctions in
school desegregation and other institutional litigations. See 515 U.S. 70, 126 (1995). He stated
that "[s]uch extravagant uses ofjudicial power are at odds with the history and tradition of the
equity power and the Framers' design." Id. Justice Thomas expressed disapproval of the
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In McNary, the Court stressed the importance of a state's ability to administer
its fiscal affairs without federal interference. 679 It equated a state's ability to
collect revenues as essential to its independence.6 80 The federal judiciary should
show the same respect for essential state functions when it orders state and local
structural reforms. In Jenkins, the district court proceeded with a remedial course
of action that disrupted the state's taxation procedures, overruled state taxation
limits, and reallocated sizable state resources. Surely this course of action violated
comity principles as the Court has articulated them. Jenkins cannot be reconciled
with McNary. The magnitude of the intrusion in both cases is comparable.68'
D. The Guarantee Clause as a Principle ofLimitation
1. Background
The Constitution's Guarantee Clause provides that the United States shall
guarantee to each of its states a republican form of government 682 The clause's
two distinct facets are the following: (1) it prohibits the states from adopting any
form of government other than a republican one; and (2) it obligates the federal
government to ensure that the states enjoy a republican form of government.6 83
Traditionally, the Court has refused to exercise judicial review over lawsuits
brought against a state asserting the state's failure to meet its obligation to
maintain a republican form of government.684 The Court has viewed these
Guarantee Clause challenges as nonjusticiable because they present political
Court's finding in its 1990 Jenkins decision that a district court possesses the power to order a
local governmental body to levy taxes and implied that this ruling could violate the principles of
comity. See id.
679 See Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 110 (1981).
6 80 See id. at 108-09.
681 See infra notes 764-65 and accompanying text.
6 82 See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. For a discussion of the Framers' view of republican
government, see ELY, supra note 14, at 77-78; WOOD, supra note 7, at 47-75, 150; Arthur E.
Bonfield, The Guarantee Clause ofArticle I, Section 4: A Study in Constitutional Desuetude,
46 MINN. L. REV. 513,515-30 (1962).6 83 See Deborah Jones Merritt, Republican Governments and Autonomous States: A New
Rolefor the Guarantee Clause, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 815, 815 (1994). For a detailed discussion
of the Framers' reasons for adopting the Guarantee Clause, see Bonfield, supra note 682, at
517-22. The clause was deemed essential to ensure that all of the states possessed the same
kind of government-a republican one. See id. at 518.
6 84 See Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912); Bonfield, supra
note 682, at 554-57. Daniel J. Elazar, a noted scholar on federalism, writes: "While the political
process has been put to hard use to find ways to guarantee state political integrity against the
pressures of centralization, virtually nothing has been added to the constitutional guarantees that
allow federal authority to be used to maintain representative government within the states."
ELAZAR, supra note 513, at 191.
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questions.685 The Court presented strong policy reasons for this stand in Pacific
States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Oregon.686
The defendant taxpayer in Pacific States asserted that the enactment of an
Oregon law through the use of an initiative measure violated the Guarantee
Clause. The Court stated that should it extend judicial review to plaintiffs
invoking the clause to invalidate state action, citizens frequently would contest in
court proceedings any one of the innumerable state obligations placed upon
them.68 7 The Court reasoned that in the course of such litigation the judiciary
could absolve citizens of their duties to their state government, thereby weakening
legislative authority and blurring the distinction between the judiciary and
legislative branches.688 The Court concluded that making the clause justiciable
would amount to the assumption of judicial authority over a political matter that
should lie within the authority of the legislative branch.689
Other traditional reasons for making the Guarantee Clause nonjusticiable
685 See Bonfield, supra note 682, at 534-36, 553-54,556-57. The Court has treated some
issues arising under the Guarantee Clause as justiciable. These areas most notably include
congressional acts that interfere with state autonomy. See Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559,
574 (1911); Louise Weinberg, Political Questions and the Guarantee Clause, 65 U. COLO. L.
REv. 887,920-21,945 (1994).
686 223 U.S. 118 (1912). For a discussion of Pacific States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v.
Oregon, see Bonfield, supra note 682, at 553-57.
687 See Pacfic States, 223 U.S. at 141-42.
688 See id. at 142. The Court stated:
[D]o the provisions of that Article [the Guarantee Clause] obliterate the division between
judicial authority and legislative power upon which the Constitution rests? In other words,
do they authorize the judiciary to substitute its judgment as to a matter purely political for
the judgment of Congress on a subject cominitted to it and thus overthrow the Constitution
upon the ground that thereby the guarantee to the States of a government republican in
form may be secured,-a conception which after all rests upon the assumption that the
States are to be guaranteed a government republican in form by destroying the very
existence of a government republican in form in the Nation.
Id.
689 See id. at 142. The Pacific States Court opined that Guarantee Clause judicial review
of state action would lead to the "ruinous destruction of legislative authority in matters purely
political." Id. at 141. Should the Guarantee Clause become fully justiciable, it could place the
Court, as in Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) I (1849), in the position of sanctioning which
of two, or perhaps more, competing state governments was legitimate. Such a course of action
would preempt legislative action at the state level and perhaps at the federal level should
Congress disagree with the Court's view. See Pacfic States, 223 U.S. at 141-42. The Court
concluded that Luther, which established the rule of treating the Guarantee Clause as
nonjusticiable, remained the leading and controlling decision. See id. at 143. One scholar
believes that the Court in Pacic States was concerned about the possible invalidation of a
substantial body of state law if the enactments were shown to have been enacted in a
nonrepublican mariner. See Bonfield, supra note 682, at 555.
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stem from the general language of the clause and its failure to define a republican
form of government.690 Recent scholarship expressing the need to give judicial
content and meaning to the clause appears to have been heard.691 In the 1990s,
the Court opened a crack in the door of its nonjusticiable rulings under the
Guarantee Clause when it entertained the notion that the doctrine does not bar the
Court from reviewing congressional actions alleged to undermine a state's
republican form of government For example, in Gregory v. Ashcroft, Justice
O'Connor opined that the ability of a state to determine the qualifications of its
officers constituted a core feature of representative government guaranteed by the
Guarantee Clause.692 One year later, in New York v. United States, the Court with
Justice O'Connor again writing the opinion, held that the Guarantee Clause was
not violated by amendments to the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy
Amendments Act that encouraged the states to develop nuclear waste disposal
sites by providing monetary incentives and denying site access for failure to meet
the Act's deadlines.693
690 See Weinberg, supra note 685, at 945. The Court in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186
(1962), concluded that the lack of criteria by which to judge Guarantee Clause issues was one
factor in the Court's decision in Luther v. Borden to make the clause nonjusticiable. See id. at
222. The Court in Baker opined that Luther held that the Guarantee Clause lacks judicially
manageable standards. See id. at 223. For a discussion of Luther v. Borden, see Bonfield, supra
note 682, at 533-36.
691 See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Central Meaning of Republican Government:
Popular Sovereignty, Majority Rule, and the Denominator Problem, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 749,
749-54 (1994) (arguing that the central meaning of republican government is popular
sovereignty and that the Guarantee Clause should be justiciable); Erwin Chemerinsky, Cases
Under the Guarantee Clause Should Be Justiciable, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 849, 850, 871, 878
(1994) (arguing that the judiciary has a role in enforcing the Guarantee Clause); Merritt, The
Guarantee Clause, supra note 522, at 70-78 (supporting the justiciability of the Guarantee
Clause). But see Kathryn Abrams, No "There" There: State Autonomy and Voting Rights
Regulation, 65 U. CoLO. L. REv. 835, 836-42 (1994) (arguing that the Guarantee Clause does
not preserve states' autonomy over voting rights regulation); Robert F. Nagel, Terminator 2, 65
U. COLO. L. REv. 843, 846-47 (1994) (arguing that a single law will not cause a state to lose its
republican character and that the clause has a narrow focus, being included in the Constitution
to prevent monarchial governments and to protect the states from unlawful insurrections).692 See 501 U.S. 452, 463 (1991). The Court's opinion additionally noted, however, that a
state's authority to determine qualifications for its governmental officials was constrained by
"[o]ther constitutional provisions, most notably the Fourteenth Amendment." Id.693 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 185-86 (1992). The Court reasoned that
because the states were free to choose, rather than commanded to comply with these incentives
provisions, the states remained accountable to their electorates and "retain[ed] the ability to set
their legislative agendas." Id.
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2. Recent Scholarship in Support ofMaking the Guarantee Clause
Justiciable
Scholars have offered a number of arguments as to why the Guarantee Clause
should bejusticiable. These views are presented below.
a. Textual Supportfor Justiciability
The text of the Guarantee Clause states that the '"United States" shall
guarantee to the states a republican form of government.694 This generic term
would seem to include the Court as well as Congress and the President.695 If the
clause is nonjusticiable, however, only the Congress and the President would
possess power to enforce it. Scholars argue that the location of the clause in
Article IV of the Constitution supports the notion that the clause is applicable to
all three branches; otherwise, it would have been placed in the specific article
empowering each branch.696 Because Article IV contains provisions relating to
the states, the placement of the Guarantee Clause in it may reflect, however, only
a judgment by the Framers that the clause naturally belongs there.
b. Judiciary's Role as Protectorate of the Constitution
Commentators argue that among the three branches the judiciary possesses
the best capability for enforcing the Guarantee Clause's dictates.697 Because the
judiciary interprets the Constitution, it should not abdicate all responsibility for
enforcement of the clause, but should forego judicial review only in those
instances where the other branches serve as better enforcement agencies. 698
Should the clause remain largely nonjusticiable, its relevancy will remain
uncertain because the executive and legislative branches, while generally
responsive to political pressures, may decline to enforce it; in contrast, the
6 94 See U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 4.
695 Justices Black and Harlan have considered the clause to be applicable to a federal
district court judge. See, e.g., Lance v. Plummer, 384 U.S. 929, 931-32 (1966) (Black, J.,
dissenting). It has been argued that the use of "United States" in the Guarantee Clause intimates
that the clause's duty rests upon all three branches of the federal government in their
appropriate spheres. See Bonfield, supra note 682, at 523; Chemerinsky, supra note 691, at 871.
696 See Bonfield, supra note 682, at 523 (arguing that the judiciary is as fully empowered
to enforce the clause as Congress because the clause was placed in a separate article, rather than
in articles I, II, or m1 relating to the duties of a specific branch of government); Merritt, supra
note 522, at 75 (arguing that the location of the Guarantee Clause in Article IV, rather than in
the articles covering a specific branch of the federal government, indicates the clause applies to
all three branches).
697 See Chemerinsky, supra note 691, at 852, 875-78.
698 See id at 851-53; see also Weinberg, supra note 685, at 889, 913.
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judiciary must decide justiciable claims.6 99
c. Anomaly of Only Two Branch Enforcement of the Guarantee Clause
It would be anomalous for the judiciary to escape a duty to uphold the
principle that the United States shall guarantee a republican form of government
to each state.7OO All three branches must effectuate the policy expressed in the
clause to make its provisions effective. Exempting the judiciary from enforcement
of the Guarantee Clause makes the clause unduly weak and may diminish the
willingness of the executive and legislative branches to enforce it
d. Indeterminacy Argument Lacks Merit
The Guarantee Clause's general wording and its failure to define what
constitutes a republican form of government should not foreclose the judiciary
from reviewing alleged breaches of the clause. The definitive features of a
republican government remain ascertainable. Such a form of government has
been defined as one that derives its powers from the people701 who are
empowered to alter their government to choose their own form of government,
and to elect officers as well as determine qualifications to hold office 702
Representation, in which a small group of citizens elected by the rest govern,
constitutes the defining feature of American republican government 703 Scholars
describe the essence of the clause to be the ability of the people to exercise
sovereignty and to change their form of government 7°4
699 Historically, it is clear that Congress will rarely exercise its Guarantee Clause powers.
See ELAzAR, supra note 513, at 191.
7 00 See Chemerinsky, supra note 691, at 870-71; Merritt, supra note 522, at 75; Martin H.
Redish, Judicial Review and the "Political Question," 79 NW. U. L. REV. 1031, 1040, 1042-
43, 1060 (1985). The Guarantee Clause "provides the only instance where the government by
its corporate name is given a duty." Bonfield, supra note 682, at 523. This terminology
"intimate[s] that the obligation rests on all the departments of the government, in their
appropriate spheres." Id.
701 See THE FEDERALISt No. 39, at 251 (James Madison) (J. Cooke ed., 1961); Amar,
supra note 691, at 764 (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 240-41 (James Madison) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961); Merritt, supra note 683, at 816. For a discussion of what republicanism
meant to Americans at the time the republic was created, see WOOD, supra note 7, at 47-75.
Early Americans believed that devotion to the public good constituted the essence of a
republican government and that vesting power in the people rather than the Crown achieved it
See id. at 55-56.
7 02 See In re Duncan, 139 U.S. 449,461 (1891) (stating that the distinguishing feature of a
republican form of government is the right of the people to choose officers and pass laws);
Amar, supra note 691, at 749-51,762.
703 See WOOD, supra note 7, at 595-97.
704 See Amar, supra note 691, at 762-766; Gwyn, supra note 614, at 71; Merritt, supra
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The clause already has been given some content Agreement exists that the
Framers of the clause sought to ensure citizen participation at the state level of
government, giving the federal government the right and duty to prevent the
formation of state monarchies or autocracies and to quell rebellions against
established state governments.705 Although some view a representative form of
government as one in which the representatives' decision making cannot be
supplanted by the voters' exercise of power through initiatives or referenda, the
Supreme Court has shielded their use, treating the legitimacy of these direct
democracy devises as political questions best left for legislative determination. 70 6
Another factor undermining the indeterminacy argument lies in the Court's
willingness to give content to the equally, if not more so, vague Equal Protection
and Due Process Clauses. Further, the Court has not labeled the even more
indeterminate Tenth Amendment nonjusticiable. 7°7
3. The Guarantee Clause Should Restrain the Judiciary as well as the
Legislative and Executive Branches
Would it be incongruous for the Court to make the Guarantee Clause
justiciable as a restraint upon the federal branches of government but
nonjusticiable as to state actions that may be questioned as antirepublican? The
answer is no because both positions uphold federalist principles.70 8 Judicial
willingness to adjudicate federal actions that raise the specter of interference with
a state's republican character both uphold the enforceability of the clause and
shield a state's republican government from federal encroachment that would
note 522, at 23.
705 See Amar, supra note 691, at 763--64 (citing THm FEDERAmST No. 39, at 243, 246
(James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)); Bonfield, supra note 682, at 517-22;
Chemerinsky, supra note 691, at 867; Nagel, supra note 691, at 844.
706See Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, 149-51 (1912);
Washington v. Manussier, 921 P.2d 473, 481-82 (Wash. 1996); Jeffrey T. Even, Direct
Democracy in Washington: A Discourse on the Peoples' Powers of Initiative and Referendum,
32 GONZ. L. REV. 247, 253-56 (1997); Hans A. Linde, Who Is Responsible for Republican
Government?, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 709,714-16 (1994).
707 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 923, 923 n.13 (1997) (stating that the Tenth
Amendment explicitly endorses a federal system of dual sovereignty); United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549, 583 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concuring) (finding Gun-Free School Zones Act
interferes with state sovereignty essential to the federal balance designed by the Constitution);
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 155-60, 177, 183-84 (1992) (finding that attributes
of state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment limit Congress's Article I powers);
Janice C. Griffith, New York v. United States: Has the Tenth Amendment Been Resuscitated?,
16 URB. ST. Loc. L. NEmSL, Summer 1993, at 1, 11-12.
7 08 But see Bonfield, supra note 682, at 559 (arguing that protection of the people from
abusive state governments is foremost among the Guarantee Clause's objects).
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eviscerate it.709 When the Court, under the political question doctrine, forces state
and local dissidents to resolve their grievances against the exercise of state power
in the capitol rather than the court house, it prevents persistent and lengthy
challenges to state power that weaken a state's effectiveness.710 The Guarantee
Clause should be justiciable where, in areas outside of the political question
doctrine, it can be administered to protect state autonomy from overly intrusive
federal intervention.7 11 The duty placed upon the federal government to protect
republican government at the state level clearly requires federal restraint from
deep intrusions into a state's separate autonomy that imperil its republican
government.712 It is far more conceivable at the beginning of the second
millennium that a state would lose its republican form at the hands of the federal
government than by actors at the state level of government.7 13
In this era of widespread judicial review, the Guarantee Clause's
effectiveness depends upon its applicability to the federal judiciary as well as to
Congress.7 14 Certainly, the nonjusticiability doctrine, which has checked appeals
to examine the states' form of republican government, should not bar the
judiciary from making inquiry into its own remedial practices that undercut
representative democracy.7 15 The judiciary has an obligation to follow the
Constitution, even if it foregoes ruling on it. The political question doctrine serves
to restrain the Court from ruling on issues that clearly fall within the
responsibilities assigned to the Congress or the President, the political branches of
709 Without specifically mentioning the Guarantee Clause, the Court in Alden v. Maine
invalidated Congress's authorization of private suits in state courts to enforce federal statutes
without the consent of the states as an unwarranted intervention in state representative
government. The Court stated that federal "authority over a State's most fundamental political
processes ... strikes at the heart of the political accountability so essential to our liberty and
republican form of govemment." See 119 S. Ct. 2240,2265 (1999).
710 For a list of cases in which the Supreme Court refused to adjudicate the merits of state
actions alleged to violate the Guarantee Clause, see Bonfield, supra note 682, at 556-57.
711 See Merritt, supra note 522, at 75-77.
712 See id. at 25.
713 In the 1990s, for example, Congress enacted many criminal laws, an area traditionally
reserved to the states and their localities. See, e.g., Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement
Act of 1994 ("Three Strikes law"), § 70001 (2), 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c)(1) (1994); The Anti-Car
Theft Act of 1992, Title I, § 101, 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1994); Gun-Free School Zones Act of
1990, Title XVII, § 1702, 18 U.S.C. § 922 (q)(1)(A) (1994). Contemporary values should
dictate the specific substance of a republican government within the limits imposed by the
historical understanding of the clause. See Bonfield, supra note 682, at 560.
714 See Anderson, supra note 518, at 138, 149 (viewing the failure of the Constitutional
Convention to adopt a Council of Revision, proposed in the Virginia Plan, as instrumental in
"the development of a kind ofjudiciary that is problematic in a representative democracy").
715 The Guarantee Clause's guarantee to the states of republican government was intended
to encompass the people or community as distinguished from a govemment See Bonfield,
supra note 682, at 545.
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the United States. The nonjusticiability doctrine should not bar the judiciary from
applying the Guarantee Clause to itself.
Because the Court has shown itself ready to rely upon the Guarantee Clause
to restrain Congress from interfering with state autonomy,716 it should make the
Clause applicable to the federal judiciary as well by placing limits upon remedial
actions that are so antimajoritarian in character as to severely curtail republican
rule. 17 The unelected members of the federal judiciary should not assume
executive and legislative roles through the imposition of equitable remedies in
structural reform litigation. A state's republican form of government, guaranteed
by the Constitution, vests the latter responsibility in elected officials who serve as
representatives of the people. The Clause's guarantee of representative democracy
surely forecloses judicial assumption of the state's most central and democratic
decision making--taxation and the allocation of scarce resources.
Benefits accrue from the activation of the Guarantee Clause. In interpreting
the Clause, the Court would need to more fully isolate the structural elements that
make the states viable partners in the Constitution's federal framework.7 18
Revitalizing the Guarantee Clause would further serve the goal of making the
federal judiciary more conscious of the impact that its decreed remedial processes
have upon republican government at the state level.7 1 9 The Court should monitor
7 16 See Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559, 567-68 (1911) (invalidating federal enabling
act for admission of Oklahoma to the union insofar as it dictated the location of the state
capital).
7 17 The words "The United States shall" in the Guarantee Clause indicate that the
judiciary and the other federal branches are mandated to enforce the Clause. See Bonfield,
supra note 682, at 523. Should the Court interpret the Clause to be fullyjusticiable, the Court as
well as the Congress would enforce the Clause to ensure the maintenance by thi states of
republican governments. See id. at 564. Even if the Court continues to make the Clause
nonjusticiable against state actors, it should review congressional action that eviscerates the
Clause's guarantee. See id. at 564. Arthur E. Bonfield argues: "For judicial abstinence would
give Congress unlimited power to impose on the states whatever government it deemed
republican. Not only would such authority spell the complete end of our federal system, but it
would also create an unchecked power capable of destroying rather than guaranteeing
republican government" Id. at 564-65.
7 18 See Bonfield, supra note 682, at 559-60 (arguing that the scope of the obligation
imposed by the Guarantee Clause must reflect both historical understanding and contemporary
values and expectations); Briffault, supra note 522, at 1336 (stating that "[t]he assurance of the
continued independent existence of the states grows out of the guarantees of a republican form
of govemmenf).
7 19 In Alden v. Maine, the Court acknowledged that Congress's abrogation of the states'
sovereign immunity from private suits to enforce federal laws blurred the "separate duties of the
judicial and political branches of the state governments... ." 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2265 (1999). The
Court opined that the displacement by the judiciary of "a State's allocation of governmental
power and responsibility" caused it "to assume a role not only foreign to its experience but
beyond its competence as defined by the very constitution from which its existence derives" Id.
The Court stated that the preservation of representative government depended upon deliberation
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the exercise of its own antimajoritarian remedial processes to ensure that their
scope does not abridge republican government 720 The Court enjoys a discretion
in its choice of measures to enforce both the Fourteenth Amendment and the
Guarantee Clause; the selected means should be necessary and proper.721
Present jurisprudence, with its focus on the protection of civil rights and
individual liberties, should be developed to include the Guarantee Clause's
assurance that states shall be governed by representative processes. A balance
between representative governmental rule and the need to protect individual
liberties must be maintained.722 This balance can best be achieved by highlighting
the protections the populace receives from the Constitution's vertical as well as its
horizontal checks and balances. The Court should place greater emphasis upon
the Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken 1l) equitable principle that calls for the collective
interests of a state and its local authorities to be considered in the design of
equitable remedial decrees.7 23 This acknowledgment of majoritarian interests,
recognized in the language and policies underlying the Guarantee Clause, should
cast in doubt the Court's sanction in Jenkins of district court-ordered taxation that
bypassed majoritarian political controls.724
Other rulings also show that the Court respects a republican government at
by the political processes to allocate scarce resources among competing interests and rejected
decision making by 'Judicial decree mandated by the Federal Government and invoked by the
private citizen." Id.
720 The Clause can serve as a positive reminder to thejudiciary that majoritarian processes
curb its powers in pursuing institutional litigation to some extent, thereby requiring it to tailor
remedies narrowly, as Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976), dictates. The Hills Court stated:
"Once a constitutional violation is found, a federal court is required to tailor 'the scope of the
remedy' to fit 'the nature and extent of the constitutional violation."' Id. at 293-94 (quoting
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971)).
721 See Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700,729 (1868).
722 See ELY, supra note 14, at 7 (arguing that majoritarian democracy constitutes the core
of the American governmental system); Bonfield, supra note 682, at 557-58 (explaining that as
the Court expanded its interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment to protect the people
against abusive and antirepublican state actions, it relinquished the exercise of power under the
Guarantee Clause).
72 3 In Milliken II, the Court stated that the "interests of state and local authorities in
managing their own affairs, consistent with the Constitution," should be taken into account in
devising equitable remedies to corect constitutional violations. 433 U.S. 267, 281 (1977).
724 Professor Paul J. Mishkin describes the tendency of institutional remedial decrees to
do the following: (1) expand the definition of constitutional rights, (2) address more issues than
the constitutional violation that justified judicial intervention, (3) bypass majoritarian political
controls, (4) allocate or reallocate state resources, and (5) involve continuing oversight of
governmental institutions for protracted periods of time. See Mishkin, supra note 4, at 955-59.
These decrees involve the take over of state or local governmental institutions without provision
for representation of all affected interests. See id. at 970-71. Congress's structural controls over
the federal judiciary, which are derived from the Constitution, shield it from the antirepublican
measures the federal judiciary has taken to reform state institutions. See id. at 969-70.
[V:ol. 61:483
JUDICIAL FUNDING AND TAXMANDA TES
the local and state level.725 The Court, when engaged in remedial action, has
stopped short of restructuring a state's public education laws and school district
organization in order to preserve local representative government726 Although
the Court must never lose sight of its duty to protect individual liberties from
majoritarian impulses, the legislative branches better achieve effective, wholesale
political reforms.7 2
7
4. Obstacles to Making Federal Action Justiciable Under the Guarantee
Clause
a. The Guarantee Clause Must Be More Firmly Declared Justiciable
At present, the application of the Guarantee Clause to the federal judiciary's
remedial powers must clear a number of hurdles that jurisprudence surrounding
the Clause has left unresolved. First, the Court must express more forcefully that
the Clause is indeed justiciable. How many members of the Court share Justice
O'Connor's willingness to view the Clause as a constitutional restraint upon
Congress and one not entirely foreclosed by the political question doctrine
remains unclear.
Further, the Court would have to embrace more strongly the notion that the
Guarantee Clause restrains the branches of the federal government, as well as the
states, from actions that restrict the exercise of republican government at the state
level. In Coyle v. Oklahoma,'728 the Court held that Congress could not dictate the
location of the Oklahoma state capital,729 finding that the Guarantee Clause did
not bestow upon Congress the power to admit a new state with qualifications that
725 See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999) (invalidating congressional
authorization of private party lawsuits to enforce federal statutory law as violating the states'
constitutional sovereign immunity and impinging upon representative government); Gregory v.
Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991) (finding that the mandatory retirement provisions of the
Missouri Constitution did not violate the Equal Protection Clause); San Antonio Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (finding Texas school financing system based on local
real property taxation did not violate the Equal Protection Clause).
726 See Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken 1), 418 U.S. 717,741-44 (1974) (declining to affirm
a district court's interdistrict, metropolitan remedy, in the absence of interdistrict constitutional
violations, to desegregate Detroit's public school system by expanding its boundaries to include
54 independent school districts for the achievement of greater racial integration).
727 See COX, supra note 511, at 88 (pointing out the legislative nature of school
desegregation decrees and arguing that the courts need the cooperation of the political branches
to further integration because "legitimacy... flows from the processes of democratic self-
government").
728 221 U.S. 559 (1911).
729 See idt at 564-65. The 1906 federal enabling act for Oklahoma's statehood admission
provided that Guthrie should be the capital of the state until 1913. See Oklahoma Enabling Act,
ch. 3335, 34 Stat. 267 (1906).
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denied it the equality enjoyed by states already admitted to the Union.730 The
Court thus found that the Clause should apply to federal acts that intrude deeply
into the sphere of state sovereignty.73 1 This ruling reinforces the view that the
Clause, designed to protect republican rule, acts as a restraint upon both the states
and the federal government, from taking measures that compromise a republican
government at the state and local level.
b. Manageable Standard to Guide the Application of the Guarantee
Clause Must Evolve
Workable standards for the Guarantee Clause can evolve by ascertaining core
state functions deemed essential to a state's republican government732 and
prohibiting all three federal branches from assuming them. For example, the
Court in Gregory v. Ashcroft found that a state's authority to determine the age
qualifications of its judges to be one that went to the 'heart of representative
government."17 33 The standards would be similar to those established under a
730 See Coyle, 221 U.S. at 567-68.
731 The Court, in Coyle, stated:
The argument that Congress derives from the duty of "guaranteeing to each state in this
Union a republican form of government" power to impose restrictions upon a new state
which deprive it of equality with other members of the Union, has no merit. It may imply
the duty of such new state to provide itself with such state government, and impose upon
Congress the duty of seeing that such form is not changed to one anti-republican-but it
obviously does not confer power to admit a new state which shall be any less a state than
those which compose the Union.
Id. at 567-68 (citation omitted). The Court's more recent decisions in Alden v. Maine and New
York v. United States suggest that a majority of the Court believes that the Guarantee Clause
applies to federal acts that intrude too deeply upon the states' residuary sovereignty. In Alden,
the Court invalidated a congressional abrogation of state sovereign immunity that facilitated
private party lawsuits to enforce federal statutory law. See Alden v. Maine, 119 S. CL 2240,
2266 (1999). Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, opined that compensatory damages
awarded to the litigants in state courts could cripple representative government by reallocating
scarce resources. See id. at 2264-65. In New York, the Court found that provisions of a federal
statute regulating nuclear waste did not violate the Guarantee Clause. See New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144, 183-86 (1992); see also Merritt, supra note 683, at 819-22 (arguing that
the Guarantee Clause restrains Congress from actions that would destroy state republican
government as well as empowers Congress to intervene to restore republican government).
732 See Bonfield, supra note 682, at 570 ("[The Guarantee Clause] can only be used to
safeguard those fundamental values that we deem too important to be left to the whim of the
various states."); THOMAS H. ODOM, INTERNATIONAL MuN. ATrORNEYs ASS'N, ANNUAL
SEMINAR: CHALLENGING THE VALIDrIY OF DOL's PART 541 REGULATIONS AS APPLIED TO
PUBLIC-SECrOR EMPLOYERS AFTER AUER v ROBBINS OR, WHAT'S AUER NEXr MOvE ON
A UERLY OVERTME PAY?," 25 (1997).
733 501 U.S. 452,461 (1991) (quoting Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634,647 (1973)).
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federal structural test except that they would focus singularly on whether the
imperiled state function constituted a core function lodged in the state's elected
representatives by the Constitution. In Alden, the Court focused on this very issue.
It pinpointed the role played by the imperiled state function in the Constitution's
federal design. 34 The Court held that congressional authorization of private
lawsuits for compensatory damages in state courts to enforce federal statutes
displaced the states' most fundamental political processes-its resource allocation
decision-making processes.7 35 The Court viewed this action as "[striking] at the
heart of the political accountability so essential to our... republican form of
government.' 736
Court-ordered remedial action to correct constitutional violations at the state
and local levels entails the loss of some representative government The question
becomes one of degree-at what point does a court's remedial dictates result in
such a loss of republican government that the federal judiciary can be charged
with violating the Guarantee Clause regardless of Supremacy Clause
implications. This Article advocates the adoption of a balancing test to guide the
prescription of court-ordered fiscal measures. The loss of representative
government entailed by judicial remedial orders constitutes one important factor
to be considered. A much narrower scope of judicial power has been counseled
should remedial taxation be under consideration because intervention in a state's
taxation system impairs the state's independent ability to perform its vital
functions.737 The option to impose remedial taxation should be exercised only
when (1) a valid state law authorizes such taxation; and (2) all other remedial
steps prove unavailable, thus forcing the judiciary to turn to taxation as a last
resort remedial action to correct an egregious constitutional violation that
otherwise would be plainly remediless.738 These standards, while difficult to
apply, provide a manageable standard of review.
c. The Guarantee Clause Must Be Applicable to a Partial as well as a
TotalLoss ofRepublican Government
In the 1912 decision, Pacific States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Oregon,
the Court's language suggests that the Guarantee Clause is triggered only when
the state's government can no longer be classified as republican in form. The
Court stated: "Congress must necessarily decide what government is established
7 34 See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2263.
73 5 See id. at 2264--65.
7 36 Id. at 2265.
737 See Printz v. United States, 521 US. 898, 932 (1997) (invalidating provisions of Brady
Handgun Violence Prevention Act that required local law enforcement officers to conduct
background checks and opining that "balancing" analysis is inappropriate when federal
directives "compromise the structural framework of dual sovereignty').
738 See infra notes 859-905 and accompanying text.
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in the State before it can determine whether it is republican or not"7 39
Antirepublican measures that fall short of destroying a state's republican form of
government seem to be foreclosed from judicial review by this language.
In recent rulings, the Court has not seemed bound, however, by the logic of
Pacific States. In New York v. United States, for example, the Court ruled upon
distinct provisions of a statute relating to nuclear waste and found them not to
violate the Clause.740 There, the Court entertained the issue of whether a federal
statute providing penalties and incentives to encourage the regional development
of nuclear waste disposal sites violated the Guarantee Clause.741 Yet, these
provisions failed to reach the magnitude necessary to cause the demise of
republican government. Thus, it appears that the earlier Pacific States language
does not obviate judicial review of legislation that encompasses antirepublican
features, but fails to totally eclipse it. Likewise, the Court should be able to review
whether a district court's remedial decree violates the Clause notwithstanding the
unlikelihood that the order would extinguish the state's republican form of
government
The Pacific States approach should be regarded as one that favored
nonjusticiability. Making the Clause applicable only when a state government can
no longer be characterized as republican in form or substance advances that
position. Unless the Court agrees to examine the antirepublican features of
specific legislation or court decrees, activation of the Guarantee Clause will not
occur because rarely, if ever, would the activity cause the state to lose its
republican form of government completely.
E. Application of Constitutional Limitations to Court-Ordered Remedial
Funding
The judiciary's funding orders, collectively, and perhaps even singly, have
the potential to cripple the effective functioning of states and local governments,
thereby eviscerating the power these entities possess to check excess federal
governmental encroachment 742 Although institutional-reform judicial orders may
correct egregious constitutional violations, they also allocate scarce state and local
739 223 U.S. 118,147 (1912).
740 See 505 U.S. 144,183-86 (1992).
741 See id. at 183-84.
742 See Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2264-65 (1999) (finding that congressional
removal of state sovereign immunity in state courts from private lawsuits to enforce federal law
would result in judicial mandates for compensatory damages that would displace the states'
allocation of resources through political processes); Arthur v. Nyquist, 712 F.2d 809, 812 (2d
Cir. 1983) (referring to burdens created by cuts in federal funding and federal court decrees
imposing costly obligations upon the Buffalo, New York school system, at the same time, to
remedy school desegregation and to achieve compliance with federal and state laws concerning
the education of handicapped children).
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public resources, traditionally considered the prerogative of only elected
officials. 43 As the exercise of the courts' remedial decree powers become even
more intrusive and expansive, the legislative, as well as the judicial nature, of
these decrees must be recognized.
The Framers of the Constitution believed that a republican government could
survive only if governmental authority was accountable to the popular will and
power was checked and balanced.744 They viewed the states' power under a
structure of dual sovereignty as a vertical check upon national power. 45 The
Court cannot ignore the Guarantee Clause's protection of republican government
and the Constitution's federal structure that envisions governmental authority
vested in the states as well as in the federal government The judiciary must begin
to develop a jurisprudence that acknowledges these factors as restraints upon its
remedial decrees. The application of a structural test would restrain the Court
from making such orders if the intrusion caused by them so deeply affected state
743 In the Jend'ns remedial process, the judiciary removed power from state and local
entities to allocate scarce resources. In Alden, the Court invalidated congressional authorization
of private lawsuits in state courts for federal law enforcement purposes, reasoning that judicially
mandated compensatory damages caused an unanticipated intervention in the states' allocation
of scarce resources through their political processes. See Alden, 119 S. CL at 2264. The Court
stated that such court-mandated damages "could create staggering burdens, giving Congress a
power and a leverage over the States that is not contemplated by our constitutional design." Id.
at 2264. See Robinson, supra note 518, at 46-47 (arguing that the role of modem governments
is to allocate resources among competing goals and to make wise balancing choices among the
inevitable goal conflicts). A 1995 report prepared by New York State's Temporary State
Commission on Constitutional Revision stated that in its conversations and public hearings
around the state people made clear to them their concern with the following: "central, practical
issues with which governments are supposed to deal: the quality and cost of education...;
safety from violence...; a method for keeping the burden of taxation within reason; and the
assurance of fiscal integrity in government at both the state and local levels...." Alan Finder,
Gridlocked Government Must Be Overhauled, Panel Says, N.Y. TuMEs, Feb. 25, 1995, at 28
(emphasis added).
The bipartisan Commission on Constitutional Revision, which was appointed by former
New York Governor Mario M. Cuomo to prepare for a possible state constitutional convention,
proposed that advisory panels be created to recommend governmental restructuring in the
following four areas: elementary and secondary education, the criminal justice system, state
fiscal practices, and the relations between the state and local communities. See id. The
Commission's 1995 report thus documents expectations that state and local government, not the
federal judiciary, should set policy in the areas of educational quality and cost. It also notes
peoples' fears that governments frequently fail to address taxation burdens and the need for
fiscal integrity.
744 See Robinson, supra note 518, at 48-49.
74 5 See THE FEDERALLST No. 46, at 297-300 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) (expressing optimism that the states possess the ability to thwart federal encroachments
upon their powers); THE FEDERALS No. 51, at 323 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) (finding security against tyranny in the federal separation of powers between "two
distinct govemrnments").
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and local governmental processes as to change the constitutional design of the
federal structure.746 Likewise, the Guarantee Clause restrains orders that diminish
the ability of state or local elected officials from making policy with respect to a
state's core functions.747
The judiciary's exercise of local legislative and executive power also violates
the Constitution's separation of powers into three distinct branches. Federal courts
should focus on proper governmental functioning rather than the application of
the same rule to every case involving remedial action.748 The Court should use a
balancing test and weigh the goal of obtaining maximum fiscal resources to
correct constitutional violations against the ability of the locality to support such a
remedial course of action. This approach would eliminate maxims now espoused
by the federal judiciary to the effect that cost considerations have no bearing upon
the remedial measures ordered.749 Further, the extent to which the judicial
remedial process intrudes upon or replaces state and local functions should be
considered. The notions of comity dictate this consideration.7 50 Any judicial
action that displaces or destroys the integrity of local and state governmental
processes or their core functions should be unacceptable.
F. Application of Constitutional Limitations to Court-Ordered Taxation
When the district court orders a school district to tax without state
authorization, as sanctioned in Jenkins, it performs a legislative function that
supersedes the legislative processes of a state's republican government By such
action, the federal judiciary deprives the citizenry of the effects of legislation, not
found to be constitutionally infirm, that its duly elected representatives have
enacted. Certainly, such orders abridge the state's republican form of government
guaranteed by the Constitution because the authority of the people to determine
the means of support for their government lies at the heart of representative
government.751
Judicial taxation orders clearly infringe upon the constitutional federal
746 The Court clearly approached this state of affairs in Jenkins.
747 See supra notes 732-36 and accompanying text.
74 8 See Lessig, supra note 368, at 161 (defining formalism as a type of legal reasoning that
seeks categorical resolutions where possible in contrast to a balancing approach).
749 See supra notes 364-80 and accompanying text.
750 See supra notes 655-73 and accompanying text.
751 See Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2264-65 (1999) (opining that representative
government cannot be preserved ifjudicial awards for compensatory damages create staggering
burdens, thereby displacing the role the states' political processes play in the allocation of
scarce resources). In Gregory v. Ashcroft, Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, opined
that a state's authority to establish the qualifications for its governmental officials lies at the
heart of representative government. See 501 U.S. 452, 463 (1991). The exercise of taxation
powers parallels, ifnot exceeds, the importance of determining officers' qualifications.
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structure because a state's taxation powers constitute one of its most fundamental
sovereign powers.752 Removed of its jurisdiction over taxation, a state lacks
sovereignty.753 The elimination of even a portion of the states' taxing powers by
either Congress or the judiciary clearly forecloses the ability of states to function
as contemplated by the Constitution's federal structure. 54 Judicial taxation orders
that undermine the role states play in a federal system eviscerate the states' ability
to further liberty by acting as a separate check against federal dominance,
corruption, or incompetence.
Court-ordered remedial taxation deviates from the Constitution's structure of
separated powers. The federal judiciary lacks the power to tax because its Article
III powers do not encompass taxation, a power explicitly given to the legislative
branch.7 55 Indeed, it has been argued that the judiciary's Article Ill powers do not
encompass structural reform injunctions that strip states of basic
responsibilities.7 56 These injunctions usually involve the type of remedial funding
discussed in this Article.
Applying formalist principles, the Court would conclude that the judiciary's
exercise of a power granted to the legislative branch violates the system of
separated powers established in the Constitution. Should the Court resort to a
functionalist mode of analysis, it would conclude likewise that taxation orders
violate separation of powers values. The power of taxation is a critical, essential
power for a legislative body to possess.757 Displacement of this power, even in a
relatively small sphere of operation, deeply intrudes into state and local decision
making by eviscerating governmental power to raise revenues and make resource
allocation decisions. Further, the exercise of judicial taxation power is neither
expressly nor implicitly granted to the federal judiciary.7 58 The Framers viewed
752 See Meriwether v. Garre 102 U.S. 472, 515 (1880) (stating that taxation constitutes
"a high act of sovereignty, to be performed only by the legislature upon considerations of
policy, necessity, and the public welfare"); Rees v. City of Watertown, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 107,
116 (1873) (stating that the power to 'aise money is the highest attribute of sovereignty" and
may be exercised "by the power of legislative authority only'); Klemm v. Davenport, 129 So.
904, 907 (Fla. 1930) (stating that "[a] 'tax' is an enforced burden of contribution imposed by
sovereign right for the support of the government, the administration of the law, and to execute
the various functions the sovereign is called on to perform").
753 Without the power of taxation, a state could not raise sufficient revenues to function as
a state in our federal system of government. See Meriwether, 102 U.S. at 513-14 (pointing out
that taxes are "imposts levied for the support of the government, or for some special purpose
authorized by if).
754 See, e.g., Rees, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) at 116-17 (stating that it is "beyond the power of the
Federal judiciary to assume the place of a State in the exercise of this authority (taxation) at
once so delicate and so important").
755 See Nagel, supra note 602, at 667; Yoo, supra note 4, at 1147-51.
756 See Yoo, supra note 4, at 1149-50.
757 See supra notes 752-54 and accomnying text
758 See Yoo, supra note 4, at 1149 (concluding that the Constitution's text and framework
2000]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
the judiciary as the least dangerous branch precisely because it possessed limited
powers.7 59 Taxation has never been viewed as a limited power, in fact, early in its
history, the Court stated that the power to tax was tantamount to a power to
destroy.760 The judicial assumption in Jenkins of state legislative powers violates
the spirit, if not any express text, of the Constitution.7 61
The Court has ruled that comity and federalism principles guide its equitable
powers by prohibiting use of remedies so intrusive as to affect the independence
and functionality of state and local authorities.762 As demonstrated in McNary,
the Court honors the principles of federalism and comity to curb the use of
equitable powers that would inhibit the collection of state taxes.7 63 Jenkins held,
however, that such principles do not prohibit the federal judiciary from ordering
local governmental entities to levy additional taxation to correct constitutional
violations.
The difference between invalidating existing taxation and ordering additional
taxation seems slight. Reallocating the tax burden in the wake of an invalid tax
can strain a state's ability to finance its programs just as ordering additional taxes
does. Both forms of judicial power upset the existing tax system and entangle the
federal judiciary in state law issues with which it lacks familiarity. Excessive
do not compel "the conclusion that the federal courts possess the inherent authority to impose
equitable remedies upon the states"). But see La Pierre, supra note 1, at 370-79 (finding an
implied judicial power to order taxation unauthorized by state law from the Eighth Circuit
Liddell and Jenkins rulings and state court decisions holding state law restrictions upon tax rates
and indebtedness inapplicable to taxes levied to satisfy tort judgments).
7 59 See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
7 60 See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316,431 (1819) (invalidating a state's
improper taxation of federal banks and stating "[t]hat the power to tax involves the power to
destroy").
761 In Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 413 (1989), Justice Scalia dissented from
the Court's holding that the Congress permissibly delegated its legislative power to a
Sentencing Commission, comprised in part of at least three federal judges, to establish
sentencing guidelines. Justice Scalia opined that Congress's delegation of broad policy
responsiibility to another branch constituted an unconstitutional delegation of its legislative
power. See id. at 415. He stated that "the basic policy decisions governing society are to be
made by the Legislature." Id.
762 See Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 108-09 (1981)
(explaining that principles of comity bar federal courts from granting relief to state taxpayers
challenging allegedly unconstitutional administration of state tax systems because state
collection of revenues is deemed essential for states to maintain their independence); see also
Hogan v. Musolf, 471 N.W.2d 216, 220-22 (Wis. 1991) (affirming the independence of the
states as the policy recognized in McNary for federal judicial restraint from interference with
state administrative procedures to address state tax claims); Tatten Partners, L.P. v. New Castle
County Bd. of Assessment Review, 642 A.2d 1251, 1264 n.9 (Del. Super. Ct. 1993) (citing
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971)).
763 See McNary, 454 U.S. at 108-09.
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judicial intrusion into complex state tax matters occurs in each case. The question
presents only an issue of the degree of intrusiveness. At most an argument can be
made that ordering additional taxation, as in Jenkins, is less intrusive than
interfering with the administration of the state's tax system because exercise of
the former remedy allows for the continuing operation of the tax structure. 64 But
one can argue just as forcefully that the intrusiveness of an order requiring the
legislature to raise taxes far exceeds the burden of restrictions placed upon the
mode of taxation. Invalidating a tax entails significantly less impact upon
legislative and executive discretion than ajudicial requirement to increase specific
items in a state or local budget.765
The foreclosure, on the basis of comity principles, of all equitable remedies
implicating a state's taxation powers arguably would be overly broad in scope.
Yet, the assumption of judicial taxation power certainly violates the notion of
restraint that comity has come to signify. The criticism that comity principles are
indeterminate can be assuaged by judicial consideration of (1) the values of
respect and restraint that comity represents, (2) the strength of a state's interest in
the particular area subject to judicial intervention, and (3) the degree of
intrusiveness entailed by the Court's proposed remedial action.
G. Application of Constitutional Limitations Overriding State Law
Limitations
In Jenkins, the Court opined that the district court could set aside state law
limitations that impeded a local government's ability to raise funds to satisfy its
constitutional obligations.7 66 This ruling sanctioned court-ordered taxation for
which no underlying state authorization existed.7 67 The federal judiciary thus
assumed the role of the state legislature, either as the creator of the new remedial
tax authorization or as a governmental body removing state statutory fiscal
limitations.
Although the judicial power extends to all cases arising under the
764 See National Private Truck Council, Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 515 US. 582,
590 (1995). In National Private, an action challenging certain state taxes as violative of the
Dormant Commerce Clause, the Court found that Oklahoma courts were precluded from
awarding declaratory or injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when an adequate legal
remedy existed. See id. at 590. The Court said that this interpretation was supported by the
"background principle of federal noninterference" in tax cases discussed in. McNaiy. See id.
It can be argued that in Jenkins the judiciary prohibited the continuing operation of the
existing tax structure because the district court barred the operation of state law limitations. See
supra notes 298-302 and accompanying text.
765 See Frug, supra note 364, at 758-59.
766 See Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33,54,57 (1990).
767 See supra note 430 and accompanying text.
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Constitution,768 this empowerment should be tempered with respect for the
Constitution's federal structural framework.769 Overruling neutral state laws, the
provisions of which do not violate the Constitution, not only tilts the framework
toward federal interests, but it also impairs the states' ability to keep in place
legitimately enacted fiscal constraints that its citizenry believe desirable or
necessary. Displacing state law limitations not enacted to frustrate federal
constitutional requirements ignores the Constitution's guarantee to the states of a
republican government that ensures the citizenry's empowerment through elected
representatives. The federal structural framework of viable states coexisting with
a federal government would be better preserved if district courts refrain from
acting as state legislatures and simply command a state governmental entity to
remedy a constitutional violation without specifying particular tax levies. This
course of action would result in less intervention in executive and legislative
decision making.770
Adherence to horizontal separation of powers principles precludes the federal
judiciary from abrogating neutrally enacted state laws not designed to thwart
constitutional commands. When a district court strikes down a valid state law
limitation that impedes its remedial process, it performs a legislative act. Strict
application of separation of powers principles preclude the judicial assumption of
legislative powers.771 When one focuses on the ability of the states to function in
a federal system---a functionalist approach to the Constitution's separation of
powers--one concludes that any judicial action to change a state's law with
respect to its taxation functions intrudes deeply into local and state governmental
processes.772 Given the wide range of remedial options available to the federal
judiciary, setting aside a state's laws that bear no infirnity other than their
restriction upon taxation cannot be supported under the separation of powers
doctrine.
The federal judiciary ignores comity and federalism concerns when it
prevents the operation of constitutionally valid state law limitations that impede
the swift exercise of equitable remedies. Removing the effect of these legitimate
768 U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § 2.
769 The judiciary, by defining constitutional rights, commanding state and local fiscal
support of their fulfllment, and then supervising expenditures for this purpose, concentrates
power in itself to perform judicial, legislative, and executive functions. See Frug, supra note
364, at 733. The Framers of the Constitution did not contemplate this centralization of power.
See id.
770 See Fnig, supra note 364, at 758-59 (pointing out that judicial mandates to increase
government expenditures significantly impact upon executive and legislative discretion).
771 See Yoo, supra note 4, at 1123-24 (arguing that if a court cannot correct a
constitutional violation through its traditional remedial power, separation of powers principles
preclude ajudicial solution and require the answer to come from the political branches).
772 See Yoo, supra note 4, at 1135 (finding the district court's enjoinment of state law in
Jenkins to be more intrusive than the federal statute invalidated in New York v. United States);
supra notes 650-54 and accompanying text.
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laws constitutes far more than minimal intrusion-it forecloses the operation of
law created by the state's citizenry or its elected officials. Such judicial action
expresses contempt rather than respect for the integrity and functionality of state
and local governments. In North Carolina State Board ofEducation v. Swann, the
Court struck down a state law designed to prevent the implementation of a court-
ordered desegregation remedy. The law invalidated there failed to further
legitimate goals.773 In Jenkins, however, the Court expressed the view that the
district court could set aside state laws enacted for lawful purposes that impeded
the exercise of its remedial powers.7 74 The doctrine of comity should be applied
to overrule Jenkin's extension of the Swann decision. Ordering a state to ignore its
constitutionally enacted laws defies the practice of comity that calls for extending
courtesy to another jurisdiction's integrity and autonomy by treating it with
proper respect
VI. PROPOSED STANDARDS TO GuIDE THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY'S
IMPOSmON OF FISCAL REMEDmS
In fashioning state and local funding remedies to correct constitutional
violations, the United States Supreme Court relies upon different principles that
have the inherent capacity to produce conflicting results. The Court adamantly
asserts that the cost of a remedy should not bar its use and that state law
limitations upon spending do not preclude federal court-ordered fiscal
remedies. 775 The Court also continues to emphasize the applicability of the
principles of comity and federalism, which if observed, would take into
consideration the cost of the remedy and its intrusive effect upon state and local
affairs. 776
The federal judiciary should abandon its categorical rules that ignore
remedial costs and state law limitations777 and replace these rules with a
balancing test that will cause courts to evaluate the intrusiveness of the remedy
upon state and local interests as well as its effectiveness in remedying
constitutional violations.7 78 Federalism concerns, including the extent to which
773 See North Carolina State Bd. of Educ. v. Swanm, 402 U.S. 43, 45-46 (1971). The
North Carolina antibusing law prohibited pupil assignment on the basis of race, making it
impossible to eliminate dual school systems held unconstitutional in Brown v. Board of
Education (Brown 1).
774 See Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 51 (1990).
775 See supra notes 365-418 and accompanying text.
776 See supra notes 367-70,435-65 and accompanying text.
777 See supra notes 364-70 and accompanying text.
778 Institutional reform litigation, political in nature, involves judges in political
bargaining, a process of compromise and balancing of conflicting interests. See Diver, supra
note 4, at 88-94. The role of the judge becomes one of spurring governmental actors to protect
the rights of minority and disenfranchised populations through restructured institutions. See id.
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the remedy will displace local law and the magnitude of the remedy's financial
impact, should constitute factors that the judiciary considers in applying a
balancing test. This balancing of interests should occur as part of the remedial
process in all areas of institutional reform litigation, including court-ordered
desegregation remedies.779
This Part proposes a balancing test, based upon Milliken IYs three-part
test,780 to guide the imposition of court-ordered fiding remedies in institutional
reform cases. The Milliken Htest directs a district court to formulate remedies that
address the nature and extent of the constitutional violation. 81 The goal of the test
is to restore the victims of constitutional violations to the position they would
have occupied in the absence of such violations.782 Under the third prong of the
test, the district court must weigh the interests of local officials in managing their
own affairs.
A. Proposed Interest Balancing Test
In devising remedies to correct constitutional violations found in the delivery
of state and local governmental services, the federal judiciary should evaluate and
at 92.
Professor Vicki Jackson has emphasized the practicalities involved in the Court's
adjudication of federalism restraints upon Congress's power. See Jackson, supra note 94, at
2228-30. She states that "[a]djudication is a form of governance as well as a form ofprincipled
decisionmaking. Too much attention to pragmatics deprives the Court of its unique basis for
legitimacy, too little, and the Court veers into a misguided quest for academic purity at the
expense of its governmental function." Id. at 2228 (citations omitted).
779 See Jackson, supra note 94, at 2257 (rejecting the use of categorical rules to adjudicate
federalism constraints on federal legislative power and arguing instead for a "deferential, 'all-
things-considered' approach" to developing any constitutional limits upon congressional
mandates to state governments). A test based upon a balancing of interests carries some
disadvantages. A balancing test introduces greater indeterminancy than categorical rules. When
the legal system fails to apply a rule consistently, the power of judicial review decreases
because judicial decision making appears to be based upon nonlegal factors that are political in
nature. See Lessig, supra note 368, at 173-74. A federal court undoubtedly will find it difficult
to determine whether a federal interest outweighs the adverse impact of a particular action upon
a state. See Tushnet, supra note 548, at 1636-38. Federal courts are likely to favor federal
interests in the application of a balancing test. See id; Yoo, supra note 4, at 1134.
780 See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
781 See Friedman, supra note 1, at 743 ('he first prong [ofthe Milliken ltest] essentially
is a 'fit' requirement: the remedy must fit the right violated, exceeding it in neither scope nor
nature.. . an inherently subjective process."); Yoo, supra note 4, at 1132 (criticizing this
remedial rule as "unhelpful in practice").
7 82 See ELY, supra note 14, at 88 (supporting a representation-reinforcing approach to
judicial review because judges as political outsiders and experts on process are well suited for
this task); Friedman, Remedies, supra note 1, at 746-47 (interpreting the compensatory nature
of the goal to be in conflict with the prospective relief ordered in school desegregation cases).
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weigh the following factors:
(1) the need to tailor the scope of the remedy to fit the nature and extent of the
constitutional violation;
(2) the need for the court's decree to be remedial in nature and, to the extent
possible, to restore the victims of discriminatory conduct to the position they
would have occupied in the absence of such conduct;
(3) the extent to which the proposed remedial actions affect the interests of
state and local authorities in managing their own affairs, including:
(a) the cost of the proposed remedial actions;
(b) the ability of state and local resources to fund the proposed remedial
actions;
(c) the extent to which the remedial actions will violate valid state and
local laws; and
(d) the extent to which the remedial actions will require the judiciary to
displace state and local governmental administration and decision-making
processes, including representative rule.
This test generally follows Milliken Y's three-part test. Once a constitutional
violation is found, the court examines the remedies available to correct the
violations pursuant to the first and second parts of the proposed test The third part
of the test incorporates additional factors for the judiciary to consider in weighing
state and local interests.
The first part of the Milliken IT test provided that "the nature of
the... remedy is to be determined by the nature and scope of the constitutional
violation."783 Later rulings emphasized a close nexus between the constitutional
violation and the remedy designed to correct it 784 The proposed first factor
reiterates the current phrasing of the Milliken H test that requires a remedial
course of action to address the injury caused by the constitutional violation. 8 5
The suggested second factor recognizes the need to afford remedies to those
whose rights are violated and to restore the victims of constitutional violations to
the position they would have occupied in the absence of such violations. Its
783 See Milliken v. Bradley (Miliken 1I), 433 U.S. 267,280 (1977).
784 See Hills v. Gautreau, 425 U.S. 284,293-94 (1976) (stating that once a constitutional
violation is found, a court "is required to tailor 'the scope of the remedy' to fit 'the nature and
extent of the constitutional violation"); Jenkins v. Missouri, 931 F.2d 470,480 (8th Cir. 1991)
("[D]ecrees must directly address and relate to the constitutional violation itself."); Al-Alamin
v. Gramley, 926 F.2d 680, 685 (7th Cir. 1991) ("mhe power of a federal court to issue
injunctive relief is circumscribed by the nature and extent of the constitutional violation.").
785 Federal courts have been criticized for engaging in remedial action that addresses
societal conditions beyond those found to violate the Constitution. See Friedman, supra note 1,
at 738 ("What emerges from a study of the law of remedy and enforcement... is the picture of
a system in which there is tremendous flexibility in the fit between right and remedy."). A court
may reject the cheapest and most effective remedial measures. See id. at 743-46.
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phraseology admits, as does the Milliken if test, that such restoration is not
possible for all victims of constitutional violations. Institutional remedies usually
require a prolonged period of implementation and often fail to provide relief to
the plaintiffs who initiated legal action many years earlier.786
B. Milliken II Adopted an Interest Balancing Test to Implement School
Desegregation Remedies
Milliken Rl's three-part test constitutes an "interest balancing" test once the
courts treat its local interests factor as an equitable principle that must be
considered. The Court in its 1995 Jenkins decision stressed that the latter interests
cannot be ignored.787 As stated in Brown if, the judiciary must be guided by
equitable principles "characterized by a practical flexibility in shaping its
remedies and. . . a facility for adjusting and reconciling public and private
needs. '788 The federal judiciary must necessarily take into account the
practicalities of the situation.789
The three rules formulated in Milliken if are consistent and compatible with
each other only if the locality possesses both the resources available and the will
to completely vindicate the victims' rights.790 Since American society continues
to define people by their color791 and shows little willingness to redistribute
resources or tax itself enough to assist the underprivileged, the fulfillment of the
786 See Friedman, supra note 1, at 745--47 (criticizing the Court's second prong of
Milliken !'s three-part test as unrealistically implying that all past harms can be rectified).
787 See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 98 (1995).
788 Brown v. Board of Educ. (Brown I), 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955) (footnotes omitted);
see also ELY, supra note 14, at 86-87 (pointing out that the protection of popular democracy
and the protection of minorities from denial of equal respect, often viewed as two conflicting
ideals, both arise from a common duty of representation).
789 See Evans v. Buchanan, 555 F.2d 373, 379 (3d Cir. 1977) (quoting Davis v. Board of
Sch. Comm'rs, 402 U.S. 33,37 (1971)).
790 While adherence to Milliken Ifs third rule (giving weight to the interests of local
officials in managing their affairs) frequently conflicts with the rights maximizing rules number
one and two, rule number three cannot be characterized as totally at odds with rule two's rights
maximizing approach. First, the local interests mentioned in the third rule must be "consistent
with the Constitution." Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken I), 433 U.S. 267, 281 (1977). Second,
one would hope that a locality's interest could be characterized as benefited by the
desegregation of its schools. The present electorate's taste for tax cutting measures, however,
may conflict with the remedial quality education mandated by the courts.
791 See Jenkins v. Missouri, 981 F.2d 1009, 1016 (8th Cir. 1992) (stating that the potential
for discrimination and racial hostility still exists); BARBARA J. FLAGG, WAs BLIND, Bur NOW I
SEE 20-23 (1998) (describing race as a social phenomenon and as an element of social
stratification); Amy L. Knickmeier, Comment, Blind Leading the "Color Blind:" The
Evisceration ofAffirmative Action and a Dream Still Deferred, 17 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 305, 306
(1997) (pointing out resistance to school desegregation and black church fires as continuing
evidence of racism).
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three rules remains unpromising. Majoritarian rule now will not elect state or
local officials who will maximize the rights of those subject to racial
discrimination.7 92 It is only the court decree that will cause local officials to
marshal the resources needed to reform institutional discrimination. Yet, such a
decree by its very nature will restructure political institutions, thereby diluting
representative democracy.
Because it is unlikely that all of the three rules can be completely fulfilled
simultaneously, the court must choose whether (1) to place total or greater weight
on rules one and two while deemphasizing or ignoring rule three, (2) to stress
local concerns that are apt to diminish or delay the effectuation of rights that
should be redressed under rules one and two, or (3) to balance the victims' rights
to be brought to the position they would have occupied absent the constitutional
violation against the needs of local governments to manage their affairs without
intrusive judicial intervention over prolonged periods of time. Although the courts
have generally chosen to take the first approach, the third course of action
comports with Milliken I's three-rule test.
The court must weigh how heavily the proposed remedy will intrude upon
local and state managerial and governance prerogatives. The inclusion of rule
three means that the federal judiciary, acting in a counter-majoritarian capacity,
must exercise some restraint upon how it imposes its will upon local officials.793
Adjudication in structural reform cases involves policy making, and a mindful
judge ensures that the remedial process includes an exchange of conflicting views
and interests.7 94 The issue becomes one of finding the point at which the federal
judiciary oversteps the inherent limitations upon its powers to root out the
constitutional violations by preempting state and local democratic processes that
have allocated scarce public resources.795 While the Supreme Court admits that
limits exist upon its remedial powers, its rulings fail to clarify the permissible
degree of judicial micro-management allowed to remedy a constitutional
792 See JACOBS, supra note 39, at 57-59, 81-82; WELLS & CRAIN, supra note 37, at 336-
37.
793 For a discussion of the counter-majoritarian difficulty, see BICKEL, supra note 515, at
16-23; DAHL, supra note 515, at 187-99; ELY, supra note 14, at 44-48. See generally Barry
Friedman, supra note 515. Professor Friedman argues that "our idealized notion of
countermajoritarian courts must give way to a vision of courts as bodies different from, but
nonetheless responsive to, popular will." Friedman, supra note 1, at 738. He states that
"majoritarian participation in defining rights through a reaction to judicial remedies and
enforcement seems both inevitable and appropriate." Id. at 777.
794 See Diver, supra note 4, at 45-47 (viewing the role of the judge in institutional reform
litigation as a political powerbroker who should facilitate the court's policy making role through
a bargaining process involving the accommodation of conflicting interests).
795 See Frug, supra note 364, at 740 (pointing out the Constitution's provisions that
emphasize the importance of democratic controls at the federal level to raise and allocate
money).
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violation.796
In an era in which school desegregation remedies frequently require millions
of dollars to implement, Milliken !)'s third rule remains elusive unless monetary
impacts are treated as part of the state and local interests that must be considered
by the court in devising its remedial decree.7 97 This rule's mandate to take into
account the interests of state and local authorities to manage their own affairs
must be done "consistent with the Constitution."798 Nevertheless, this narrowly
cast rule clearly encompasses state and local interests in the level of funding that a
court orders to desegregate public schools because court-ordered funding removes
local discretion in the allocation of scarce fiscal resources. 99
The federal judiciary should place more focus on evaluating the likely
effectiveness of a proposed remedial plan.800 School desegregation remedial
plans require local cooperation to be effectual. 80 1 The elimination of long-
standing racial discriminatory practices materializes more quickly when local
leadership supports the enforcement of a court decree to remedy discriminatory
conduct 802 The most viable remedial plans involve balancing both individual and
collective interests because consideration of community interests and resources
796 An Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals decision indicates awareness of constitutional
limitations upon the judiciary's remedial powers. In Jenkins v. Missouri (Jenldns D), the Eighth
Circuit rejected the district court's income tax surcharge as beyond the reach of judicial power
because it introduced a new form of taxation to finance a public school system, and, as such,
restructured the "State's scheme of school financing." 855 F.2d 1295, 1315 (8th Cir. 1988).
Miiken Fs three-part test is viewed as allowing "courts to do pretty much what they want."
Friedman, supra note 1, at 747.
7 97 See Frug, supra note 364, at 773 (arguing that the Supreme Court should address "the
importance of limiting judicial impact on the public purse in the delineation of appropriate
judicial remedies for constitutional violations").
7 98 Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken II), 433 U.S. 267,280-81 (1977). It is not clear what the
Court intended by the inclusion of this phrase.
7 99 See Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240,2264-65 (1999).
800 Once a plan goes into effect, it cannot be altered easily because those affected by the
plan resist change once a consensus has been reached. See Fishman & Strauss, supra note 55, at
223. A school system may face political opposition to an amended plan and most often will
prefer the status quo. See id.
801 See Diaz v. San Jose Unified Sch. Dist., 633 F. Supp. 808, 827 (ND. Cal. 1985)
(recognizing that the success of a desegregation plan depends upon parents and students as well
as school authorities and community comnnitment to improve the quality of education);
TAYLOR, supra note 50, at 8 (pointing out that remedial desegregation in Buffalo in comparison
to Boston proceeded more peacefully and with better results, because the Buffalo Board of
Education, unlike Boston's School Committee, cooperated with the district court).
802 See JACOBS, supra note 39, at 82; Friedman, supra note 1, at 768 (finding that, in
devising remedies, courts defer to the interests of governmental bodies that have violated rights
and negotiate with these bodies in the enforcement of them); see also supra notes 216-18 and
accompanying text.
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enhances the community's capability to remove the constitutional violations.803
C. Unconstitutional Prison Conditions Remedied by Interest Balancing
The federal judiciary's remedial approach to correct unconstitutional prison
conditions includes the same kind of interest balancing advocated here to guide
the imposition of fiscal remedies in institutional reform litigation. In recent years,
numerous lawsuits have been instituted to remedy prison conditions alleged to
violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against the infliction of cruel and
unusual punishment Although some federal courts overlook Milliken l's interest
balancing approach as a guide to implement school desegregation remedies, they
frequently refer to interest balancing as part of their decision-making processes to
correct unconstitutional prison conditions.804 The Supreme Court recently
8 03 Judges surveyed by the Institute of Judicial Administration reported that insufficient
funds for the improvement of educational programs constituted a major limitation upon the
ability to achieve complete success in the implementation of school desegregation programs.
See Flicker, supra note 215, at 366. Other impediments included white flight, segregated
housing, and zoning patterns. See id.
804 See, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 558-60 (1979) (upholding visual cavity
searches of prison inmates after contact visits with a person from the outside because
reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment cannot be precisely defined, thereby requiring a
balancing of legitimate prison security needs against privacy interests of inmates); Toussaint v.
McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1087, 1114 (9th Cir. 1986) (upholding the district court's order for
prison expenditures to reduce noise and to provide adjustable hot and cold running water
controls and citing Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 16
(1971), for the proposition that the "task is to correct, by a balancing of the interests, the
condition that offends the constitution"); Newman v. State, 683 F.2d 1312, 1321 (11th Cir.
1982) (overruling district court order to release prisoners to reduce overcrowding and stating
that "[t]he consent decree appears to represent the proper balance between the duty of the
district court to remedy constitutional violations and the right of the State to administer its
prison and parole systems"); Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1266 (9th Cir. 1982) (Tang, J.,
concurring) (opining that federal courts, in shaping orders affecting state and local
governments, must consider the three rules set forth in Milliken 11s three-rule test and that the
third rule of taking into account state and local interests in managing their own affairs is
particularly relevant in curing constitutional violations in prisons); Ramey v. Hawk, 730 F.
Supp. 1366, 1371 (E.D.N.C. 1989) (upholding urine testing of prisoners to deter drug use
because the government has a legitimate reason for the policy, which struck a "reasonable
balance between protecting the prisoners' constitutional rights and enabling prison
administration to safely and efficiently carry on the task of running the penal institution within
the confines of available time and resources"); Alberti v. Klevenhagen, 606 F. Supp. 478, 487
(S.D. Tex. 1985) (applying an interest balancing test to determine whether the court should
grant a stay to its order to hire additional county jail guards to correct constitutional deficiencies
and stating that after "balancing the equities in this case-irreparable harm to the defendants,
substantial injury to the plaintiffs, and the public interest," the harm caused by higher taxes to
fund the remedy did not outweigh defendants' bad faith in failing to implement court orders).
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affirmed, in Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail,80 5 the role that interest
balancing should play in the judicial review of proposed consent decree
modifications designed to correct Eighth Amendment violations.806 The Court
opined that the district court could appropriately consider fiscal constraints in
tailoring consent decree modifications in institutional reform litigation.80 7
VII. ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY'S REMEDIAL TAXATION
PRINCIPLES
This Part critiques the various principles established by the federal judiciary
for determining the conditions upon which judicial taxation may be ordered to
correct constitutional violations. This Article argues that the constitutional
limitations explored in Part V make doubtful the constitutionality of any remedial
judicial taxation imposed in the course of institutional reform litigation. Should
the Court continue to uphold judicial taxation, however, clearer standards for its
imposition need to evolve. Part VIII proposes a set of more definitive guidelines
after exploring a number of alternative standards.
A- Summary ofJudicial Principles
The federal judiciary responded in a variety of ways, as shown in Part II, to
the issue of court-ordered taxation to fund a school desegregation remedy. This
Part analyzes the following principles articulated in these rulings:
(1) The legislative solution to funding the desegregation remedies should be
received with a presumption of regularity.808
805 502 U.S. 367 (1992).
80 6 See id at 392-93. In Rufo, a district court had refused to grant a county sheriff's
request to modify a consent decree to permit double bunking in some cells in view of an
increased number of pretrial detainees. See id. at 367. The Court admonished lower federal
courts that they could best effectuate the public interest by taking a flexible approach to consent
decree modification and implementation because institutional reform litigation decrees directly
affect the operation ofpublic institutions as well as the parties bound by them. See id. at 381.
Interest balancing is also used to determine whether state and local governments have
encroached upon First Amendment rights. In Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 363 (1976), Justice
Brennan, writing for the plurality, opined that the benefits gained by restricting First
Amendment rights must outweigh the loss of these constitutionally protected rights.
807 See Rufo, 502 U.S. at 370. The Court found that a sheriff's request to modify a consent
decree to allow double bunking in some jail cells under construction should be considered
because "the public interest and considerations of comity require that the district court defer to
local government administrators to resolve the intricacies of implementing a modification." Id.
808 See United States v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 677 F.2d 1185, 1190 (7th Cir. 1982)
(stating that "[i]t is not the province of a federal court to instruct the legislature on how it should
finance its obligations"); United States v. Missouri, 515 F.2d 1365, 1373 (8th Cir. 1975). But
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(2) "[I]nsofar as practical a court should exercise its discretion in accordance
with State law, always remaining mindful that the beleaguered taxpayer ought not
to incur a tax increase beyond that absolutely essential for effective
reorganization." 809
(3) If the legislature refuses to act to establish taxation policy, the court can
"fill the... void."810
(4) A district court must defer to the political funding process before it may
require an increased tax levy, and such orders may be imposed only when
"necessary to remedy a violation of the Constitution, and only after exhausting all
other [remedies]." 811
(5) A district court may order an increase in taxes, but only after it has made a
finding that no other alternatives are available or sufficient to finance its
desegregation order.812
(6) "[A]s a prerequisite to considering a taxation order," a finding must be
made "that any remedy less costly than the one at issue would so plainly leave the
violation unremedied that its implementation would itself be an abuse of
discretion." 813
B. Judicial Deference to the Established Tax Rate
In United States v. Missouri, a court-ordered desegregation plan called for the
consolidation of three school districts to desegregate one of the districts and the
establishment of a new uniform tax rate throughout the consolidated district to
fund the remedial plan.814 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that
see Evans v. Buchanan, 582 F.2d 750, 775 (3d Cir. 1978) (permitting the legislature to provide
a statutory procedure for devising a tax rate to fund a desegregation plan because state political
processes are preferred over federal court intervention, but not according presumptive regularity
to any legislative lowering of the tax rate).
809 Evans v. Buchanan, 447 F. Supp. 982, 1029 (D. Del. 1978).
810 Id. at 1035.
811 See Liddell v. Missouri (Liddell VII), 731 F.2d 1294, 1321 (8th Cir. 1984).
812 See id. at 1323. This standard was approved in Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 51-
52 (1990) (finding that the district court improperly ordered a tax increase because it failed to
avail itself of a permissible alternative: "[lIt could have authorized or required KCMSD to levy
property taxes at a rate adequate to fund the desegregation remedy and could have enjoined the
operation of state laws that would have prevented KCMSD from exercising this power.").
813 Jenkans, 495 U.S. at 79 (Kennedy, J., concurring). This test is similar to the one
articulated by the district court in Evans v. Buchanan, 447 F. Supp. 982, 1025 (D. Del. 1978). In
Evans, the court stated that "[a]uthorization to set a school tax rate is properly a product of the
political process. For that reason.... a federal court should not become involved failing a total
abdication of responsibility over a period of time such that further delay significantly
jeopardizes constitutional rights."Id. at 1025.
814 See 515 F.2d 1365, 1366-68 (8th Cir. 1975). For a discussion of Missouri, see supra
notes 240-44 and accompanying text.
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deference should be given to the tax rate set by state and local decision makers to
cover the new district's operations.815 Likewise, in Evans v. Buchanan, the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the district court should grant the same
presumptive validity to the legislature's taxation framework that it accorded other
legislative acts.816 The district court, however, opined that the scope of judicial
review could exceed the rational basis test in ascertaining whether the tax rate "so
strip[ped] the [county school district] of financial support that the unconstitutional
intent to thwart desegregation decrees may be inferred as a matter of law."8 17
Strong policy reasons support the judiciary's grant of presumptive validity to
the governing taxation legislation and taxation rate when the district court
implements school desegregation remedies. The legislature should not be
presumed to frustrate a desegregation plan, and should the legislature use its
taxation powers to do so, the presumptive validity accorded taxation policy can be
rebutted easily. Such judicial deference concedes that the power to make taxation
decisions rests with the legislative body and treats the subject of taxation as
comparable to other legislative decisions that traditionally are accorded deference.
Courts consistently recognize taxation as among the most sensitive areas of state
governmental operations and one in which the judiciary should intrude only with
trepidation.818 Further, the judiciary should not establish a regimen of different
degrees of legislative deference depending upon the remedial action under
consideration. Such a scale would not only complicate judicial review, but it
would eviscerate the notion that all violations of constitutional rights must be
vindicated.
815 See Missouri, 515 F.2d at 1373.
816 see 582 F.2d 750, 779 (3d Cir. 1978). For a discussion of Evans, see supra notes 245-
67 and accompanying text.
817 Evans v. Buchanan, 468 F. Supp. 944,951 (D. Del. 1979).
818 See Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 110 (1981)
(barring on comity grounds state taxpayers' action challenging the state's administration of
taxation because the federal judiciary must recognize a state's need to administer its fiscal
operations); Heine v. Levee Comm'rs, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 655, 660-61 (1874) (upholding
district court's refusal to assess and collect taxes to fund delinquent bonds issued by board of
levee commissioners because the exercise of such power would constitute an invasion by the
judiciary of the state's legislative powers). In Heine the Court stated that the remedial taxation
requested "must be derived from the legislature of the State" as it is not an inherent judicial
power. Id. at 661; see also Kelley v. Metropolitan County Bd. of Educ., 836 F.2d 986,997 (6th
Cir. 1987) (reversing district court order for state assumption of local school board's
desegregation costs and declaring that few, if any areas, of the states' guaranteed republican
govemment are more important than finance and taxation); Rhen v. Malcolm, 507 F.2d 333,
341 (2d Cir. 1974) (rejecting judicial taxation to fund a new jail to replace a male detention
center, the operation of which violated prisoners' due process rights);T-E FEDERALIST No. 35,
at 216-17 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (stating that the exercise of
taxation powers requires "extensive information and a thorough knowledge of the principles of
political economy"); THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961) (stating the belief that thejudiciary would not exercise the power ofthe purse).
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C. The No Alternative Test
In Liddell VT, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the judiciary
possessed the power to order taxation in excess of that authorized under state law
to remedy segregation.8 19 The court opined, however, that "[l]imitations on this
power require that it be exercised only after exploration of every other fiscal
alternative."8 20 A district court finding as to the nonexistence or insufficiency of
other revenue sources constituted a prerequisite to a taxation order contrary to
state law.821
The Supreme Court's application of the no alternative test822 in Jenkins
demonstrates its unworkability. If a federal court wants to strike down a judicially
imposed tax, it can almost always find the availability of an alternative course of
action. The alternative considered viable by the Supreme Court in Jenkins
consisted of taxation directly imposed by local authorities rather than by the
district court itself. Nevertheless, this option entailed the same result as the district
court's remedial order: judicially ordered and authorized taxation.823 Both
alternatives resulted in the same impact upon taxpayers. The Court's preferable
alternative boiled down to nothing more than a procedural difference in the
imposition of the tax.824
Jenkins equally demonstrates how easily a court, while ostensibly following
819 See Liddell v. Missouri (Liddell V), 731 F.2d 1294, 1320 (8th Cir. 1984).
820 ld.
821 See id. at 1323. The Liddell VIII decision also phrased this test as one that should be
operative only after all other remedies were exhausted. See Liddell v. Board of Educ. (Liddell
VIII), 758 F.2d 290,300-01(8th Cir. 1985).
822 The "no alternative test' originated in Liddell VII, 731 F.2d at 1320. See supra notes
274-78 and accompanying text In Missouri v. Jenkins, the Court applied a "no alternative test'
in reviewing the district court's taxation order that disregarded state law. The Court ruled that
the test was not satisfied because the district court alternatively could authorize and direct the
Kansas City, Missouri School District to levy property taxes in an amount sufficient to fund the
desegregation remedy. See 495 U.S. 33, 51 (1990).
823 See supra notes 333-34.
824 Finding an alternative to remedial taxation should mean finding a less intrusive
remedy than taxation. In Jenkins, taxation imposed by the KCMSD was viewed as meeting the
'no alternative tese' because it was less intrusive than taxation directly imposed by the Court.
See Jenkins, 495 U.S. at 51.
The "no alternative test' can be analogized to the Court's application of the strict scrutiny
test. Under the strict scrutiny test, a classification can be upheld only if another branch of
government can show a close relationship between the classification and the promotion of a
compelling governmental interest. If the judiciary finds that a classification is not needed to
achieve an overriding governmental interest, the law will be invalid under the Equal Protection
Clause. Likewise, if alternatives, other than judicially ordered taxation, can be employed to
remedy a constitutional violation, the "no alternative test' has not been satisfied. The "no
alternative test' should prove as difficult to apply as the strict scrutiny standard of judicial
review.
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the no alternative test, can impose taxation even when alternative courses of
action or financing exist to avert the remedial taxation. The Court rejected the
State's argument that the lower federal courts, upon finding the State and the
KCMSD jointly and severally liable, should have turned to state-financed
desegregation remedies rather than rely upon court-ordered local taxation that
violated state law. 825 State flnding clearly existed as an alternative to court-
ordered taxation to satisfy the KCMSD's share of remedial costs. The Court's
rejection of this alternative seemed to emanate from a desire to uphold remedies
approved by lower courts. Otherwise, the remedial process could be delayed until
alternative remedial orders were implemented.
According to the Jenkins Court, if a rational reason exists for a district court's
choice of remedies, appellate courts should uphold the lower court's remedial
action.826 The Court stated that the state's earlier resistance to assume the
remedial plan's costs supported the district court's decision to dismiss state
alternative financing.827 Further, the district court tailored its remedial actions in
response to the Eighth Circuit's ruling that rejected placing three-fourths of the
remedial funding upon the state.828 The Court thus indicated that the federal
courts possess the power to set aside state tax law limitations upon a school
district's power of taxation when another joint constitutional violator could be
required to fund the desegregation remedies without displacing state law.829
The no alternative test appears to impose rigorous conditions precedent to
judicial taxation so as to make its application narrow in scope. In practice,
however, the test provides plenty of room for an expansion ofjudicially mandated
taxation. First, the test operates when the court deems that the existing taxation
framework will produce insufficient, as opposed to nonexistent, revenues to cary
out the desegregation plan. The court thus determines the level of taxation it
deems desirable rather than giving deference to the amount of taxation that can be
levied under existing state statutory law. The use of this test will continue to
involve the federal judiciary in day-to-day judgment calls as to the amount of
desirable funding to carry out a desegregation plan. The test permits judicial
taxation when the level of taxation does not meet the court's expectations.
Second, the test does not provide guidance as to the alternatives that must be
825 See Jenkins, 495 U.S. at 53-54.
82 6 See id. at 54.
827 See id.
828 See Jenkins, 495 U.S. at 54.
829 See id at 53-54. The Supreme Court referred to its statement in Milliken v. Bradley
(Milliken fl), 433 U.S. 267, 291 (1976), that the enforcement of a money judgment would not
violate principles of federalism, but that an attempt to restructure local governmental units
would violate such federalism principles. See Jenkins, 495 U.S. at 54. The Court stated: "But
we did not there state [Milliken /] that a district court could never set aside state laws
preventing local governments from raising funds sufficient to satisfy their constitutional
obligations just because those funds could also be obtained from the States." Id. at 54.
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tried before the court can declare the exhaustion of all available alternatives.
Uncertainty remains as to the extent of a school district's obligation to search for
alternative funding sources. For example, must the school district appeal to the
state legislature to authorize new funding sources to satisfy the no alternative test?
Or, alternatively, could the court rule as to the non-necessity for such appeals
because the school district should only have to search for remedies provided by
the existing taxation framework?
The no alternative test, as well as the other taxation principles outlined, fail to
guide the district court, at the time it initiates a remedial school desegregation
plan, as to the degree of its power to mandate new or additional sources of
revenue. A district court that designs a plan without giving consideration to the
existing levels of available funding and taxation may take a rights maximizing
posture. When the level of taxation proves inadequate to implement the remedial
plan fully, the court will appear powerless unless it enforces its decree. To avoid a
retreat from its desegregation plan, the court may opt for mandated taxation.
Changing a plan when it is well under way will delay the remedial process and
frequently will be met with resistance.830 The district court should plan its
funding mechanisms at the same time that it undertakes to design a desegregation
plan.
The no alternative test proves difficult to apply as Little Rock, Arkansas
school desegregation litigation demonstrated. During the course of litigation, a
district court and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reached different
conclusions as to the propriety of a judicial order to raise school revenues by
extending school district millages831 due to expire without voter approval. 832 The
Arkansas Constitution required voter approval of such millages after the measures
were placed on the ballot.833 The district court viewed an order to extend such
830 Once a consensus on a plan is achieved, it develops a momentum of its own that limits
the court's ability to amend it. See Fishman & Strauss, supra note 55, at 223. The parties
affected by a desegregation plan who have relied upon it frequently oppose alterations to it. See
id. School officials will be reluctant to amend a plan if hostile reaction is anticipated to the
proposed changes. See id.
831 The district court explained the extension of millages, derived from the word "mills"
used in determining the amount of tax, as the imposition of a tax that would not exist without
the extension. See Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 778 F.
Supp. 1013, 1016 (E.D. Ark. 1991), rev'd on other grounds, 971 F.2d 160 (8th Cir. 1992). The
district court stated that the extension made "permanent what was voted as a temporary tax for a
specific purpose." Id. at 1016.
832 Compare Little Rock, 778 F. Supp. at 1017-18 (finding that extending the millages
would constitute a tax prohibited by Missouri v. Jenkins because Arkansas school districts,
unlike the KCMSD in Jenkins, did not possess any power to tax without voter approval of the
rillages), with Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist. No. 1,971 F.2d 160,
164-65 (8th Cir. 1992) (extending the millages permitted under the law-of-the-case doctrine
because the extensions had been ordered previously).833 See ARK. CONST. art. XIV, § 3. Under the Arkansas Constitution, school districts are
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millages as constituting judicial taxation because local school districts lacked
power to extend such millages without a vote of the people.834 Applying the no
alternative test, the district court concluded that a judicial order to extend millages
without a vote had to be preceded by Liddell VI's required factual finding that
"all other fiscal alternatives [are] unavailable or insufficient." 835 The district court
interpreted Jenkins and Liddell to authorize judicial taxation only as a last resort
following a judicial determination that "no alternative remedial plan... would
address the constitutional violations without causing a flmding crisis. '836 The
district court believed that "more than just funding alternatives must be
considered."837
The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's decision, holding that because
it had directed the district court to approve a settlement agreement that included
court-ordered extensions of the millages, those extensions were settled as the "law
of the case."838 The "law-of-the-case" doctrine bars reopening and re-litigating
the same issue in the same case by making the ruling of the highest court the law
of the case.8 39 The Eighth Circuit added, however, that in view of the costly
school desegregation plan, the millages at issue could not be omitted without
sacrificing the school districts' ability to achieve unitary status.840 It did not
accept the district court's "suggestion that a remedy can be so limited once this
court has found it to be constitutional." 841 Instead, as this statement suggests, the
appellate court implicitly rejected the district court's application of the no
alternative test.
authorized to levy an annual tax for the maintenance of schools, the erection and equipment of
school buildings, and the retirement of existing indebtedness if a majority of the qualified voters
in the school district voting in the election approve the rate of tax so proposed. See id. If a
majority of taxpayers disapprove the proposed rate of taxation, then the tax shall be collected at
the rate approved in the last preceding annual school election. See id.; Little Rock 971 F.2d at
163 n.1.
834 See Little Rock, 778 F. Supp. at 1018.
835 Id. at 1017 (quoting Liddell v. Missouri (Liddell VII), 731 F2d 1294, 1323 (8th Cir.
1984)). The district court found that no such factual finding had been made. See id. The district
court further found that it lacked power to extend the millages because under the Supreme
Court's holding in Jenkins, a district court can order a local government to raise taxes only if the
local government has some power to tax. See id. at 1018. The court opined that "for the reasons
so eloquently stated by the concurring Justices in Jenkins ... a district court does not have the
power under Article Ell of the Constitution to impose or increase taxes, either directly or
through delegation to a local government body." Id.
836 Id. at 1019.
837 Little Rock Sch. Dist., 778 F. Supp. at 1019 (emphasis in the original).
838 See Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 971 F.2d 160,
165 (8th Cir. 1992).
839 See id.
840 See id.
841 Id.
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D. The Last Resort Test
Justice Kennedy, in his concurring opinion in Missouri v. Jenkins, wrote that
"as a prerequisite to considering a taxation order, I would require a finding that
that [sic] any remedy less costly than the one at issue would so plainly leave the
violation unremedied that its implementation would itself be an abuse of
discretion."842 This statement echoes the Griffin court's holding: judicial taxation
becomes permissible only when the lack of taxation creates a palpable
injustice.843 Judicial taxation cannot be imposed under the last resort test if room
for disagreement exists as to the amount of revenue needed to correct the judicial
violation. When the lack of tax revenue clearly leaves constitutional violations
blatantly remediless, however, judicial taxation may be ordered 44
1. Advantages of the Last Resort Test
The last resort test achieves greater predictability and certainty in application
than the no alternative test because it more narrowly defines the scope of judicial
power that can be exercised to order taxation. The last resort test's guidelines
present greater clarity than those of the no alternative test because the court must
only make one determination: whether the lack of taxation creates an abuse of
discretion; no assessment of possible alternatives to correct the violation is
regarded. Further, the test supports federalism principles by requiring the
judiciary to focus on remedial action costs. A taxation order cannot emanate
unless existing taxes plainly leave the violation unremedied. Rather than placing
the judiciary in the position of finding alternative remedial routes that may or may
not exist within the existing local governmental structure, the test forces the
judiciary to work within that structure unless it is so deficient as to cause an abuse
of discretion.
2. Disadvantages of the Last Resort Test
The last resort test must be more clearly defined to become practicable.
Upholding taxation in the vague "abuse of discretion" area will most likely
produce divergent decisions. The test requires district court judges to determine
the point at which the implementation of a remedial plan using available
monetary resources leaves the constitutional violation so plainly unremedied as to
constitute an abuse of discretion. Obviously, district court judges may possess
different notions of what magnitude of remedies will correct a constitutional
842 Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 79 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
843 See Griffin v. County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 232-33 (1964); supra notes 239, 363
and accompanying text.
844 See supra notes 239,264-67,363 and accompanying text.
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violation so as to avoid implementing a remedial course of action that constitutes
an abuse of discretion. Further, the judiciary may view the degree of financing
needed to correct these violations differently than the citizenry. Additional
guidelines would be helpful to obtain greater uniformity and certainty in this
difficult area of devising adequate monetary relief.
The last resort test is flawed also by its failure to address the issue of whether
the federal judiciary may impose taxation unauthorized by state law.8 45 Because
the test does not impose state law authorization as a prerequisite for judicially
mandated taxation to correct an "abuse of discretion," 846 it must be presumed that
such taxation could be imposed absent such authorization. It is entirely possible
that a district court could find the existing level of state authorized financing
deficient enough to categorize the remedial implementation plan as an abuse of
discretion. Yet, Justice Kennedy, concurring in Jenkins, concluded that the federal
district court lacked the power to order taxation unauthorized by state law because
the federal judiciary does not possess independent taxation powers.847 Justice
Kennedy counseled restraint from the exercise of judicial taxation given the deep
intrusion into state and local political processes that such taxation always
entails. 848
E. Balancing Test
1. Application of the Balancing Test
In Jenkins 1, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals applied a balancing test to
determine the validity of two different taxes imposed by the district court for
remedial purposes. The appellate court held that a court-ordered income tax
surcharge, for which no state law authority existed, invaded the province of the
legislature and exceeded the power of the district courL849 In the same opinion,
however, it upheld a court-ordered property tax increase, also unauthorized by
state law, as a less obtrusive method to rectify constitutional violations.850 The
court weighed the necessity for judicial taxation against the degree of
intrusiveness involved in imposing the remedy upon state and local processes.
845 See Jenkins, 495 U.S. at 74-75 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
846 justice Kennedy phrased the last resort test as follows: "[A]s a prerequisite to
considering a taxation order, I would require a finding that that [sic] any remedy less costly than
the one at issue would so plainly leave the violation unremedied that its implementation would
itself be an abuse of discretion." Id at 79.
847 See idat 74-75.
848 See id at 75 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
849 See Jenkins v. Missouri (Jenkins II), 855 F.2d 1295, 1315-16 (8th Cir. 1988).850 See id. at 1312-16. In Jenkins II, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals endorsed
Milliken I!'s three-part test and stressed the importance of balancing collective interests against
rights maximizing interests. See id. at 1299.
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The Eighth Circuit found that the property taxation needed to fund the
desegregation remedy for the Kansas City Missouri School District had been
greatly restricted by levy reductions mandated by Proposition C.851 Upon
weighing these monetary needs against the intrusiveness of the remedy, it decided
that setting aside these levy reductions would not inappropriately disrupt state and
local governmental procedures. 852 On the other hand, the Eighth Circuit found
that the imposition of an income tax surcharge, by restructuring Missouri's school
financing scheme, did not defer appropriately enough to the existing state and
local taxation framework.853
Evans v. Buchanan's principles of remedial taxation also employ a balancing
test8 54 because they provide that "insofar as practicable, a court should exercise
its [remedial] discretion in accordance with State law... * 855 Counterbalancing
the desire to follow state law, the court cautioned that "[ijf the legislature refuses
to act to establish taxation policy, the court can fill the legislative void."856 The
court's admonition that the judiciary should "always [remain] mindful that the
beleaguered taxpayer ought not to incur a tax increase beyond that absolutely
essential for effective reorganization" furthaer affirms the promulgation of a
balancing test.8 57 Should the Jenkins IT and Evans precedents be expanded, the
judiciary will need to articulate more clearly the factors to be considered and
weighed in its policy analysis.
The application of a balancing test involves weighing the extent of the harm
caused by the proposed judicially ordered taxation against the benefits derived
from the additional revenues obtained by the judicial taxation. Harms caused by
judicial taxation include the relaxation or possible disregard of comity and
federalism principles. More specifically, remedial taxation may result in judicial
displacement of the existing tax structure, loss of representative government, and
invalidation of neutral, validly enacted state and local laws. The potential
851 See Jenkins II, 855 F.2d at 1312 (citing Mo. REv. STAT. § 164.013 (Supp. 1987)).
852 See Jenkns II, 855 F.2d at 1314.
853 See id. at 1315. In weighing the intrusiveness of the ordered taxation, the court
imposed a "goes too far" balancing test comparable to the test set in motion by Justice Holmes
in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), to determine when an
unconstitutional taking has occurred. The income tax surcharge went too far in invading state
and local processes whereas the additional property taxation in Jenkins "merely remov[ed] the
levy limitation on an existing state or local taxing authority." Jendns, 855 F.2d at 1315.
854 See San Francisco NAACP v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 695 F. Supp. 1033,
1043 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (opining that "[i]n Evans, the Third Circuit balanced the duty of a federal
court to ensure that its remedial decrees are carried out against the right of elected legislators to
set the specific tax rates necessary to raise money").
855 Evans v. Buchanan, 447 F. Supp. 982, 1029 (D. Del. 1978), aft'd, Evans v. Buchanan,
582 F.2d 750 (3d Cir. 1978) (emphasis added).
856 Id. at 1035.
857 Id. at 1029.
2000]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURWAL
weakening of judicial capital caused by public disenchantment with an activist
judiciary performing legislative functions forms another negative factor for the
district court to evaluate in applying a balancing test. Benefits to be derived from
judicially ordered taxation include the degree to which the production of
additional revenues restores the victims of constitutional violations to the position
they would have held absent such violations. The ability to correct the
constitutional violations with tax dollars produces the greatest benefit, but this
accomplishment must be weighed against an assessment of the intrusiveness of
the remedy.
2. Advantages of the Balancing Test
The application of a balancing test causes the judiciary to evaluate both the
benefits and the harms that stem from a decree ordering judicial taxation. The
court's policy analysis through the application of such a test is preferable to
judicial reliance upon narrow rules that do not address the tensions between
federalism principles and the need to remedy the constitutional violations. The
singular focus of these restrictive rules on either the harms or benefits derived
from judicial taxation forecloses a global review. A balancing test should include
consideration of both the extent to which the violation can be remedied by the
additional expenditure of public tax money and the concomitant harms from
judicial oversight or displacement of state executive and legislative functions. The
benefits of this test stem from its comprehensiveness in causing the judiciary to
evaluate the effect of the remedy upon state and local interests as well as its
efficacy in correcting the constitutional violations.
3. Disadvantages of the Balancing Test
The balancing test provides less guidance than Liddell ViTs no alternative
test and Justice Kennedy's sanction of judicial taxation as a last resort to remedy
an abuse of discretion that otherwise would occur by leaving the constitutional
violations unremedied. Both the no alternative test and the last resort test narrow
the circumstances under which judicial taxation can be invoked. A balancing test,
however, can incorporate guidelines by articulating the factors to be balanced.
Generally, the judiciary would weigh whether the contemplated taxation
exceeded existing norms of judicial propriety by unduly disturbing the existing
state and local governmental tax structure, or conversely, whether leaving the
violation less than completely remedied would be deemed egregious. The
application of a balancing test would seem to result in placing greater weight
upon, rather than limiting, the imposition of judicial taxation because the federal
judiciary'repeatedly has stressed the necessity of using its remedial powers to
[Vol. 61:483
JUDICIAL FUNDING AND TAX MANDATES
correct constitutional violations.858
VIII. PROPOSED STANDARDS TO GUIDE THE IMPoSITIoN OF JUDICIALLY
MANDATED TAXATION
Given the Court's historic declarations that the judiciary lacks the power to
tax, most federal courts will remain hesitant to consider remedial taxation.8 59
Because the Court in Jenkins upheld, however, the power of a district court in the
Eighth Circuit to order taxation to implement a school desegregation remedial
plan, future courts may impose taxation when the costs of such a plan are not met.
This Article proposes guidelines to minimize the possibility of judicial taxation,
but acknowledges its possible occurrence should Jenkins remain in effect
A. Proposed Guidelines
(1) At the earliest time possible, the district court should determine whether
fiscal remedies will be needed to correct constitutional violations. If so, after
examining the nature of the violations, the district court:
(a) should specify the governmental institutional deficiencies that need to
be corrected so as to remedy the constitutional violations; and
(b) should defer to the existing tax rate and existing method of taxation to
provide the remedial revenue needed.
(2) If the district court finds that deference to the existing tax rate and
structure is plainly unworkable, it should make repeated attempts to involve the
local taxing body and political community in providing new revenue sources or in
re-allocating existing resources as necessary. Should cooperation fail, the district
court should make findings that:
(a) describe the taxation deficiencies;
(b) determine the amount of additional remedial revenue plainly needed
to remedy the constitutional violations; and
(c) ascertain alternative funding sources.
(3) Prior to ordering remedial taxation, the court should further find that:
(a) alternative funding sources have been sought and repeatedly denied;
and
(b) the deficiencies of the existing tax rate and method of taxation cause
the constitutional violations to be plainly remediless.
858 See Jenkins 11, 855 F.2d at 1313 (citing North Carolina State Bd. of Educ. v. Swam,
402 U.S. 43, 45 (1971) ("The Supreme Court has made it clear that state law limitations cannot
hinder a district court from remedying constitutional violations:"). See supra notes 86-94 and
accompanying text.
859 See La Pierre, supra note 1, at 376; see also supra note 229 and accompanying text.
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(4) Should taxation be ordered, it must be a form of taxation for which state
authorization exists.860
The standards require the district court to ascertain the funding needed to
correct the constitutional violations at the earliest time possible. A demonstrated
need for the fiscal remedies advances political accountability and makes judicial
intervention more plausible.861 This requirement should cause the court to be
cognizant of the fiscal practicalities that will affect the remedial process. Further,
it should deter the court from pursuing remedies that are fiscally unattainable.
Remedial plans cannot be devised without adequately considering their financial
implications. An early examination of the community's fiscal resource base
should assist the court in tailoring remedies to redress the constitutional
violations.
The standards next provide that the district court specify the institutional
deficiencies that resulted in the constitutional violations. By delineating such
deficiencies, the court points out the seriousness of the problem, making
corrective action credible. Further, the standards require deference to the existing
tax rate and funding mechanisms. 862 They contemplate that the district court will
attempt to work within the state's existing fiscal framework to correct the
constitutional violations. Existing precedent supports this deference. 863 In the
sensitive and complex area of taxation, the judiciary should be deferential to
judgments made by elected officials because they are more politically accountable
than appointed federal judges.864 Further, the standards reinforce the necessity for
a court to work with state and local governmental officials to remedy the
constitutional violations.865 Judicially mandated fiscal remedies that ignore local
860 See supra notes 427-34, 766-74 and accompanying text; infra notes 876-80 and
accompanying text (discussing why taxation should not be ordered unless authorized by state
law).
861 See Jackson, supra note 94, at 2241-42.
862 See Jackson, supra note 94, at 2230 (recommending that the Court exercise a high
degree of deference in reviewing Congress's actions that affect the states).
863 See supra notes 814-17 and accompanying text.
864 See Jackson, supra note 94, at 2230 ("A concern for political accountability both
supports judicial review and cautions that it should be highly deferential to the judgments of the
national legislature, which has a greater capacity than the federal courts to behave in a
politically accountable way.").
865 This requirement seeks to involve officeholders in the solution of suits instituted to
increase minority share of limited state and local resources. See BICKEL, supra note 515, at 21
(noting the tendency of judicial review to weaken the democratic processes over time);
MCGOWAN, supra note 85, at 82 (noting the citizenry's desire to seek immediate relieffrom the
judiciary rather than to achieve reform with less speed and efficacy through direct political
action); Diver, supra note 4, at 90 (finding that institutional reform cannot proceed without the
"participation of those whose behavior must be altered"); Jackson, supra note 94, at 2228
(pointing out that federalism is quintessentially political in nature and that workability is its
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conditions or bypass elected officials rarely succeed.866
Should the district court find that its remedial approaches cannot be
implemented under the existing tax structure, it must make detailed findings as to
the taxation and revenue inadequacies and search for alternative funding sources.
These requirements are comparable to the "plain statement" rule that requires
Congress to indicate clearly when it intends to preempt the states from exercising
power.867 In a judicial context, it requires as a condition precedent to a judicial
taxation order, (1) an explicit analysis of the deficiencies of the existing tax rate
and method of taxation that cause the constitutional violations to be plainly
remediless and (2) the exhaustion of all alternative remedies. Although this clear
statement requirement restricts the remedial process, it does not rule out the
possibility of judicial taxation. It is simply a tool that elevates consideration of
federalism interests.868
Second, the standards call for a tighter nexus between the end, adequate
financing to remove the constitutional violations, and the means to accomplish
this goal. The judiciary should not resort to judicial taxation until it has taken the
following action: (1) described the taxation deficiencies, (2) determined the
revenue amount plainly needed to constitutionally correct readily perceived
constitutional violations, and (3) ascertained alternative funding sources.869 This
process further protects federalism values by ensuring that the courts' intrusive
remedial powers restricting state autonomy will not be exercised unless clearly
core).
866 See supra notes 213-18 and accompanying text.
867 See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 470 (1991) (refusing to apply federal
employment mandates to state judges in the absence of statutory language making it clear
Congress had intended the requirements to apply to the states); Lessig, supra note 368, at 207
('It [the clear statement rule] simply requires that when regulating in an area of primarily
intrastate economic activity, Congress make plain the economic effect that it estimates a statute
will have on interstate commerce.").
868 See Jackson, supra note 94, at 2240 (arguing that federalism concerns can be protected
by a "process-based 'clear evidence/clear statement' model designed to require some
evidence.., that Congress acted reasonably in concluding that federal legislation was
'necessary and proper' to the exercise of one or more of its powers"); Lessig, supra note 368, at
207.
Requiring a plain statement rule causes the party subject to the rule (1) to provide evidence
that it acted reasonably in concluding that certain actions were necessary and proper, (2) to be
more thoughtful about the actions contemplated, and (3) to provide opportunities for the parties
subject to the contemplated actions (here, state and local governmental officials) to make their
case for alternative proposals. See Jackson, supra note 94, at 2240-41.
869 Professor Vicki Jackson argues that federal courts should presume that congressional
directives to state legislatures are not "Necessary and Proper" when a goal can be accomplished
by other means. See Jackson, supra note 94, at 2253. This presumption is analogous to the
Court's "no alternative' test in the area of judicially imposed taxation. Professor Jackson
presents the presumption as a replacement to a bright line rule prohibiting legislative
commandeering. See id.
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necessary.870 When the judiciary imposes obligations upon state and local
governments that affect their fundamental governmental functions, such as
taxation, it should make clear the substantive basis upon which the duties rest.871
Hopefully, the judiciary's coercive power to order taxation will be exercised
rarely. The power conceivably may be needed, however, in situations where
governmental entities withdraw fiscal resources needed to correct constitutional
violations, which readily are viewed as egregious in nature. Here, the
constitutional violations are plainly remediless.872 The standards, however, do not
support judicial taxation for which no underlying state authorization exists. 873
Judicially created state tax authorization thrusts the judiciary into a state law-
making role not contemplated by the Constitution and further undermines the
institutional independence of the states by replacing and performing their unique
governmental functions. The Constitution's fiamework, the separation of powers
doctrine,874 the Guarantee Clause, as well as comity and federalism
considerations, all explored in Part V of this Article, contemplate that the
judiciary should restrain itself from exercising legislative powers875
870 See id at 2235-38 (arguing that the Necessary and Proper Clause provides a textual
basis for judicial enforcement of limits upon Congress's exercise of its powers, supporting
judicial examination of whether the means used to carry out Congress's enumerated powers are
necessary and proper); Lessig, supra note 368, at 200-01 (arguing that a tighter fit between
ends and means could be used to interpret the scope of the Necessary and Proper Clause,
thereby limiting the scope of Congress's Commerce Clause power, but fearing that the Court
would be unable to ascertain consistently the degree of tightness required).
871 See Jackson, supra note 94, at 2252-53 (arguing that when a federal statute imposes
duties on state governments in their "governmental capacities," a more substantive form of
judicial review is warranted).
872 See id at 2254-55 (rejecting formalist rule making and arguing that federal
commandeering of the states should be permissible if the need is sufficiently urgent).
873 See id at 2255 (pointing out the need to avoid undue federal interference with unique
state governmental functions and arguing that federal regulation of the states can threaten the
existence of the states as "independent sources and locations of government authority'. But see
La Pierre, supra note 1, at 370-79 (finding an implied judicial power to order taxation
unauthorized by state law).
874 Numerous articles and books have been written about the separation of powers
doctrine. See generally GWYN, supra note 612; Gerhard Casper, An Essay in Separation of
Powers: Some Early Versions and Practices, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 211 (1989); Abner S.
Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era of Presidential Lawmaking, 61 U. CHM. L. REV. 123
(1994); Martin H. Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial
Function, 94 YALE L.J. 71 (1984); Strauss, supra note 637, at 488.
875 &ee GWYN, supra note 612, at 101, 103, 106 (stating that Montesquieu, who first
popularly expounded the separation of legislative, executive, and judicial functions, viewed the
judicial function as the most frightening governmental power); WOOD, supra note 7, at 152
(presenting Montesquieu's view of the necessity to separate judicial power from executive and
legislative power). The function of the legislative power is to declare the general will by maling
laws whereas the judicial power decides criminal and civil cases. See GWYN, supra note 612, at
103, 110. The judicial function involves the power to apply both the statutes enacted by the
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B. No Judicial Taxation Without State Law Authorization
1. Policy Reasons for No Judicial Taxation Without State Law
Authorization andfor Judicial Deference to State Law Taxation Limits
The Court should firmly establish again the rule that federalism postulates
embedded in the Constitution bar court-ordered taxation when state law does not
authorize such taxation by state and local entities. The Court repeatedly followed
this rule prior to Jenkins.876 True, adoption of this principle possibly could leave
some constitutional violations remediless, thus limiting to some degree the federal
legislature and constitutional law. See id. at 125.
While Hamilton argued that judicial review was compatible with the separation of powers
doctrine, France at the time rejected judicial review as violating the doctrine. See Gwyn, supra
note 614, at 65, 72; see also THE FEDERAU sT No. 78, at 467 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961) (stating that "[t]he interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar
province of the courts"); Anderson, supra note 518, at 147 (arguing that judicial review makes
the judiciary, rather than the legislature, the paramount governmental body).
876 See, e.g., United States v. County of Macon, 99 U.S. 582, 591 (1878) (refusing to
order tax levies in excess of the taxation authorized by state law to pay the principal of and
interest on delinquent county bonds); Heine v. Levee Comm'rs, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 655, 660-61
(1873) (refusing to use the Court's equitable powers to order taxation to provide a remedy for
holders of delinquent bonds issued by local levee commissioners); Rees v. City of Watertown,
86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 107, 120-22 (1873) (refusing to satisfy city indebtedness by ordering
remedial taxation in violation of a state law in existence when the debt was incurred); City of
Galena v. Amy, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 705,708-11 (1866) (ordering city to levy taxes authorized by
law to pay debt service on the city's indebtedness, but declining to order remedies not
authorized by law to provide sufficient funds for all creditors).
In Merhvether v. Garrett, 102 U.S. 472 (1880), the Court clearly held that the separation of
powers doctrine bars the federal judiciary from ordering taxation not authorized by state law.
The Court opined:
So long as the law authorizing the tax continues in force, the courts may, by mandamus,
compel the officers empowered to levy it or charged with its collection. to proceed and
perform their duty;, but when the law is gone, and the office of the collector abolished,
there is nothing upon which the courts can act The courts cannot continue in force the
taxes levied, nor levy new taxes for the payment of the debts of the corporation. The
levying of taxes is not ajudicial act. It has no elements of one .... In the distribution of the
powers of government in this country into three departments, the power of taxation falls to
the legislative.... It is the province of the courts to decide causes between parties, and, in
so doing, to construe the Constitution and the statutes of the United States, and of the
several States, and to declare the law, and, when their judgments are rendered, to enforce
them by such remedies as legislation has prescribed, or as are allowed by the established
practice. When they go beyond this, they go outside of their legitimate domain, and
encroach upon the other departments of the government and all will admit that a strict
confinement of each department within its own proper sphere was designed by the
founders of our govenment, and is essential to its successful administration...
Id. at 515.
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judiciary's remedial powers. The judiciary still preserves, however, its remedial
power to order a state or local legislative body to provide a remedy. Furthermore,
federal courts retain an array of very coercive powers to carry out school
desegregation plans. A district court, for example, could order the closing of
public schools unless the state legislature acted to correct constitutional violations,
as the New Jersey Supreme Court did in Robinson v. Cahill.
Taxation, unauthorized by state law, but nonetheless ordered by the federal
judiciary, presents more troubling constitutional issues than does court-ordered
taxation of a state authorized form already imposed by state or local bodies. First,
when a court creates the taxation mechanism, it intrudes far more deeply into a
state's sphere of autonomy. Second, a court's willingness to legislate taxation at
the state and local level undermines the legitimacy of local rules of law because
judicial intervention demonstrates the deficiencies of the state's or locality's
existing legal framework or legislative processes. Such judicial taxation expresses
contempt for state and local voters who failed to provide the legislative authority
that the judiciary finds lacking. Third, a judicial order directed at a local entity to
levy taxes for which no state authority exists violates the venerated maxim that
political subdivisions of a state can exercise only those powers that the state
entrusts in them.87 7 Ignoring the common law structural principles that govern the
exercise of state and local power diminishes their viability, a serious problem that
may not be obvious to scholars and jurists unfamiliar with the rudiments of state
and local government law.878 Further, judicial taxation of the kind upheld in
Jenkins, applicable solely to the KCMSD, grants relief to the plaintiffs in one
school district, but fails to address comparable taxation issues present in other
school districts, thus creating unequal distinctions and privileges among local
governmental units.
Judicial restraint from ordering unauthorized state and local taxation produces
several benefits. First, it prevents the federal judiciary from placing itself in the
position of a state legislative body that creates and enacts legislation. Any judicial
attempt to order taxes unauthorized by law amounts to the creation of law-a
legislative function. Judicial taxation not authorized by state law nullifies
representative governmental action and imposes taxation without representation.
Such taxation sharply departs from the Court's traditional posture that federalism
and comity considerations bar it from interfering with a matter as sensitive and
877 See Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 177-78 (1907) (upholding a state's
absolute discretion to establish the number, nature, and duration of powers its municipal
corporations may hold and considering this principle to be among the Court's settled doctrines
"to be acted upon whenever they are applicable"); City of Cleveland v. United States, I11 F.
341,343 (6th Cir. 1901) (holding that mandamus will not lie to compel a mayor and council to
levy taxes not authorized by law to satisfy a judgment against the city for improvements made
by the relator).
87 8 See supra notes 431-34 and accompanying text.
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complex as a state's taxation system.879 By refusing to become enmeshed in the
administration and creation of state tax revenue, the Court honors the principles of
federalism, comity, and separation of powers, three strong underlying precepts of
the constitutional framework.
This self-imposed limitation further preserves respect for the judiciary and
promotes judicial independence by ensuring judicial restraint from the exercise of
legislative power. The majority of state courts, when faced with the need to
generate taxation revenues to correct state constitutional violations, adhere to this
form of institutional control.880 Third, by eschewing unauthorized remedial
taxation, the judiciary must more actively seek the involvement of state and local
officials in finding the revenue sources to fund the remedial plan. Courts should
encourage local and state officials to initiate remedial action within their sphere of
authority. When elected officials participate in devising remedial implementation
plans, the citizenry's voice in their selection should ensure greater acceptance of
the imposed remedies.
2. Precedent Supports No Judicial Taxation Without State Law
Authorization and Judicial Deference to State Law Taxation Limits
Missouri v. Jenkins has become synonymous with court-ordered taxation, but
its primary precedential impact lies not in an order to tax, but in an order to
impose taxation unauthorized by state law. The taxation ordered in Jenkins
exceeded the state constitution's taxation cap.881 Although federal courts
frequently state that their remedial powers are not limited by state law,882 Jenkins
remains unique among the school desegregation cases in upholding the district
court's taxation order for which no underlying state authorization existed.883
879 See Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 103, 105, 107,
115-17(1981).
880 See supra notes 488-90 and accompanying text.
881 The district court ordered the KCMSD to increase its property tax levy from $2.05 to
$4.00 per $100 of assessed valuation. See Jenkins v. Missouri, 672 F. Supp. 400,412-13 (W.D.
Mo. 1987). The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld this levy increase. See Jenkins v.
Missouri (Jenkins IR), 855 F.2d 1295, 1313 (8th Cir. 1988) (holding that state law limitations
may be set aside to remedy constitutional violations). The tax levy violated provisions of the
Missouri Constitution that require a two-thirds vote of the voters for a levy higher than $3.25
per $100 of assessed valuation. See MO. CONST. art. X, §§ 11 (a)-(c); see also Missouri v.
Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 56-58 (1990) (upholding the power of federal courts to set aside state
imposed limitations upon taxation).
882 See, e.g., North Carolina State Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43, 45 (1971); Griffin
v. County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218,233 (1964); United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 902 F.2d
213,219 (2d Cir. 1990); United States v. Missouri, 515 F.2d 1365, 1372 (8th Cir. 1975); Haney
v. County Bd. of Educ., 429 F.2d 364,368 (8th Cir. 1970).
883 This Article takes the view that the KCMSD lacked state authorization to undertake
the tax levy rollback in violation of Proposition C, first ordered by the district court, as well as
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Courts often rephrase or repeat the broad language in North Carolina State
Board of Education v. Swann endorsing the imposition of remedial measures in
violation of state policy.884 This reiteration gives the appearance of widespread
support for such a proposition when in fact federal courts, with the exception of
those in the Eighth Circuit, have been loath to override neutral state law
limitations. Even the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals vacates district court orders
that violate state law while continuing to state in dicta that the federal judiciary
possesses the power to set state laws aside.885
Although federal courts frequently cite the Eighth Circuit dicta in Haney v.
County Board of Education to the effect that state law limitations place no
restraint upon the federal judiciary's remedial powers,886 an examination of the
the later property tax levies, ordered by the district court without voter approval, that exceeded
the tax levy limits established by the Missouri Constitution. See supra notes 298-302, 332-34,
427-30, 766-67, 881 and accompanying text; see also Warner, supra note 1, at 1026-27, for
the novel argument that the majority opinion in Jenkins may be interpreted as based upon the
implication that the KCMSD possessed taxation powers once the district court ordered the
removal of the state law limitations. This argument proceeds from the notion that limitations on
the school district's taxation powers may be severed from the grant of tax power. See id. But see
Brocker, supra note 1, at 758-59 (arguing that it was not possible for the district court in
Jenkins to enjoin the state law limiting the KCMSD's power to levy a property tax without also
enjoining the grant of power that authorized the tax because the state law provision
"inextricably coupled the grant and limitation of the power to tax").
884 See, e.g., Yonkers, 902 F.2d at 216, 219 (denying intervention to parties whose
interests were found adequately represented in a proceeding in which the district court had
ordered that park land be rededicated for use as a public school site and stating in dicta that a
federal district court may order the suspension of state law to remedy constitutional violations);
Missouri, 515 F.2d at 1372 (quoting North Carolina State Board of Education v. Swann's
statement that a state imposed limitation "must give way when it operates to hinder vindication
of federal constitutional guarantees").
885 See generally Liddell v. Missouri (Liddell VII), 731 F.2d 1294 (8th Cir. 1984);
Missouri, 515 F.2d 1365; Haney, 429 F.2d 364.
8 86 Federal courts frequently quote the statement in Haney that "[t]he remedial power of
the federal courts under the Fourteenth Amendment is not limited by state law." See Haney, 429
F.2d at 36. See also, e.g., Liddell MI, 731 F2d at 1321; Hoots v. Pennsylvania, 672 F.2d 1124,
1131-32 (3d Cir. 1982) (quoting Haney and stating that although the district court modeled its
order to conform with Pennsylvania statutory provisions, the statute was not binding on the
district court); Missouri, 515 F.2d at 1372; Taylor v. Coahoma County Sch. Dist, 330 F. Supp.
174, 183 (ND. Miss. 1970); see also Bradley v. School Bd., 338 F. Supp. 67, 108 (ED. Va.
1972) in which the court stated the following:
Appellees' assertion that the District Court for the District of Aikansas is bound to adhere
to Aikcansas law, unless the state law violates some provision of the Constitution, is not
constitutionally sound where the operation of the state law in question fails to provide the
constitutional guarantee of a non-racial unitary school system. The remedial power of the
federal courts under the Fourteenth Amendment is not limited by state law.
Id. at 108.
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facts in Haney reveals that the federal judiciary made every attempt to comply
with state law while exercising its remedial powers. The plaintiffs, in a school
desegregation case, proposed to create a new unitary school district by
consolidating two school districts. Instead, the court ordered the annexation of
one school district by the other, apparently on the basis that state law required the
annexation of all school districts lacking an "A" rating by June 1, 1979.887 The
plaintiffs argued that the district court erred in its assumption that it was bound by
Arkansas law.888 The Eighth Circuit agreed with the plaintiffs that the district
court was not bound by Arkansas law in overseeing the implementation of a
school desegregation plan,889 but it found that the district court did not err "in
ordering the larger more populous former white school district to annex the
smaller less populous former black school district if that annexation [did] in fact
accomplish a unitary nonracial school system."890 The Eighth Circuit then
887 See Haney, 429 F2d at 367-68.
888 See id. at 368.
889 See id.
890 See id. at 369. In Bradley v. School Board, the district court interpreted Haney as
follows:
In Haney, the merger of state school districts, as a form of possible remedy, was
approved despite that it might in certain respects require the violation of state statutes
whose constitutionality was not questioned. A single district judge decided that case, and
appeal was taken to the court of appeals, where no jurisdictional question was raised.
Such orders as were approved in Haney are not such as can only be entered by a
three-judge court for the reason that no one is thereby ordered to disobey a state law on
account of its unconstitutionality. The question of the law's validity never arises; its
disregard is directed as a matter of remedy alone, in order to undo the effects of proved
unconstitutionally discriminatory acts. A single judge can enter such an order.
Bradley, 324 F. Supp. 396,400-01 (E.D. Va. 1971).
In Jenkins v. Township of Morris School District, the Supreme Court of New Jersey
discussed Haney as follows:
In Haney v. County Board of Education of Sevier County, Ark., the court of appeals flatly
rejected a district court's notion that consolidation to eliminate segregation in the public
schools may not be achieved without the voter approval contemplated by state law. In the
course of his opinion, Judge Lay noted that 'state political subdivisions have long ago lost
their mastery over the more desired effect of protecting the equal rights of all citizens'; he
pointed out that political subdivisions of the state are 'mere lines of convenience for
exercising divided governmental responsibilities' and 'cannot serve to deny federal rights';
he stressed that equal protection rights do not depend on the votes of the majority, and in
response to those who still persist in their opposition to integration, he had this to say:
Separatism of either white or black children in public schools fluives only
upon continued mistrust of one race by another. It reflects a continuum of the
fallacious 'separate but equal' doctrine, which the law now acknowledges
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proceeded to modify the district court's order regarding the composition of the
new school district board in order to follow the governance structure established
by Arkansas law.89
1
Likewise, in Liddell VD, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals prodded the
district court to exercise restraint before setting aside state law limitations. The
district court had entered an order that authorized and directed the St. Louis Board
of Education not to reduce its operating levy as required by Proposition C.892 The
district court thus overrode a tax cutting measure, as in Jendins. On appeal, the
Eighth Circuit struck down the district court's order to ignore Proposition C
because the district court made no factual finding that "all other fiscal alternatives
were unavailable or insufficient"8 93 In addition, the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that state law could not be bypassed without an evidentiary hearing
providing factual findings that (1) the district court determined both the short and
the long-term monetary amount required to fund the desegregation order and
assessed the school district's ability to fund the order with its own resources, (2)
the district court considered alternative resources, such as submissions to voter
referenda or new state legislative authorizations to impose other taxes, if the
school district lacked adequate resources to fund the desegregation order, and (3)
the voters or the state legislature failed to authorize new funding sources.894
In United States v. Missouri, a decision cited in Liddell Vff,89 the Eighth
Circuit also refused to uphold a district court order that overrode a tax cap. The
serves only as a sleeping sickness, whether it be engendered by the white or
black. Separatism is just as offensive to the law when fostered by the Negro
community as when the white community encourages it Perpetuation of a
bi-racial school system moves only toward further intolerances and
misunderstandings. The law can never afford to bend in this direction again.
The Constitution of the United States recognizes that every individual, white or
black, is considered equal before the law.
Jenkins v. Township of Morris School District, 279 A2d 619, 628 (NJ. 1971) (emphasis in the
original) (citations omitted).
891 In lieu of retaining existing board members from the two school districts, as the district
court had ordered, the Court of Appeals instructed the district court to order a popular election
to obtain district-wide voter participation in the election of a new board for the newly created
district since Arkansas law called for elected school boards exercising general governmental
powers. See Haney, 429 F.2d at 369.
892 See MO. REV. STAT. § 164.013 (Supp. 1999) (Proposition C) (requiring school districts
to reduce property taxes in an amount equal to 50% of the previous year's sales tax receipts in
the district). See Liddell v. Board of Educ., 567 F. Supp. 1037, 1056 (E.D. Mo. 1983) (ordering
the board of education not to reduce its operating levy as required by Proposition C). The court
ordered that the revenue retained by noncompliance with Proposition C's roll back be used to
fund the desegregation remedial plan. See id.
893 Liddell v. Board of Educ. (Liddell VII), 731 F.2d 1294, 1323 (8th Cir. 1984).
894 See id. at 1323.
895 See id at 1320.
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district court ordered the annexation of two school districts to a third school
district It then ordered the establishment of a uniform school tax rate throughout
the new district fixed at a maximum rate exceeding the rate in effect in all three
of the districts at issue.896 The district court found no reasonable possibility
existed that the requisite number of voters would approve the taxation rate the
court deemed necessary to fund the desegregation plan.897 Two of the school
districts attacked the imposition of a tax levy without the popular vote Missouri's
Constitution required.898 On appeal, the Eighth Circuit while affirming its broad
remedial powers, reversed the district court's tax rate ruling. Seeking to comply
with state law, the Eighth Circuit held that the tax rate should be set at the
maximum rate of the annexing district 8 99 The appellate court opinion referred to
several Missouri Attorney General opinions concluding that "when one school
district annexes another, the voter-approved levy of the annexing district applie[s]
to the annexed territory."90 0 So even the Eighth Circuit with the exception of its
aberrational decision in Jenkins, did not set aside fiscal state law limitations, albeit
proclaiming its power to do so in the event it found insufficient remedial funding
for a school desegregation plan under existing state law.
3. Jenkins Not Viewed as Precedential Support to Override State Law
Limitations
Several federal courts have chosen a rather confined reading of the impact
that Jenkins should have on overriding state law limitations relating to taxation. In
Berry v. Alameda Board of Supervisors,901 indigent plaintiffs attacked a state
constitutional limitation on real property taxation, commonly known as
'Proposition 13," claiming it violated their due process and equal protection rights
because it limited the amount of medical benefits to which they were entitled
under California statutes. Finding no violation of clearly defined federal
constitutional rights, the district court declined to apply Jenkins.902 In fact the
896 See United States v. Missouri, 515 F.2d 1365, 1371 (8th Cir. 1975).
897 See id. at 1371-72.
898 See id. at 1372.
8 9 9 See id at 1373.
900 Id. at 1373 n.8.
901 753 F. Supp. 1508 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
902 See id at 1512-14. The California statutes and the Fourteenth Amendment did not
preclude all disparities in grants of welfare benefits. See id. Further, the court suggested that the
remedial process found necessary to remedy school desegregation plans might not be
appropriate to remedy other constitutional violations, stating that "school desegregation cases
pose unique settings for the application of equitable principles." Id. at 1513. Beny thus suggests
that overriding state tax limits for federal court remedial purposes should have limited
applicability except in the implementation of school desegregation remedies. See id. at 1513-
14.
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district court referred to the principle of comity, a reference rarely found in school
desegregation opinions, as a restraint upon the exercise of jurisdiction over the
plaintiffs' claims.903
In Little Rock School District v. Pulaski County Special School District,
which was reversed later on other grounds, the district court opined that Jenkins
sanctioned a judicial taxation order only when the locality ordered to tax
possessed some authority to tax.904 The district court explicitly stated that Jenkins
could not be read to authorize court-ordered taxation by a locality without taxing
authority under state law.905
CONCLUSION
The struggle to remedy racial discrimination has taken many twists and turns
since the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Brown I in 1954. Public
opposition to busing caused the courts, beginning in the 1970s, to employ
incentives, such as the creation of quality improvement programs and magnet
schools, to further integration in the nation's public schools. The courts' remedial
goals focused on providing higher quality education and achieving greater racial
balance in schools with substantial minority enrollments due to residential
segregation. The United States Supreme Court's approval, in Milliken Hf, of these
court-ordered, quality-educational remedial measures, involving intrusive judicial
oversight, ushered in an era of expanded judicial power to reform state and local
educational programs and facilities.
The large cost of implementing Milliken H-type remedies broadened the
scope of the federal judiciary's fiscal remedial power. When local resources
proved deficient to meet the expense of the desegregation remedial plans, the
courts turned to the states' budgets for added financial support. The highly
publicized Jenkins v. Missouri school desegregation litigation in Kansas City,
Missouri illustrates this expansion of the federal judiciary's equitable powers to
reallocate state and local resources. Rather than rely upon existing funding levels,
District Court Judge Russell G. Clark went one step further-he ordered school
district taxation and set aside Missouri's legally created and generally applicable
limitations upon tax levy amounts to augment the district's fiscal resources.
9 03 See id. at 1515. The district court cited Fair Assessment in Real Estate Association v.
MeNary as precedent for the exercise of equitable restraint in suits challenging the
constitutionality of state tax laws. See Berry, 753 F. Supp. at 1514-15; see also Colonial
Pipeline Co. v. Collins, 921 F.2d 1237, 1243 (1lth Cir. 1991) (noting the policy of equitable
restraint derived from principles of cornity and construing Jenkins as precedent for "only a
circumscribed power to interfere with a state's taxation system in order to remedy constitutional
violations").
904 See 778 F. Supp. 1013, 1018 (E.D. Ark 1991), rev'don other grounds, 971 F.2d 160
(8th Cir. 1992). For a discussion of Little Rock, see supra notes 831-41 and accompanying text.
9 05 See id
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In its 1990 Jenkins decision, the United States Supreme Court upheld the
district court's taxation orders and removal of state law limitations impeding such
taxation. The Court only stipulated that once ordered, the taxation should be
undertaken by the local school district, not by the district court itself. Judicial
assumption of taxation powers clashes with the Court's more recent
pronouncements in Alden v. Maine, Printz v. United States, and New York v.
United States that confirm the existence of outer limits derived from the
Constitution's federal structure upon Congress's Commerce Clause power. In
these rulings, the Court railed against congressional commandeering of the states
to implement federal regulatory programs and stressed the need to maintain the
balance imposed by the Constitution's structure of shared power between the
states and federal government Surely, the Court must believe that postulates
derived from the Constitution's federalist structure bear upon the judiciary as well
as upon Congress and the President.
The widespread fiscal remedial power upheld in Jenlns violates the
Constitution's structure of vertical and horizontal powers. The Constitution does
not vest the power of taxation in the judiciary, instead, this power is lodged in the
legislative branch. Judicial taxation further defies notions of comity and
federalism, well established by the Court's precedent, that caution against overly
intrusive remedial measures in the sensitive areas of state-federal relations. The
Court's rulings consistently stress the necessity to treat the administration of a
state's taxation system with respect because taxation constitutes a core state
function essential to the states' separate existence. This Article further argues that
Jenkins's approval of judicial taxation violates the Constitution's Guarantee
Clause by undermining the Constitution's guarantee of state republican rule, a
form of government that derives its powers from the people. When the unelected
federal judiciary orders state or local taxation, unauthorized by the state
legislature, the citizenry is deprived of representation by their elected officials.
Taxation and the allocation of fiscal resources are among the fundamental
governmental powers that reside in the people's elected representatives-a
principle inviolate since the framing of the Constitution.
In Jenkins, the Court did acknowledge that a tax increase ordered by a federal
court constitutes an extraordinary remedy and should be imposed only after the
district court determines that permissible alternatives are not available to
effectuate the remedial plan. This Article criticizes the "no alternative" test as
difficult to apply because it invites disagreement about the practicality and
availability of alternative methods to fund a court-ordered remedial plan
underway. After the formulation of a plan, alternative financing mechanisms that
produce less revenue than originally contemplated by the court's orders
undermine the judiciary's credibility and upset plaintiffs' expectations.
At the outset of school desegregation or institutional reform litigation, the
district court should carefully examine the financial impact of the remedial plan as
well as the steps deemed necessary to correct the constitutional violations. The
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scope of the plan should be achievable within ordinary, not extraordinary, state
fiscal conditions. When a district court's remedial plan substantially implicates
the public treasury, the court should consider the local and state interests affected
by the plan as well as the violated constitutional rights. The district court should
follow the balancing test established in Milliken HIthat calls for a consideration of
state and local interests in the remedial process as well as an examination of the
nature and extent of the constitutional violation and the need to remedy the
constitutional violation to the extent possible.
A standard calling for a more stringent series of findings prior to the issuance
of any tax orders should replace the unworkable no alternative test. Judicial
taxation should be imposed only in the most extreme of circumstances-when
alternative funding sources have been repeatedly denied and the taxation
deficiencies cause the constitutional violations to be plainly remediless. Because
court-ordered taxation unauthorized by state law deeply intrudes upon state
autonomy and transforms the judiciary into a state legislature, the Court should
refrain from it.
